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Abstract: Despite several decades of criticism, dichotomous thinking about behavioral development (the view that the behavioral
phenotype can be partitioned into inherited and acquired components) remains widespread and influential. This is particularly true
in study of birdsong development, where it has become increasingly common to diagnose songs, elements of songs, or precursors of
songs (song templates) as either innate or learned on the basis of isolation-rearing experiments. The theory of sensory templates has
encouraged both the dichotomous approach (by providing a role for genetic blueprints to guide song learning) and an emphasis on
structural rather than functional aspects of song development. As a result, potentially important lines of investigation have been
overlooked and the interpretation of existing data is often flawed. Evidence for a genetic origin of behavioral differences is frequently
interpreted as evidence for the genetic determination of behavioral characters. The technique of isolation rearing remains the
methodology of choice for many investigators, despite the fact that it offers only a rather crude analysis of the contribution of
experience to song development and provides no information at all about genetic contributions to development. The latter could in
principle be elucidated by the application of developmental-genetic techniques, but it is unlikely that these can easily be applied to
the study of birdsong. Because developmental questions are so often posed in terms of the learned—innate dichotomy, "experience"
istaken to be synonymous with "learning" and the possible role of nonobvious contributions to song development has largely been
ignored. An alternative approach, based on Daniel Lehrman's interactionist theory of development, permits a more thorough
appreciation of the problems that have yet to be addressed, and provides a more secure conceptual foundation for theories of song
development.
Keywords: behavior genetics; birdsong; development; early experience; innateness; interactionism; isolation rearing; learning;
nature/nurture; sensory template; song learning
I. Introduction
In the introduction to a recent review of the birdsong
literature, Konishi (1985) wrote:
The study of birdsong has made significant contribu-
tions to the development of modern ethology. Con-
cepts such as species-specificity in animal signals, in-
nate predispositions in learning, and sensory templates
for motor development were put forth first in birdsong
research. . . . Also, it was the study of song develop-
ment that elevated the much debated issue of instinct
versus learning from the realm of semantic discourse
and confusion to an experimentally tractable subject.
(p. 125)
No one who is familar with the research literature on
Birdsong could argue with the first part of this quotation.
The study of song has been an important focus of research
on animal behavior for many years — it is a fascinating and
theoretically productive field that has produced some
important insights, not only for ethologists, but also for
workers in many other areas of the behavioral sciences.
The second part of Konishi's statement, however, is
more questionable. Research on song development has
certainly produced a wealth of data on such problems as
specificity of song learning, sensitive periods, social ver-
sus sensory influences, species differences in learning
mechanisms, and the neural bases of learning. But de-
spite the many important contributions that it has made,
much of this work is marred by an unfortunate adherence
to a theoretical viewpoint that is widely regarded as
inadequate to the analysis of behavioral development. As
a result, theories of song development rest on shaky
conceptual foundations and the interpretation of many
experimental data remains theoretically suspect. The
study of song development is still deeply influenced by
both explicit and implicit allegiance to an outmoded view
of behavioral development that seeks to attribute ele-
ments of behavior separately to one of two sources:
genetic information and environmental information. It is,
of course, commonly supposed that such dichotomous
thinking has been eradicated from the study of develop-
ment, and that the frequent use of phrases such as innate
behavior, genetic determination, and hard-wired behav-
ior patterns is to be understood only as a linguistic
convenience. I have argued elsewhere (Johnston 1987)
that this is not at all true. The assimilation of interactionist
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template (Kroodsma 1984; Marler & Pickert 1984; Marler
& Sherman 1983; 1985). Most of this recent research has
posed the same question as the earlier work of Marler and
Konishi: How much of this structure is innate and how
much is learned? My argument here is that posing that
question has resulted in serious conceptual inadequacies
in the literature on song development. Before discussing
the problems inherent in such an approach and offering
some suggestions for a more productive alternative, let
me show that the issue of innate-versus-acquired aspects
of song structure is, and always has been, a central topic in
research on song development.
C. Distinguishing innate and acquired components of
song and the song template
The idea that song development can be understood by
distinguishing innate from acquired songs (or elements of
songs) is surprisingly widespread in the literature and has
been for the past 20 or more years. Most often, conclu-
sions about innateness are reached on the basis of experi-
ments involving isolation rearing (the deprivation experi-
ment urged by Lorenz 1965; see further below), but
cross-fostering (rearing of young by adults of another
species) and tutoring with nonconspecific songs have also
been widely used techniques. From these experiments,
four general groups of conclusions have been reached
about the innate and learned contributions to song
development.
1. Song as a whole is either Innate or learned. When
isolation rearing and cross-fostering failed to change the
vocal behavior of doves (Streptopelia spp.), Lade and
Thorpe (1964) concluded that "the songs of doves must be
considered to be genetically encoded in some way" (p.
366). Thorpe (1964) considered isolation rearing to be
especially valuable for the study of song development
because it permits us to study "the way in which be-
haviour patterns of great complexity are genetically
coded and controlled" (p. 155). Twenty years later,
Kroodsma (1984) reared flycatchers in isolation and, find-
ing no differences between the songs of wild and isolated
birds, concluded that: "Songs of the alder flycatcher
(Empidonax alnorum) and willow flycatcher (Empidonax
traillii) are innate" (p. 13; the quoted sentence is the title
of Kroodsma's article).
Differences among species in the "degree of in-
nateness" of song have been widely recognized. Marler
(1967) compared song development in several species of
sparrows, "some of which display the transmission of
vocal behavior by tradition [i.e., learning] while others
have the apparently more common method of direct
genetic transmission" (pp. 231-32). Kroodsma and Pick-
ert (1984b) pointed out that "the songs of some sub-
oscines are innate. . . . in sharp contrast to the oscines,
where vocal learning is the rule" (p. 395). Finally, Marler
and Sherman (1985) compared song development in isola-
tion-reared swamp and song sparrows (Melospiza geor-
giana and M. melodia) and concluded that "genotypic
control over gross song structure is less rigid in the swamp
sparrow than in the song sparrow" (p. 69).
2. Elements of song are either innate or learned. In his
classic defense of the learned—innate dichotomy, Lorenz
(1965) proposed that even when whole patterns of behav-
ior (such as song) cannot be diagnosed as either learned or
innate, it will always be possible to distinguish learned
from innate elements of the behavior. Lorenz's position
(the so-called intercalation of learned and innate behav-
ior) is widely represented in the study of song develop-
ment. Rowley and Chapman (1986) introduce a study of
the effects of cross-fostering on several patterns of behav-
ior in cockatoos (Cacatua spp.) by forcefully restating
Lorenz's view: "Since behaviour is part innate and part
learned it is important to recognize those aspects of
behaviour that have been transmitted genetically and
those which have been acquired through the individual's
experience of life" (p. 1). That recognition, they suggest,
can be accomplished by the technique of cross-fostering,
which "can help identify whether an element of be-
haviour is innate or learned" (p. 12). Cross-fostered
young "often show certain species-specific behaviour
patterns which must be innate as they could not have
been learnt from their behaviourally alien foster-parents"
(p. 13).
Guttinger  (1979; 1981; Guttinger et al. 1978) has stud-
ied song development in several finch species and their
hybrids and writes that his primary aim is to understand
"how a genetically determined program controls species-
specific behaviour activities which also contains [sic]
learnt patterns" (Guttinger 1979, p. 286). Marler (1963),
citing Poulson's (1954) study of song development in the
linnet (Carduelis cannabina), noted that "pitch and tim-
bre [of the song] seemed to be innate, but the rhythm and
melody were not" (p. 237). When Lemon and Scott (1966)
reared cardinals (Richmondena cardinalis) in isolation,
they found different effects on two syllable types and
concluded that "unlike the complex syllables, simple
syllables may have some innate basis since they develop
in isolated birds" (p. 196; cf. Dittus & Lemon 1969, p.
530).
The distinction between learned and innate elements
has generally been made on the basis of isolation rearing,
but similarities in song structure between birds with
different (even though unknown) rearing histories may
also be attributed to innate influences. Marler and Pick-
ert (1984) described a number of similarities in songs from
widely separated populations of the swamp sparrow and
on that basis concluded that the species has "an innate
repertoire of note types, with a species-specific mor-
phology that is genetically controlled" (p. 686). (Several
conceptual errors involved in taking such similarities in
behavior to imply genetic determination are discussed in
section IV, below.)
3.Birds have innate songs that can be modified by learn-
ing. Reports in the older literature sometimes concluded
that some birds have an innate song, but that this song can
be modified or elaborated by learning. That conclusion
was usually based on the finding that isolation-reared
birds sing a song that is similar to, but less complex than,
the song of wild birds. Thus Thorpe (1964) distinguished
the "innate," or "primary," song of buntings (Emberiza
spp.) from elaborations of this song produced by imita-
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tion, and Marler (1963) noted that "some of the birds with
an inherited song nevertheless modify it by learning in
nature" (p. 234). This formulation is less common now
than it was, although the song of birds reared in auditory
isolation is still sometimes referred to as "innate song"
(for example, by Marler & Sherman 1983).
4. The template or blueprint for song development may be
innate or learned. Often, learned and innate contribu-
tions to song development are discussed in terms of the
sensory template or blueprint, rather than the song itself.
In the chapter that first introduced the template concept,
Marler (1963) wrote: "The two most obvious ways in
which such [genetic] control could operate are either by
an inherited pattern of motor input to the sound produc-
ing organs, or by an inherited auditory 'template' to
which the animal would match the sounds produced, as a
result of hearing its own voice" (p. 233). The same
distinction was also made, in almost identical language,
by Marler and Sherman (1983, p. 517). Kroodsma (1985)
found that isolated eastern phoebes (Sayornis phoebe)
develop the same two song types as do wild birds and
concluded from this that the species has an "innate song
template" (p. 27). Searcy and Marler (1987) played the
song of isolation-reared male song sparrows (Melospiza
melodia) to wild males and females and found a stronger
response than to the song of deafened birds. They in-
terpreted these results as "further evidence for innate
auditory templates" (p. 509) that must involve "genet-
ically programmed specifications" for song (p. 517).
Shiovitz (1975), discussing the role of learning in song
recognition by the indigo bunting (Passerina cyanea),
noted that birds must learn species-specific song and
suggested that "learning can be restricted to conspecific
figures [i.e., syllables] if an innate species-specific
cue . . . is present" in the song (p. 169). Dooling and
Searcy (1980) measured the cardiac response of young
swamp sparrows to conspecific and heterospecific song
and interpreted their results as evidence "for innate
perceptual biases as a basis for selective learning" (p.
505). Indeed, almost every mention of selective vocal
learning assumes some kind of "innate perceptual bias,"
so closely have the two ideas become linked.
Some authors have discussed differences among spe-
cies in the degree of genetic specification of song by the
song template. Konishi (1978b) pointed out that "the
extent to which the innate template can guide normal
song development varies from species to species" (pp.
297-98). In their study of song development in the marsh
wren (Cistothorus palustris), Kroodsma and Pickert
(1984b) remark that selectivity in song learning is made
possible by the innate song template, but they point out
that in species with large repertoires (like the wren)
"genetic encoding of all the information necessary to
restrict learning to conspecific song models would be-
come increasingly difficult" (p. 395).
Clearly, the attempt to recognize innate elements of
song, or to distinguish between innate and learned contri-
butions to song development, is a prominent component
of current research in the area. The preceding examples,
taken from publications spanning almost 25 years and
written by many different authors working on a wide
range of species, show that the learned-innate distinction
is not just characteristic of a few individuals working on
the fringes of the area, but pervades the thinking of some
of the most productive and influential researchers on song
development.
Ill. Sources of information in behavioral
development: The learned-innate controversy
In the review paper cited earlier, Konishi (1985) re-
marked that "it was the study of song development that
elevated the much debated issue of instinct versus learn-
ing from the realm of semantic discourse and confusion to
an experimentally tractable subject" (p. 125). And yet it
was precisely the distinction between innate and ac-
quired components of behavior that provided the source
of the confusion to which Konishi refers and that, as we
have just seen, still characterizes much of the research in
song development. How much "elevation," then, has
actually been achieved by the study of song develop-
ment? The answer to that question must be "very little,"
and the unfortunate consequence is that serious concep-
tual inadequancies about behavioral development con-
tinue to be propagated by the very discipline that is
perhaps best equipped to dispel them.
Although debate over the issue of learned and inher-
ited contributions to behavior has a very long history
(see Oppenheim 1982), the debate between Konrad
Lorenz and Daniel Lehrman during the period from
1953 to 1970 served to bring the issues involved into
sharp focus for behavioral biologists. That debate in-
volved a number of points of disagreement, the most
important of which was how one should understand the
problem of analyzing the development of behavior. In
articulating his influential theory of instinct during the
1930s and 1940s, Lorenz (1935; 1937) had argued that
behavior could be divided into the two categories of
learned and innate. Learned behavior, according to
Lorenz, depends on the animal's experience, and its
development can be attributed to the environment of
rearing; innate behavior depends on the animal's genetic
inheritance and can be attributed to the activity of its
genes. For Lorenz, the two categories are both exclusive
and exhaustive: All behavior can be unambiguously as-
signed to one or the other category, provided that the
correct descriptive units are used. In order to determine
whether a particular unit of behavior is learned or in-
nate, Lorenz proposed to use the technique of depriva-
tion rearing. If an animal is reared from birth or hatching
without the opportunity to learn the behavior in ques-
tion, and still the behavior develops normally, then it is
innate. If the behavior does not develop normally, then
it is learned.
In his well-known critique of Lorenz's theory of in-
stinct, Lehrman (1953) argued that the learned-innate
dichotomy was entirely inadequate to the task of analyz-
ing the development of behavior. He pointed out that
attributing behavior to the genes simple avoids the prob-
lem of explaining its development, since the genes clearly
do not contain the behavior itself. Furthermore, he
argued, the deprivation experiment does not eliminate
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appropriate and inappropriate interpretations of data on
the origin of differences in behavior.
Does all of this mean that differences in behavior are of
no interest or relevance to the study of behavioral devel-
opment? Clearly, that cannot be the case. The demon-
stration of differences between experimental and control
groups is the foundation on which the analysis of behav-
ioral development must rest. The problem is that com-
paring the songs of, say, swamp and song sparrows reared
under identical conditions (Marler & Sherman 1983;
1985) cannot reveal any of the detail that we need in order
to understand how genes contribute to development. The
conclusions that can be drawn from such an experiment
are precisely parallel to those that could be drawn from a
hypothetical experiment that described behavioral dif-
ferences between genetically similar animals reared in
different environments, in the absence of any information
about what environmental differences were involved. We
would know that the environment affected the develop-
ment of the behavior under study (although we could
hardly have been in any doubt about that to begin with)
but would be at a complete loss as to how the environ-
ment produced the observed effect. Only by specifying
the environmental factors that differentiated the groups,
the times during development when those differences
were in effect, and all the other things that go into
specifying the independent variables in a selective rear-
ing experiment could we hope to make any developmen-
tal sense out of the results.
The same requirements apply to studies of the genetic
contribution to behavioral development. Unless we can
specify what genetic differences obtain between two
groups of animals, we cannot possibly give a developmen-
tal interpretation to any behavioral differences that we
find. In the case of different species, the genetic dif-
ferences that exist are likely to be so large (or, at any rate,
so unspecifiable) as to prevent even a small degree of
precision in explicating the genetic contributions to de-
velopment. The use of species differences in the study of
behavioral epigenetics (Marler & Sherman 1985) limits
our conclusions to the unhelpful platitude that "genes
affect behavior." Only by systematic and precise manip-
ulation of genetic structure and activity, for example by
the careful use of single-gene mutants and genetic
chimeras (Stent 1981), can any useful substance be add-
ed. Techniques such as these, of course, belong in the
province of geneticists and developmental biologists, not
of ethologists and other students of animal behavior. That
is not to say that ethologists cannot apply those tech-
niques to the study of behavioral development, but,
when they do, their activities will look much more like
developmental genetics than ethology. However, until
very much more is known about the genetics of songbird
species, and mutations affecting song development are
identified and isolated on constant genetic backgrounds,
the application of those techniques to elucidating the
genetic contribution to song development will be
impossible.
V. Basis for an interactionist approach to the
study of song development
If the innate—learned dichotomy is not an acceptable
basis for the analysis of behavioral development, what
then? The alternative approach is to follow the lead of
Lehrman (1953; 1970) and others (Bateson 1987; Gottlieb
1976 ; 1983; Kuo 1922; 1924; Lerner 1978; Oyama 1982;
1985; Schneirla 1966; see Johnston 1987) and consider all
behavior to arise in development from interactions within
and between the organism and its environment. How
would such a view influence the experimental analysis of
song development, and what new insights might it pro-
vide? This section briefly describes the interactionist
approach to development, with special reference to the
development of birdsong. Later sections of the paper
consider more specifically how the interactionist ap-
proach both alters our interpretation of current experi-
mental results and suggests new experiments.
Two misinterpretations of interactionist writings have
contributed to the rather limited impact of these ideas,
despite the lip service that is often paid to the insights that
they provide. First, although Lehrman (1953), in perhaps
the most influential statement of the interactionist posi-
tion, said clearly that development involves an interac-
tion between the organism and its environment, the
interaction in question is often taken to be between the
organism's genes and its environment (e.g., Fox 1970).
Because the environment of the genes and the environ-
ment of the organism are quite different, the meaning of
the term interaction in this formulation is elusive. It is not
clear what kind of behavioral research follows from ac-
cepting the interpretation that development involves a
"gene—environment interaction," beyond a recognition
of the obvious and entirely uncontroversial point that
genes and environment both contribute to the develop-
ment of behavior.
The second misinterpretation follows directly from the
first: If development is (erroneously) interpreted as a
gene—environment interaction, then a research meth-
odology (Lehrman's selective rearing experiment) that
does not directly examine genetic contributions to devel-
opment will inevitably be seen as reflecting an extreme
environmentalist bias in which the genes are denied any
role in development. Thus those who think, correctly,
that something must be said about genetic contributions
to development are drawn to the old dichotomous posi-
tion, which seems to provide more scope for talking about
genetic involvement in development. Unfortunately, the
conceptual inadequacies inherent in the old view inevita-
bly result in the attribution of some aspects of the phe-
notype (either behavior itself or some precursor of behav-
ior, such as a template) directly to the genes. A better
approach might be to attempt a rearticulation of the
interactionist view to accommodate the need to acknowl-
edge the genetic contribution to development more ex-
plicitly. Such an acknowledgment is in fact made ex-
plicitly by proponents of the interactionist view, such as
Lehrman (1953; 1970), Schneirla (1966), Gottlieb (1976),
Bateson (1987), and others, and has recently been dis-
cussed at length by Oyama (1985). It is sufficiently un-
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familiar, however, that a further restatement may be
worthwhile.
It is helpful at this point to recall Lehrman's original
formulation of the interactionist view of development:
"The problem of development is the problem of the
development of new structures and activity patterns from
the resolution of the interaction of existing structures and
patterns, within the organism and its internal environ-
ment, and between the organism and its external environ-
ment" (Lehrman 1953, p. 345; emphasis added). The
elements that participate in these interactions make up a
"developmental ecosystem" (Johnston 1982) or "develop-
mental niche" (Werner & Gilliam 1984; West & King
1987) within which species-typical behavior develops;
they include gene products, hormones, patterns of neural
activity, nutrients, anatomical structures (both neural
and nonneural), physical variables (such as temperature,
salinity, pH, and gravity), self-produced stimulation,
sensory experience, social interactions, and a host of
other potential contributors to the development of the
organism. Some of these elements (such as anatomical
structures) depend on previous developmental interac-
tions for their characteristics and all the elements may
undergo extensive changes throughout the course of
development. The interactionist view is that no aspect of
the phenotype can be attributed to one of these elements
- all aspects of the phenotype depend on interactions
among many of them, and the purpose of a developmental
analysis is to determine which elements interact in what
ways to give rise to particular aspects of the phenotype.
Typically, this is done by selectively manipulating one or
a few elements and observing the effects of these manip-
ulations on development. Elements in the external
postnatal environment are the most accessible, and
Lehrman's original argument was largely based on ana-
lyzing the contribution of environmental factors to behav-
ioral development. Even 35 years later, the external
postnatal environment continues to receive the greatest
amount of attention, but the roles of prenatal factors
(DeCasper & Fifer 1980; DeCasper & Spence 1986;
Gottlieb 1971; 1981; Vince 1979), self-stimulation (Gott-
lieb 1981; Wallman 1979), diet (Castro & Rudy 1987;
Ottinger & Tanabae 1969), and hormones (Whitsett &
Vandenbergh 1978) have also been investigated.
Genetic manipulations are particularly difficult to
achieve with any degree of precision — it is not possible,
for example, to prevent a specific gene from being tran-
scribed during a specific period of development in a
 specific organ or tissue. The external environment can, of
course, be manipulated in that way and a very large
experimental literature (including that on song develop-
ment) testifies to the important effects of environmental
influences on behavioral development. However, the
interactionist approach lends itself just as readily to ac-
counting for genetic contributions to development as it
 does to accounting for environmental ones. In some
species, such as mice, crickets, and fruit flies, wide ranges
of single-gene mutations have been described, many of
them with potent effects on the behavioral phenotype
(e.g., Bentley 1975; Konopka 1979; Quinn & Greenspan
1984; Rothenbuhler 1967; Sidman et al. 1965). These
mutations, especially when combined with techniques
for forming genetic mosaics, provide one means of inves-
tigating genetic influences on development, as reviewed
by Stent (1981). Unfortunately, the finding that a single-
gene mutation affects some behavior may be presented as
evidence that the behavior in question is genetically
specified, or developmentally controlled by the genes. As
Stent suggests, single-gene mutations should be seen as
tools that may be used to uncover the ways in which genes
influence behavior in the course of development, not as
evidence for "genetic control."
The interactionist approach thus accommodates the
role of genetic influences as well as that of experience.
The manipulations it proposes (such as Lehrman's selec-
tive rearing experiment, or the technically very demand-
ing experiments on gene action described by Stent)
involve altering one or more putative influences on devel-
opment, whether environmental or genetic, and deter-
mining the behavioral effects of those manipulations.
What it resists is any attempt to attribute any aspects of
the behavioral phenotype directly to particular influ-
ences, such as environmental information, genetic pro-
grams, and the like. The concern of ethologists with
specifying the genetic contributions to development is
entirely appropriate, but the interactionist approach ac-
commodates such contributions just as it does those of
experience. In the case of birdsong, the problem at
present is more a practical than a conceptual one: We
simply do not have the means to manipulate genetic
activity in song birds with the degree of precision needed
to say anything very useful about genetic contributions to
song development. Until it becomes possible to induce
single-gene mutations that affect song development and
begin to trace the action of the genes involved, our
knowledge of genetic contributions to song development
must remain virtually nil. Of course we must bear the
genetic contribution in mind, but we can do that and still
reject claims that the genes must be found to specify some
aspects of the phenotype, such as a blueprint for song
learning or some aspects of the structure of a song
template. As was pointed out long ago (Kuo 1922;
Lehrman 1953), such claims merely obscure the develop-
mental work that is being left undone, and they do so in
two ways: They deflect attention from the possibility that
forms of experience other than learning contribute to
song development (see section VI, below); and they make
it unlikely that the tools of.genetic analysis will ever be
applied to the task of elucidating genetic contributions to
song development because of the mistaken assumption
that this contribution can be revealed by the relatively
simple technique of isolation rearing.
Given that technical limitations currently preclude the
kinds of experimental manipulations that would permit
the direct investigation of genetic contributions to song
development, what specific contributions might the in-
teractionist approach make to research in this area? Much
current research on song development is limited in the
two respects discussed at the beginning of this paper.
First, by subscribing to a dichotomous view of develop-
ment, researchers have ignored the potential contribu-
tion of experiential influences that are not obvious
sources of information for song development. Second, by
focusing largely on the structural aspects of song, they
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may overlook important functional components of song
development. Once these two limitations are recognized,
some largely unexplored lines of experimental investiga-
tion become apparent that might provide important in-
sights into the development of song. The next two sec-
tions sketch out these research directions.
VI. Nonobvious experiential contributions to
song development: Beyond song learning
Because most studies of song development have adopted
a dichotomous approach, they have sought experiential
contributions to development that appear, prima facie, to
be "informative" to the nestling, following Lorenz's
(1965) distinction between genetic and environmental
"sources of information" for development (Johnston
1987). The most obvious such contribution is hearing the
song itself, and so the role of imitation, or modeling, of
song has been a primary focus of research. The interac-
tionist approach rejects Lorenz's sources-of-information
metaphor (Johnston 1987) and takes a different view of
experiential contributions to song development. In par-
ticular, it emphasizes the role of nonobvious factors in
development.
One of Lehrman's (1953) original criticisms of the
learned—innate dichotomy was that it grants experiential
status only to the most obvious kinds of experience:
observation, imitation, trial-and-error learning, and so
forth. Lehrman pointed out that this approach leaves
unanalyzed a wide range of possible effects of experience
that do not bear such an obvious relationship to the
behavior under study, a point also made earlier by Kuo
(1922). An example of such nonobvious experiential con-
tributions to behavioral development is provided by
Gottlieb's (1981) studies of the perceptual specificity of
ducklings' responses to the maternal call of their species.
In two species (the mallard, Anas platyrhynchos, and the
wood duck, Aix sponsa) Gottlieb has shown that auditory
experience with the calls of embryos or hatchlings is
necessary for the usual specificity of response to the
maternal call to develop (Gottlieb 1980a; 1980b; 1984).
Another example comes from Wallman's (1979) study of
the development of young chicks' response to meal-
worms. Chicks with normal visual experience readily
peck at and eat mealworms, but chicks that have been
denied the opportunity to see their own toes (which had
been either covered or painted) for the first 2 days after
hatching do not.
Clearly, there are a number of nonobvious sources of
experience available to developing songbirds, but their
possible role in song development has largely been over-
looked, with one exception, namely, the effects of social
context on the process of song learning. Quite early in the
study of song development, Immelmann (1969) showed
that zebra finch (Taeniopygia guttata) nestlings will learn
songs sung by a heterospecific foster father in preference
to tape-recorded conspecific songs, suggesting that social
bonds might play an important role in song learning in
that species. Similar results have more recently been
obtained by Baptista and Petrinovich (1984; 1986; Pe-
trinovich & Baptista 1987), who found that white-
crowned sparrows, previously thought to be capable of
learning only conspecific song (Marler 1970a), can also
learn heterospecific song if it is sung by a live song tutor.
Live tutoring also seems to extend the sensitive period for
song learning (Petrinovich & Baptista 1987), and these
results suggest an interesting developmental interaction
between song learning and the social context in which
that learning occurs (see Payne 1981; Pepperberg 1985).
Another example of the importance of social factors in
song development comes from the studies of West and
King (1985a; West et al. 1981a) on the cowbird (Mo-
lothrus ater), a nest parasite. In that species, the imita-
tion of song models does not appear to play an important
role in the development of song. Instead, social interac-
tions among males are necessary for the normal develop-
ment of species-typical song structure and function (West
& King 1980; West et al. 1979), and interactions between
males and females underlie the development of popula-
tion-typical song dialects (King & West 1983; 1987; King
et al. 1980).
All these studies indicate the potential importance of
experience other than hearing song itself for the normal
development of song, and they suggest that it may be
worthwhile to consider other nonobvious contributions to
song development as well. Such contributions might
include the following:
i. Self-produced calls both prenatally and postnatally
ii. Calls of siblings both prenatally and postnatally
iii. Calls (not song) of parents and other conspecifics
iv. Nonvocal social stimulation from siblings
v. Nonvocal social stimulation from parents
vi. Conspecific song heard prenatally or in early
postnatal life
In some birds and mammals, prenatal and early
postnatal auditory experience is known to play an impor-
tant role in the development of behavior (DeCasper &
Spence 1986; Gottlieb 1971; Vince 1979). The auditory
system of songbirds may be less well developed at hatch-
ing than is that of precocial birds, but Khayutin (1985) has
shown a remarkably specific auditory sensitivity to con-
specific calls in nestlings of several altricial species (the
pied flycatcher, Ficedula hypoleuca; the great tit, Pam
major; and the redstart, Phoenicurus phoenicurus) at
least as young as 2 days old, using auditory evoked
potentials to calls and other stimuli. Some of Kayutin's
data suggest that auditory sensitivity to calls may be
present prenatally, even in these altricial species (Khayu-
tin 1985, p. 126).
Although song learning (in the sense of imitation of
song themes or syllables) is unlikely to occur so early in
life, such very early auditory sensitivity may well make a
less obvious contribution to song development. The se-
lectivity of song learning discussed earlier in connection
with the notion of a blueprint for learning might have its
origins in very early experience (including prenatal expe-
rience) with conspecific calls, either those of parents or of
self and siblings. Several studies have reported consider-
able vocal activity in young nestlings of many species
(e. g. , Howes-Jones 1984; Muller & Smith 1978; Thomp-
son & Rice 1970; Wilkinson 1980), suggesting the rela-
tively rich environment of species-typical sounds experi-
enced from very early in life. Such calls are not prima
facie "informative," in the sense used by Lorenz (1965)
and criticized elsewhere (Johnston 1987), but they are
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part of the developmental niche (Johnston 1982; West &
King 1987) of the young bird and their contribution to
song development cannot be excluded a priori. In partic-
ular, they may provide experience that is sufficiently
species-specific to attune the young bird to some acoustic
features of conspecific song and thus provide the basis for
selective vocal learning later in life.
In some early discussions of the song template (e.g.,
Mader 1970a; Nottebohm 1968) it was pointed out that
the developmental origins of this hypothetical structure
were unknown, and the suggestion was made that very
early auditory experience might play a role in its develop-
ment. The importance of early experience (other than
song) has been emphasized only very occasionally in the
more recent literature (for example, by Lanyon 1979),
however, and the tendency to consider as innate any
abilities that do not depend on song learning has become
widespread, as documented in an earlier section. When
subjects in song-learning experiments are taken from the
wild as 5- to 10-day-old nestlings, as is common, the role
of early auditory experience in their development cannot
be ruled out. When birds are hand-reared from the egg,
greater control over their early experience is obtained,
but systematic comparison of results from hand-reared
and wild-reared birds is made virtually impossible by the
very wide variation both in the species studied and in
other aspects of experimental methodology (see
Kroodsma, 1977, for a discussion of similar concerns).
From the interactionist perspective, the role of early
auditory experience other than song in song develop-
ment remains unspecified.
The role in song development of nonvocal social in-
teractions, either between nestlings and parents or
among siblings, also merits consideration. Work on the
cowbird discussed above (West et al. 1981a) has shown
that, in this species, social interactions other than hearing
song play the most important role in song development.
Even where imitation of song plays a preeminent role, as
in the white-crowned sparrow and the zebra finch, social
factors may also be important (Baptista & Petrinovich
1984; 1986; Immelmann 1969). Studies of zebra and
Bengalese finches have revealed that species differences
in interactions within broods are important to the normal
development of sexual preferences (Kruijt et al. 1983; ten
Cate 1982; 1984; 1985). If species-typical social interac-
tions are part of the developmental niche within which
normal song development occurs, they may provide part
of the experience on which that development normally
depends, a point also raised in passing by Konishi (1964).
VII. Functional outcomes of song development
Because the concept of the song template is so
thoroughly imbued with structural associations, its im-
portance in the study of birdsong has encouraged an
emphasis on the structural aspects of song development.
According to the template theory, a young bird starting
to sing matches the structure of its song against the
structure specified by the template and adjusts its output
accordingly (section IIA, above). During the earlier (nes-
tling) stage of song development, the template may act
as a blueprint for learning, permitting the identification
of conspecific songs on the basis of their structural fea-
tures. This structural emphasis is reflected in the ap-
proach generally used to assess the effects of interfering
with song development, which is to examine sound spec-
trograms of experimental song and compare them (either
visually or statistically) with spectrograms of the song of
wild-reared or control birds. In most cases, this is done
without reference to two important questions: (1) What
are the functionally significant aspects of song structure
in the species under study? and (2) How has experimen-
tal rearing affected the efficacy of song as a signal for
social communication?
Functional issues in the study of birdsong have, of
course, long been a focus of research interest. The de-
scription of learned song dialects in many species (Baker
& Cunningham 1985) has raised questions about the
evolutionary consequences of song learning, but those
questions have not directly addressed the developmental
origins of song function in the individual. It has been
known for years that different structural features of song
carry information about species (Becker 1982) and indi-
vidual (Beer 1970) identity; the song features that carry
different kinds of information vary widely among species.
Playback studies have shown that although some features
of the song can be manipulated without interfering with
its signal function, others must be left intact if the song is
to remain effective as a territorial display, courtship
signal, or signal for individual recognition. For example,
Emlen (1972) found that altering the syntactic arrange-
ment of notes in the song of the indigo bunting (Passerina
cynaea) did not reduce its effectiveness in species recog-
nition, but that altering the intervals between notes or
changing the acoustic structure of individual notes in the
song did interfere with its communicative function. In
other species, different features of the song are important
for the communication of species distinctiveness (see
Becker 1982, for a review).
It is apparent from functional analyses of birdsong that
abnormalities in certain structural features of a song may
have more important functional consequences than ab-
normalities in others. An important set of developmental
questions that has been largely overlooked by the struc-
tural emphasis encouraged by the template theory con-
cerns how various kinds of rearing experience contribute
to the functional development of song in different spe-
cies. A number of such questions might be posed, includ-
ing the following.
1. Are the structurally normal songs of tutored, laborato-
ry-reared birds also functionally normal? Many studies
have shown that when young birds are exposed to tape
recordings of their species-typical song, they develop
songs as adults that are structurally similar (as assessed by
spectrographic comparisons) to the songs of wild-reared
birds. In fact, tape-tutored birds are generally used as a
control group in studies of song development. West's
results show that important functional differences exist
between the structurally very similar songs of socially
reared and isolation-reared cowbirds, suggesting that the
same may be true in other species as well. In that context,
it may be worth recalling that tape tutoring and social
tutoring (which is closer to the normal situation in which
song develops) affect song learning in the white-crowned
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sparrow in very different ways (Baptista & Petrinovich
1984; 1986; Petrinovich & Baptista 1987). Socially tutored
birds can learn heterospecific songs that tape-tutored
birds cannot; they can also learn songs outside the sen-
sitive period for song learning shown by tape-tutored
birds (Baptista & Petrinovich 1984; Marler 1970a). Since
social tutoring is apparently a more potent form of song
experience than tape tutoring, might it also produce a
functionally more effective song? If so, we would be
forced to conclude that the presence of a social tutor
makes some nonobvious functional contribution to song
development that should be investigated.
2. To what extent does isolation rearing result in the
development of song that is nonfunctional? The isolate
song of many species is structurally very impoverished,
lacking most of the species-typical organization of notes,
syllables, and song themes. It might be thought that such
disorganized song would be completely nonfunctional,
and playback of isolate song from a very small number of
individuals in one or two species (Shiovitz 1975; Lanyon
1979) has tended to confirm that impression. However,
Searcy et al. (1985) found that territorial male swamp and
song sparrows both responded more to the isolate song of
conspecifics than to the normal song of heterospecifics,
suggesting that at least some functional specificity devel-
ops despite isolation rearing. Nonetheless, both species
also responded more to normal than to isolate songs of
their own species, indicating the importance of song
experience to the development of functionally normal
song. The results of this study are especially interesting
because they confirm that song-sparrow song does not
develop normally in isolation, as previously thought
(Mulligan 1966). Kroodsma (1977) showed that the song of
isolation-reared song sparrows differs structurally from
normal song, and the data of Searcy et al. (1985) provide a
functional confirmation of Kroodsma's analysis. Some-
what different results were obtained in another species by
Spitler-Nabors and Baker (1987), who found that female
white-crowned sparrows do not distinguish between the
isolate song of their own and another species. The dif-
ference between the two species may indicate different
functional effects of isolation rearing in Melospiza and in
Zonotrichia, or it may be due to the different response
measures used in the two experiments (territorial re-
sponse in the case of Melospiza, courtship displays in the
case of Zonotrichia; but see Searcy & Marler 1987).
An interesting counterpoint to these studies of isolate
song in sparrows is provided by West and King's (1980;
1985a) studies of song development in the cowbird (see
also section VI, above). Cowbirds are nest parasites
whose song development was long thought to be quite
independent of early song experience (Mayr 1974;
Lehrman 1974), as might be expected in a species whose
young do not have the opportunity to hear conspecific
song during early life. The song of the male cowbird
(females do not sing) functions primarily as a courtship
signal and its functional analysis has been greatly facili-
tated by the fact that females respond to the song by
adopting a stereotyped copulatory posture (West et al.
1979). The response provides a bioassay for the potency of
male song — the more potent (i.e. , functionally effective)
the song, the greater the proportion of females that will
respond with the copulatory posture. Females respond as
readily to song playback as to the presence of a live male,
permitting functional assessment of the song alone, un-
contaminated by other aspects of the courting male's
behavior. If male cowbirds are reared in social isolation,
their courtship song is more potent than the songs of
socially reared or wild-caught males (King & West 1977;
West et al. 1979; West & King 1980). Acoustic analyses of
normal and isolate song, coupled with playbacks of song
recordings that had been altered in various ways, re-
vealed that the critical difference between the normal and
isolate songs was in the relative amplitude of the in-
terphrase unit (IPU), a brief burst of sound that occurs
near the middle of the song (West et al. 1979). In isolate
males, the amplitude of the IPU is large in relation to the
introductory phrase, and it is this increased relative
amplitude that is responsible for the greater potency of
isolate song.
Apart from the studies just discussed, little attention
has been paid to the functional consequences of isolation
rearing for song development. The widespread tendency
in the Birdsong literature to categorize songs or song
elements as either learned or innate has strongly encour-
aged the interpretation that a seriously disordered song
indicates the adaptive necessity of song learning, without
which (it is presumed) functional song will not develop.
To the extent that isolate song is functionally effective
(Searcy et al. 1985; Searcy & Marler 1987) or structurally
normal (Kroodsma 1984; Marler & Sherman 1985), this is
often said to indicate the existence of "genetically spec-
ified song structure. " Both the developmental origins of
song structure in isolated birds and the degree to which
that structure is functionally effective need to be ad-
dressed more carefully in the study of song development.
It should be noted that isolation rearing is only one
experi nental technique that might be used to investigate
the functional aspects of song development and, like
other versions of the deprivation experiment, it is se-
riously limited in the information it can provide. Because
the conceptual orientation in the study of song develop-
ment has involved attempts to partition the song into
learned and innate elements (following the logic of
Lorenz's deprivation rearing), there has been little or no
motivation to devise other rearing techniques that would
give more precise information about the contributions of
experience to song development. Although functional
analyses of the effects of isolation rearing would be wel-
come, the interactionist view suggests a different and
more selective analysis, such as might be provided by the
following question.
3. Does exposure to functionally significant features of
song play an especially critical role in song develop-
ment? Gottlieb's (1981) studies of auditory perceptual
development in ducklings were mentioned earlier in
connection with possible nonobvious contributions of
experience to song development. In those studies, nor-
mal perceptual development has been shown to be es-
pecially dependent on exposure to the critical acoustic
features that underlie species-typical perceptual sen-
sitivity in later life. In mallard ducklings (Anas
platyrhynchos), the normal preference for the maternal
call depends mainly on the repetition rate of notes in the
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call — calls pulsed at the normal rate of 4 notes/sec are
preferred over either slowed (2 notes/sec) or quickened (6
notes/sec) calls. The development of this preference
depends on prenatal exposure to the embryonic call,
which, to be effective, must also be pulsed at its normal
rate of about 4 notes/sec — exposure to either faster or
slower rates has no effect on perceptual development
(Gottlieb 1980a). In the wood duck (Aix sponsa) similar
findings have been reported. In this species, frequency
modulation (FM) of the notes in the call is the critical
acoustic feature for species recognition and hatchlings
must be exposed to sibling calls that have the appropriate
FM. Stimulation with artificially altered FMs is not
effective (Gottlieb 1980b).
Although Gottlieb's experiments concern the develop-
ment of perceptual specificity, and most work on bird-
song has concerned song production, his findings raise
the intriguing possibility that normal song development
might be especially dependent on exposure to the func-
tionally significant features of song for that species. As
discussed earlier (section IIB), several studies have
shown that, in some species, conspecific song is more
readily learned than heterospecific song. Indeed, selec-
tive learning of song was one of the primary contributions
to the development of template theory in birdsong re-
search (Marler 1976). However, little attention has been
paid to the acoustic features of conspecific song that make
it more easy to learn than heterospecific song. A func-
tional perspective on song development provides
grounds for suggesting that nestlings may be especially
sensitive to the functionally important acoustic features of
song and will only, or preferentially, learn songs that
include those features. Studies of song learning in two
species of sparrow support that suggestion.
The songs of adult song and swamp sparrows differ in
both the structure of notes and syllables and the temporal
organization of syllables into phrases and songs. By play-
ing back normal and altered recordings of song to ter-
ritorial male swamp and song sparrows, Peters et al.
(1980) showed that syllable morphology, but not temporal
organization, is important for species recognition in the
swamp sparrow; both syllable morphology and temporal
organization are important in the song sparrow. Accord-
ing to the hypothesis outlined above, selective vocal
learning in the swamp sparrow should depend on syllable
morphology and not on temporal organization, whereas
learning in the song sparrow should depend on both these
acoustic features. Studies of both species confirm that
prediction. Using artificially constructed tape recordings,
Marler and Peters (1977) found that young male swamp
sparrows will learn song consisting of conspecific (swamp-
sparrow) syllables, even if they are organized into pat-
terns characteristic of heterospecific (song-sparrow) song.
They will not learn song-sparrow syllables, regardless of
their temporal organization. Song sparrows also preferen-
tially learn song consisting of conspecific (song-sparrow)
syllables, but they will learn heterospecific (swamp-spar-
row) syllables if they are organized into temporal patterns
characteristic of conspecific song (Marler & Peters 1988).
The interaction between syllable morphology and tem-
poral organization for song learning in the song sparrow is
complex. For example, repetition of a heterospecific
syllable (in the "trill" phrase of a two-part song) seems to
increase the likelihood that the syllable will be learned,
but not if the song consists solely of repetitions of the
syllable in the absence of other song phrases (Marler &
Peters 1988). The overall impression gained from the
studies of these two species confirms the hypothesis that
acoustic features of song that are functionally important
during adulthood also play an important role during early
learning of song. The hypothesis could be further tested
with other species in which functionally important song
features have been identified (Becker 1982; Peters et al.
1980).
An interesting correspondence between functionally
significant song features and preferential song learning
has been demonstrated in the Carolina wren (Thryo-
thorus ludovicianus) by Morton et al. (1986). As is the
case in other avian species (Morton 1975), the structure of
Carolina wren song is well adapted for transmission
through the habitat in which the species lives. Indeed,
wren populations sing songs that seem to be specifically
adapted to the transmission requirements of local en-
vironments (Gish & Morton 1981). Morton et al. (1986)
found that young wrens will learn to sing undegraded
conspecific songs in preference to the same songs that
have been artificially degraded to simulate the effects of
transmission through vegetation. Their study suggests
that preferential song learning in the Carolina wren
depends on precisely those features of the song that
permit it to function as a long-distance acoustic signal.
VIII. Conclusion
The study of birdsong development has been, and will
remain, an important and influential research focus in
behavioral biology. However, as long as so many of its
practitioners continue to embrace the untenable view
that elements of behavior can be attributed separately to
genetic and environmental sources of information, its
influence will not be a progressive one. By continuing the
search for learned and innate elements or precursors of
song, many students of song development are keeping
alive an invidious distinction that should have been laid to
rest decades ago. In fact, it is repeated with monotonous
regularity in textbooks and review articles that the
learned—innate distinction is a relic of the past and that
there is no longer any need to point out its inadequacies
and misleading implications. Unhappily, that is not so, for
the distinction continues to motivate and inform this large
and influential body of research literature (and see John-
ston 1987). As a result, not only is the dichotomous view
of development perpetuated, but potentially important
avenues of research on song development are obscured
(sections VI and VII, above). Contrary to Konishi's (1985)
claim, the study of song development has not made the
issue of learned versus innate behavior into "an experi-
mentally tractable subject" — it has only served to per-
petuate the confusion to which that distinction gives rise.
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NOTE
1. It is entirely possible that some of the "innate differences"
described in Experiment I and some of the "acquired dif-
ferences" described in Experiment II would be exactly the
same. Changes in environment can sometimes have the same
phenotypic effects as certain changes in genotype, a finding that
has given rise to the concepts of phenocopy in genetics and
ecophenotype in ecology and evolution. Phenocopies and eco-
phenotypes are often construed as environmental copies or
imitations of phenotypes that are normally genetically deter-
mined, another illustration of the tendency to categorize phe-
notypes as being either genetically or environmentally deter-
mined (Oyama 1981).
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Singing down a blind alley
John Alcock
Department of Zoology, Arizona State University, Tempe, Ariz. 85287
Timothy Johnston advances two major claims in his attempt to
breathe new life into the old Lorenz—Lehrman argument. The
first is that many students of birdsong are still confused about
the interdependence of genes and environment in behavioral
development. The second is that the failure to adopt Lehrman's
"interactionist theory of development" has had serious and
damaging consequences for the study of birdsong. I am not
persuaded on either count.
At the heart of Johnston's argument is a deep antipathy
toward such words as "innate" and - instinct." He apparently
feels that researchers who use these words believe that behavior
can be "genetically determined" in the sense of developing
without any environmental input. There is no doubt that some
birdsong researchers really do use the I-words, but are they so
naive as not to realize the interactive nature of development? I
think not.
Konishi's (1985) review, which Johnston cites at the outset as a
key example of a paper based on dichotomous thinking, contains
an explicit discussion (p. 135) of what "innate" means to bird-
song researchers. An innate song or an innate song template is a
distinctive song or specific neural substrate for song production
that reliably develops in the absence of certain acoustical experi-
ential inputs, namely, exposure to conspecific song and (for
some researchers) exposure to auditory feedback from self-
produced songs. There is no debate that in some species these
acoustical experiences have large effects on adult song, but in
others they have little or no effect. The results of isolation
experiments are to some degree dichotomous. Either listening
to conspecific song has a developmental effect or it does not. To
label one category learned and the other innate acknowledges
the reality of these results and in no way implies acceptance of
the proposition that innate behavior is "genetically determined"
whereas learned behavior is not.
Furthermore, the general use of "innate" as a synonym for
"developmentally resilient" or "developmentally buffered
against certain kinds of experience" performs a useful service
that is not advanced by interactionist lingo. Lehrman's interac-
tionist hypothesis is that the development of a behavior pattern
is dependent on an overwhelmingly complex interaction be-
tween genes and environment and between the products of
preceding gene—environment interactions in the developing
organism and its internal and external environment. Doesn't
this imply that development will be affected by a nearly infinite
range of interactive influences? If this were true, there should
be immense variation in the outcomes of developmental pro-
cesses within species, given that all individuals inevitably expe-
rience different environments and possess different genes. But
despite their unique interactive developmental histories, song
sparrows almost always sing song-sparrow songs, and even when
reared in acoustical isolation from their fellows, they sing songs
that exhibit distinctive elements of the fundamental song-spar-
row pattern. This is an intriguing result, and it suggests that not
all developmental outcomes are equally probable and not every
potential experiential influence on development has equal
impact.
I will go further. Lehrman's interactionist theory of develop-
ment has been available for researchers to use for 25 years, and
there have been and continue to be ardent advocates of its
conceptual validity. Why then have there been so few produc-
tive research applications of the theory? Is it simply the slavish
adherence of biologists to dichotomous thinking? Or could it be
that the "theory" is so general and vague that it fails to generate
useful testable hypotheses? After having criticized previous
studies in the light of interactionist theory, Johnston's research
suggestions strike me as decidedly nonrevolutionary. He con-
cludes that it would be a good idea to check for additional subtle
experiential influences on the development of birdsong. No one
will stand in the way of researchers interested in these
"nonobviousco tributions to song development," but Johnstond e
not specify how this avenue of research will overturn or even
substantially modify the current view of birdsong development
as presented in Konishi's review.
Johnston also claims that the dichotomous view of birdsong
development has taken attention away from the functional
analysis of birdsong. This claim is based on a failure to discrimi-
nate between proximate and ultimate causation in biology.
Johnston complains that researchers who experimentally inves-
tigate the development of birdsong focus "on the form of adult
song, rather than on its function," as if one type of study
necessarily precluded the other. Studying the effects of certain
kinds of experience on the developing form of birdsong qualifies
as proximate research, an exploration into the mechanisms
within individuals that underlie the behavior of interest. No one
suggests that this work cannot or should not be informed by an
understanding of functional/evolutionary questions, but ques-
tions of proximate mechanism and ultimate function deal with
separate aspects of a trait and complement rather than compete
with one another.
The interactionist "theory" of behavioral development uses a
proximate level of analysis and therefore cannot be inherently
more evolutionary or functional than alternative proximate
approaches to the development of birdying . To study questions
of function, one uses various evolutionary approaches that are
entirely different from those used to answer proximate ques-
tions. Studies of birdsong development not conducted under
the aegis of interactionist theory have revealed many differences
between species and many special features of the process of song
acquisition. Some of these characteristics have been analyzed
from a functional perspective; others (some identified by John-
ston) remain to be explored. But to suggest that previous
proximate studies of birdsong have impeded research on the
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functional significance of birdsong is to misread the goals of
proximate and ultimate studies of behavior.
The study of the ontogeny of birdsong is far from complete,
but a great deal has been learned about the process by re-
searchers who include - innate" in their vocabulary. I am skep-
tical that abolishing the word and replacing it with a different
terminology will yield major new research approaches to the
fascinating problem of birdsong development.
Birdsong and the "problem" of nature and
nurture: Endless chirping about inadequate
evidence or merely singing the blues about
inevitable biases in, and limitations of,
human inference?
Marc Bekoff
Department of Environmental, Population, and Organismic Biology,
University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo. 80309-0334
Johnston's target article, in which he slides smoothly from a
consideration of the ontogeny of birdsong to development in
general, strikes me as being timely and provocative; provocative
both in addressing important issues and also in being a bit too ad
hominem for my taste. Having been greatly influenced by
Daniel Lehrman, it is a shame that Johnston did not take to heart
Lehrman's (1970, p. 46) admonition that personal attacks should
not be part of intellectual discussions among people who dis-
agree. His "I'm right and you're wrong" attitude often conveyed
by unnecessary "pedantic posturing" (Gould 1988) and data-
jamming (Bekoff 1981; 1988) is not only counterproductive and
unfair but also premature. It is probable that it will always be
premature to advocate exclusively one or another position be-
cause of the impossibility of demonstrating that the develop-
ment of all behavior in diverse species will be explainable by a
single theory. Furthermore, when humans study nonhumans,
they inevitably incompletely understand them and their in-
ferences cannot be perfect (Byers & Bekoff 1986). Thus, the best
way to proceed is to put forth alternative hypotheses and then
test each one systematically (Bateson 1978; Hacking 1965; Mil-
ler 1987; Murray 1986; Platt 1964; Quinn & Dunham 1983) to
present as "strong inference" as possible (Platt 1964).
Although I believe that there never will be strong or perhaps
even weak agreement among "dichotomists," "interactionists,"
those that take middle ground, or among scientists interested in
the development of behavior in general (Oyama 1988a; 1988b;
Plomin 1988a; 1988b), lively debates are healthy and inevitable.
Like the continued controversy over sociobiology (Kitcher 1985;
1987 — which is not totally unrelated to the present essay), it is in
the interest of the disputants to keep the debates alive (Seger-
strale 1986). The discussions do not necessarily continue be-
cause of a failure to communicate, but rather because people are
people and like to cling to ideas that are dear to them (Loehle
1987).
Now, what about the evidence supporting a single theory of
development? Kitcher's (1985) book Vaulting ambition: So-
ciobiology and the quest for human nature (see also Kitcher
1987) stresses that the major question that one needs to consider
in a critical evaluation of a field is "How good is the evidence?"
Of course, people disagree in their judgments of what is "good
evidence." The question of evidence is critical to Johnston's
argument. He argues (with respect to birdsong but it is certainly
applicable to other areas) that "potentially important lines of
investigation have been overlooked and the interpretation of
existing data is often flawed." He also summarily dismisses the
techniques of isolation rearing. Now, how objective is he being?
If important lines of investigation have been overlooked, is it not
premature to conclude that a single explanation of available data
is absolutely correct? And, even if the interpretation of some
available data is incorrect, is it still not possible that future
investigations will result in the accumulation of data that sup-
port earlier "incorrect" explanations of previously poor evi-
dence? At the moment, I just do not see why the "dichotomous"
way of looking at things constitutes "reliance on an outdated and
inadequate view of development."
Johnston also writes that "if the innate—learned dichotomy is
not an acceptable basis for the analysis of behavioral develop-
ment, what then?" Note now that "birdsong" becomes trans-
lated to "development in general." He suggests that we adopt
the interactionists' perspective "and consider all [my emphasis]
behavior to arise in development from interactions within and
between the organism and its environment." Elementary con-
sideration of Karl Popper's (1959) and others' writings tells us
that we cannot know something about all of anything, but that
we can know that not all of anything is possible.
Another area that Johnston considers concerns "units of
selection." He discusses alternative views in which supposed
interactions occur between "genes and the environment" or
between "organisms and the environment," preferring the
latter because it is easier to fit in with his point of view. But it is
not entirely clear that there is a correct view of units of selection.
To wit, philosophers still have not come up with one answer
despite deep and usually objective consideration of the issues
(Brandon 1982; Mitchell 1987 and references therein; Sober
1980; 1984). Mitchell (1987) concludes that "the question of the
unit of selection turns out to be ill-formed" (p. 352) because
more than one entity can be involved in the evolution of traits by
natural selection. Sober (1984) is also unable to come up with a
totally acceptable unit and writes that he is thus "able to alienate
reductionists and antireductionists alike" (p. 215). And, Rosen-
berg (1985) writes, "But organisms are not the units of selection"
(p. 139), and then later on states, "The individual organism is of
course the immediate (but perhaps not sole) unit of selection" (p.
205). [ See also Ghiselin: "Categories, Life and Thinking" BBS
4(2) 1981. ]
Now, just because philosophers cannot come up with a simple
resolution to the problem of "units of selection" this does not
mean a solution is impossible. Rather, their dilemma simply
makes it clear that there are alternative points of view and that
the one a person chooses is most likely to be the one that fits in
best with his view of the world (Loehle 1987).
In summary, there is nothing inherently wrong with the
interactionist point of view and the underlying assumptions
necessary for its acceptance. What is disconcerting is Johnston's
(sometimes ad hoc) sweeping dismissal of alternative explana-
tions of development. His insistence that the interactionist
perspective will be applicable to all behavior is, in my opinion,
misleading, myopic, premature, and philosophically unsound.
Furthermore, Johnston does not offer any clear-cut experiments
that could be used to assess unambiguously his or the di-
chotomists' view in all situations. I would like to have read about
hypothetico-deductive experiments that would conclusively
show that the interactionists' point of view is the only tenable
explanation for the development of all behavior. Also, a presen-
tation of the types of data needed to reject alternative points of
view would have been welcome.
Last, why Johnston accuses others of "keeping alive an invid-
ious distinction that should have been laid to rest decades ago" is
unclear to me. Is he also not discriminating unfairly and express-
ing his views too strongly? After all, all of the data are not yet in,
and never will he.
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Developmental creationism
Gordon M. Burghardt
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Johnston, by his detailed analysis of birdsong research, hopes to
once again discredit the view that genes can specify or control
"any aspects of the behavioral phenotype." His message is
couched in an attack on "dichotomous thinking," in which
"innate" is equated with genetically determined and "learning"
is equated with experience. Johnston argues that this can lead to
faulty interpretations and loose thinking. I agree. Where I part
company is in the view that this is currently a major problem
only present in the kind of studies criticized.
The early ethologists pointed out that a good deal of behavior
should be considered a phenotypic character that is as much a
part of an animal's evolutionary heritage as its morphology and
physiology. "To use the term innate in reference to structure or
behavior is a shorthand way of referring to phenomena which we
consider to be shaped and influenced strongly, although per-
haps indirectly, by specific genetic information" (Burghardt
1973, p. 361). In other words, the innateness concept includes
an ultimate aspect that needs to be considered in any proximate
analysis. Developmental studies of all phenotypic characters
need to take into account life history, ecology, and genetics as
well as form and function (Burghardt 1977; 1988).
It is clear that the term innate is used in different senses and
that these can cause confusion (Lehrman 1970). This is also true
of terms such as communication, learning, and experience.
Arnold (1981) suggested using the term "congenital" to refer to
behavior present at birth (thus not prejudging the role of
heredity), "ontogenetically stable" to refer to characters appar-
ently resistant to change, and "heritable" to refer to the role of
genetics in explaining phenotypic variation in a given popula-
tion in a specified environment. This is useful but it cannot be
strictly applied to the birdsong work since the behavior is not
present at birth. Hence we still have the problem of "matura-
tion" versus "experience" (Schneirla 1965). In any event, initial
genetic channeling and postconception modifiability are not
incompatible (Burghardt 1977).
To argue that a heritability of 1.0 is identical to innateness as
determined by studies of individual development is question-
able. Having five digits on a hand can be considered an innate
character specified by genetic information. Yet in a diverse
genetic population of human beings or iguanas, phenotypic
variability in the number of digits will be nil and calculated
heritabilities zero. Thus the innate differences and heritability
approaches do not always get at what others mean by the term
innate.
Nonetheless, whereas the detailed answers derived from
individual developmental studies and genetic studies may dif-
fer, an essential congruence will usually be found (Burghardt
1973). Thus, species-typical and apparently adaptive behaviors
found to be congenital in newborn animals (such as chemically
based prey preferences in snakes, Burghardt 1977; Arnold 1981)
will almost always be shown to be heritable and under a strong
degree of genetic influence. Are not probabilities and gener-
alization major aspects of science?
It is interesting that concepts on the nurture side of the
dichotomy do not receive the same intense censure as those on
the nature side (Burghardt 1973; 1977). The even-handed ap-
pearing "pox" on both innate and learned (which goes back to
both Kuo 1924 and Lehrman 1953) is too often a rhetorical ploy
to get rid of the innate and still keep on with the learning. In
spite of protestations, Lehrman's (1953) alternative interpreta-
tions of instinctive behaviors almost all ultimately relied on
hypothesized conditioning, and many have proved erroneous.
Gottlieb's (1973) classification of determinative, facilitative,
and maintenance embryological precursors was a major concep-
tual advance to which Johnston, surprisingly, does not refer. I
used it as the main framework for a treatment of ontogeny in
communication (Burghardt 1977) that addresses every major
issue brought forth by Johnston at this late date. So what is going
on here?
Attempts to deny behavior the same status in biology as other
phenotypic characteristics are comparable to the criticisms of
evolution by creationists. Whereas biologists have a lot of data
that is most consistent with an evolutionary interpretation, the
creationists scour the literature for inconsistencies, lapses of
logic, overenthusiastic claims, and, most tellingly from their
point of view, slippery moral and ethical slopes that will be
greased if the evolutionary approach is allowed to continue
unchallenged.
Many attacking the acceptance of specific genetic or innate
factors in animal behavior have the sincere conviction that such
acceptance will foster racism, sexism, capitalism, and fascism in
our own species (e.g., Lewontin et al. 1984). Lehrman's (1953)
famous critique of classical ethological theory made many salient
points and clarified important issues. But it is well known that
there was a political agenda behind the attack and that the
concept of genetic factors in behavior was itself suspect in the
post-World War II thinking of Lehrman and others. This was
shown near the end of Lehrman's (1953) analysis when he could
not resist bringing in Lorenz's speculations on human racial
differences and domestication.
More subtly, Johnston's careful analysis also seems to be
motivated by similar ideological concerns. Why else does the
last paragraph voice his displeasure that "many students of song
development are keeping alive an invidious distinction that
should have been laid to rest decades ago"? Invidious how? A
mistaken approach to studying birdsong may be foolish but
hardly invidious (except perhaps to all those deafened birds). If
one feels that those who entertain the concept of genetic control
of behavior are unwitting dupes or fellow travelers on a slippery
slope, one should say so explicitly. Otherwise, one must get on
with the task of studying song development in order to demon-
strate the empirical power of his point of view. Fortunately,
unlike during the Lysenko and Pavlovian eras in the Soviet
Union, the accusation of being "theoretically suspect" has less
ominous implications today.
Just as developmental studies of molecular biology have
progressed well beyond the simple one-gene/one-enzyme idea,
so have behavioral studies, and they will increasingly approach
the interactionist stance advocated by Johnston. However,
there is much that we need to know, even at the "crude" level,
before we can effectively address the more subtle, the nonob-
vious. Bateson (1985), in commenting on the Schneirla-
Lehrman approach, stated that "a model should simplify and
point to particular problems that are amenable to analysis. This
one primarily seems to tell us that life is complicated" (p. 9). We
may finally begin to appreciate a most profound statement on
scientific methodology by one of the founders of classical
ethology:
An unbroken description of reality would be simultaneously the
truest and most useless thing in the world, and it certainly would not
be science. If we want to make reality and therefore truth useful to
science, we must do violence to reality. We must introduce the
distinction, which does not exist in nature, between essential and
inessential. By seeking out relationships that seem essential to us, we
order the material in a surveyable way at the same time. Then we are
doing science. (von Uexküll 1909/1985, p. 227)
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Selectionist mechanisms: A framework for
interactionism
Stanislas Dehaene and Jean-Pierre Changeux
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The nature/nurture dichotomy has been commonly used as a
paradigm for the experimental study of the complex interactions
between an organism and its environment. That it turned out to
be an oversimplification is no surprise, but it does not entail
returning to such extreme interactionism as Johnston suggests.
The contention that there is "a host of potential contributors to
the development of the organism" can hardly be denied. Being
neutral with respect to the nature of the interaction between
these contributors, interactionism appears too powerful to suf-
fer refutation by experiment.
Selectionist (or Darwinist) theories of learning (Changeux et
al. 1984; Changeux & Dehaene, in press; Edelman 1978; 1987;
see also Jerne 1967) offer a third way between the over-
simplification of the nature/nurture approach and the excessive
generality of interactionism. Selectionist theories belong to the
interactionist framework since they attribute adult behavior to
an interaction of genetic potentials and environmental pres-
sures. However, the rules of this interaction are clearly defined.
In their full generality, selectionist theories apply to any two
successive levels of study of a biological system (Changeux &
Dehaene, in press). It assumed that lower levels function as
generators of a diversity of transient forms, produced by a
combinatorial rule, which are later selectively stabilized or
eliminated at a higher level according to their fitness (or reso-
nance) with environmental or internal cues. For example, in the
development of the neuromuscular junction in vertebrates,
multiple innervation governed by molecular mechanisms of
"blind" growth precedes a pruning of functional nerve endings
by neuronal activity, which ultimately leaves one axon terminal
per muscle fiber.
Another example at a higher level is the initially wide "genet-
ic envelope" (Changeux & Danchin 1976) that human neonates
possess for discriminating linguistic sounds (Eimas 1975), which
gets reduced as the baby loses the capacity to discriminate
sounds that do not belong to his maternal language (Werker &
Tees 1984). These examples do not imply that selection is always
a two-stage process: In general, there may be several hier-
archically organized phases of diversification followed by selec-
tive stabilization, each taking place within the structures laid
down by the preceding one (see Nottebohm, 1981, for a sug-
gestion that seasonal dendritic growth underlies periodic re-
learning in the canary). [ See also Ebbesson: "Evolution and
Ontogeny of Neural Circuits" BBS 7(3) 1984. ]
Applying selectionist theories to birdsong acquisition, al-
though not mentioned by Johnston, is not recent (see Marler &
Peters 1982b). Plastic song initially contains a wide diversity of
syllables, most of which will not be retained in adult song. The
well-documented process of syllabic attrition (Marler & Peters
1982b) has been interpreted as a selection by matching of early
productions with syllables memorized in the first weeks of life
(Marler & Peters 1981). The selectivity of learning to conspecific
material observed in birds like Melospiza georgiana (Marler &
Peters 1977) may result from constraints in the initial "genetic
envelope": The set of "pre-representations" produced at the
early stages of song development should not in general provide
the potential to learn any song.
We have recently proposed a formal neuronal model of
birdsong acquisition (Dehaene et al. 1987). The model applies to
song memorization (sensory learning), which is supposed to be
as selective as the later sensory-motor or imitation phase. Three
biologically plausible properties are simulated: (1) "synaptic
triads," which model the possibility that the efficacy of a synapse
is modulated by a neighboring synapse of the same postsynaptic
neuron via allosteric modifications of receptor conformations,
(2) self-excitatory clusters of neurons which can maintain a
sustained activity and are organized into superimposed layers
termed sensory, input, and internal, and (3) a Hebbian modifi-
cation rule which stabilizes connections when their presynaptic
activation matches the postsynaptic activity of their target cell.
In the simulated network, some clusters act as sequence detec-
tors of the input song. These detectors respond initially to
diverse transitions and progressively acquire more selectivity to
the particular song which is learned. The initial connectivity
provides the network with the capacity of internally producing a
diversity of songs. The learning rule progressively prunes this
repertoire according to its resonance with the song heard.
Our model, and selectionist theories of birdsong acquisition
in general, suggest a number of experimental tests that are not
considered by Johnston. Johnston is basically right in proposing
to stop the isolation rearing paradigm. But rather than studying
more closely the social aspects and functional outcomes of
birdsong, which is likely to add more complexity but little
understanding to the acquisition process, we propose to explore
further the learning mechanism itself. Very little is known about
how song is memorized in the first weeks of life. Our model
proposes that the sensory phase is governed by the same
principles of selection as the later imitation phase. Initial re-
sponding to a global repertoire, followed by subsequent narrow-
ing and tuning of sensory capacities is predicted. At the neural
level, single-cell recordings in the HVc,nucleus of the white-
crowned sparrow (Konishi 1985; Margoliash 1983) have led to
the identification of sequence-specific neurons. Similar record-
ings at different ages in the course of learning should reveal a
progressive tuning of sequence-detecting neurons to more and
more restricted portions of the song. At the behavioral level, it
should be possible to selectively maintain song elements that
are normally eliminated by exposing the bird early to synthetic
songs containing those elements. Supporting this prediction,
Kreutzer (1987) describes a population of cirl bundings (Ember-
iza cirlus) whose repertoire contains an atypical, normally elimi-
nated song which resembles the productions of isolation-reared
birds.
To conclude, selectionist theories of learning adhere to the
interactionist view that adult behavior results from an interac-
tion between internal potential and external constraints, but
with definite limits on this interaction. The notion of "learning
by instinct" (Gould & Marler 1987) emphasizes a similar idea.
Recently, we have suggested (Changeux & Dehaene, in press)
that similar selectionist mechanisms may extend to the higher
level of human reasoning. At short time scales, "mental models"
and rules of behavior would be selected according to their
congruence with the current goal of the organism. The prefron-
tal cortex would generate a diversity of "models" and rules
available for later selection. If such a theory of "mental Dar-
winism" is correct, and if selection is indeed the key to brain
function, song learning in birds might be a useful animal model
for the study of its neural bases.
Nature/nurture and other dichotomies
Eugene S. Gollin
Department of Psychology, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder,
Colo. 80309
Johnston's target article is a clear and valuable exposition of the
so-called interactionist position that is descended intellectually
from the work of Anastasi (1958), Carmichael (1925), Kuo (1967),
Lehrman (1953), and Schneirla (1957). Among its main points
are the emphasis on the impact of nonspecific experience upon
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development (nonspecific experience refers to a wide range of
activities not typically thought of as formal learning) and the
conceptual difficulties that inhere in the retention, even im-
plicitly, of the nature/nurture dichotomy. In addition, Lehr-
man's (1953) well-conceived critique of isolation-deprivation
experiments is reaffirmed.
Elsewhere, Johnston (1987) has conducted an extensive cri-
tique of the use of dichotomies in the study of behavioral
development. It is therefore surprising that he persists in
retaining two dichotomies in the present paper: The first
inheres in any interactionist position, whether it is rendered in
terms of heredity and environment as has been the traditional
usage, or in Johnston's (via Lehrman 1953) preferred organism
and environment formulation. The second dichotomy that is
retained is the treatment of function and structure as separate
entities, a theoretical stance and research strategy that pervades
theory and research in developmental biology and psychology
(Collin et al. 1988).
With respect to an interactionist position, Hebb (1963) has
pointed out that, "For the present, at least, we may note that the
interactions of experience with the genetic and nutritive factors
have become really inextricable. It is no longer possible to
distinguish sharply between constitutional and experiential fac-
tors in the development of behavior" (pp. 22-23). Freedman
(1974) put it even more succinctly, holding that the relationships
between organisms and environments are not interactionist, as
interaction implies that organism and environment are separate
entities that come together at an interface. Organism and
environment constitute a single life process (Gollin 1984). This
view has been asserted by Johnston himself (1985), who held
that, "Evolution forged the organism and its environment into a
single integrated system, and it is the properties of the eco-
system, rather than those of the organism alone, that hold the
key to a successful analysis" (pp. 92-93).
Silvern (1984) has put the issue in the following terms in
dealing with emotional-behavioral disorders:
The concept of open systems suggests that organismic and environ-
mental characteristics do not interact so much as they are inter-
defined. Insofar as description is to be relevant to life, health, or
pathology, the organism must be described in terms of the process of
exchange with the field; the field must be defined by the structure of
the organism that allows only certain aspects of the "objective en-
vironment to enter into the organism-environment system." (p. 118)
It follows from the rejection of the interactionist position that
no aspect of the environment is intelligible in itself but is so only
in relation to the focus or needs of some organism (Goodman
1984). In von Uexkiill's (1926) terms, what becomes a feature of
the Umwelt does so at least partially because of the structure,
focus, and developmental status of the organism.
With respect to the function—structure dichotomy, it is
important to recognize that what is taken as a structure is a
function of the salience of an organization from some point of
view. All structures may be regarded as dynamic configurations,
that is, as patterns of functional relationships, and in comple-
mentary fashion functions are to be regarded as the activities of
structures. These ideas have been expressed neatly by Toulmin
(1967):
A physical system, or mechanism, is now characterized by a wave-
equation that characterizes in one step both the material constitution
of the system and its mode of operation. There is no procedure for
specifying the one independently of the other, and to speak of either
in isolation is a mere abstraction. (p. 828)
The persistence of dichotomies in developmental biology and
psychology is amply demonstrated in Johnston's target article,
whose main thrust is to demonstrate the conceptual inade-
quacies and research fallacies that are the consequences of
dichotomous formulations in science. It will not be an easy task
to adopt perspectives that shed these often implicitly held
commitments. Their pervasiveness is amply illustrated in this
otherwise commendable work.
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Comparing the two template concepts formulated by Marler in
1963 and 1984 illustrates a great step forward in the way we
think about behavioral development, from the innate—learned
dichotomy to a highly interactionist approach (1984). However,
in his critique, Johnston has completely overlooked this. In
1963, the template was characterized as follows: "The two most
obvious ways in which such control could operate are either by
an inherited pattern of motor input to the sound producing
organs, or by an inherited auditory 'template' to which the
animal would match the sounds produced as a result of hearing
its own voice." This template requires no specific auditory
stimulation in order to begin influencing song development. In
the deprivation experiment song structures the birds produced
were categorized as either normal (innate) or aberrant (learned).
There is no doubt that this categorization has been strongly
influenced by the nature/nurture dichotomy. Marler's postula-
tion of latent auditory templates in 1984 brings a highly interac-
tive framework to the song differentiation process. He suggests
that these endogenous templates require specific triggering
from the environment: "Lacking species-specific auditory stim-
ulation, some templates remain latent and uninvolved in song
development, hence the abnormality of song reared in isolation.
When activated, the templates provide the basis for memorizing
learned songs and converting them into motor patterns by
auditory feedback" (p. 289). Looking for latent templates pro-
vides a way to disentangle the set of interactions in the orga-
nism—environment system, as postulated by Johnston. Latent
templates cannot be assessed by the classical rearing experi-
ments using soundproof boxes. Instead, we must do selective
rearing experiments by manipulating, specified aspects of the
environment that may activate the latent template for guiding
the developmental process.
In addition to the frequently discussed adherence to the-
oretical viewpoints, we should take into account the fact that the
song-learning data are highly channeled by the technical design
of the apparatus used for converting acoustical events into a
visual display from which the songs can be analyzed. The
sonograph shows songs not according to the bird's own sensory
processing but according to a scale defined by human engineers
for the special purpose of speech analysis. If sonograms of songs
from different individuals of the same species are compared with
what is heard by the human listener one receives two contrast-
ing impressions: Individual differences in the microstructure of
single notes are emphasized by sonograms, but species-univer-
sal temporal rules for note delivery, one of the dominant fea-
tures for our ears, is less easy to decipher from sonograms.
Individual differences in the structure of notes are impressively
documented sonographically. In contrast, species-typical char-
acteristics such as tonal quality and the temporal rules for
uttering single notes within songs are hard to detect, whereas
changes in pitch frequencies are extremely well documented.
As a consequence, the analysis of the individual frequency
pattern of the notes dominates studies of birdsong develop-
ment. Since it is these patterns that are most subject to sensory
experience, the contribution of learning tends to be overempha-
sized.
In the focus on note morphology the more general notion of
song as a "melody pattern" has been overlooked. The melody
pattern is determined by the rhythmic arrangements of single
tones in sequences. To assess this more general aspect of songs,
we studied the temporal (rhythmic) rules for producing single
notes within song units in several Cardueline finches (e.g.,
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Guttinger  1978; Guttinger  et al. 1978). In contrast to the
microstructure of the single notes, the rules for producing the
vocalizations do not vary from song to song during singing bouts
or between the songs of different individuals. Thus, we can
study organizational rules independently of the individually
shaped repertoire.
The songs of greenfinches (Chloris chloris) and those of
canaries (Serinus canaria) show large differences in their organi-
zational rules. Unlike greenfinches, canaries sing in strophes,
with two major temporal groupings: highly predictable short
intervals between subunits within the strophe and highly vari-
able pauses separating consecutive strophes. In greenfinches
there are no preferred groupings and the duration of pauses is
independent of the duration of the preceding "trill," whereas in
canaries there are statistically preferred and avoided combina-
tions of durations of vocalizations and pauses.
These regularities are also shown by extremely deprived
animals (deafened as nestlings or raised by foster parents with-
out hearing conspecifics). We varied both the environment and
the genotypes (contra Johnston, section IV): We studied three
morphologically different species of greenfinches (Guttinger
1978) and various breeds of domesticated canaries as well as wild
canaries (Guttinger 1985). The greenfinches showed variable
pauses whereas the canaries showed very similar bimodal fre-
quency distributions resembling those observed in acoustically
deprived canaries. I accordingly conclude that these organiza-
tional rules are genetically determined to a high degree.
Having demonstrated high constancy in the temporal pattern
within one species, we went on to inquire into the extent to
which these constraints can be overcome by intensive tutoring
of an aberrant pattern. Juvenile canaries were isolated as eggs
from singing conspecifics and were tutored with playbacks of six
strophes of the whinchat songs (Saxicola rubetra). The canaries
copied the individual notes with high accuracy and embedded
the entire, heterospecific strophe into their song. However,
whinchat strophes are much shorter (2 sec) than canary strophes
(10-60 sec) and the canaries who had been tutored with tapes of
whinchat strophes integrated them into their songs as subunits.
Each heterospecific strophe was followed by vocalizations typ-
ical of their own species. These embedding trills, which highly
resembled the note categories of normal canaries, had been
developed without any specific acoustic models.
These results suggest that the overall pattern of the species-
specific note morphology can be internally guided (Schwager &
Guttinger, in prep.). Analyzing variation ranges of various song
parameters in nature and under selective rearing conditions can
reveal "relative differences" in the degree of genetic influence.
We are aware that even "innate" parameters can be shaped by
subtle epigenetic interactions between genetically formed neu-
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At one time (the 1950s & early 1960s) most of us would have
accepted Johnston's characterization: "in behavioral genet-
ics . . . the aim is to assess the contributions of genetic varia-
tion to behavioral variation" or to make "estimates of heri-
tability" (see Hirsch & Boudreau 1958). In those days it took us
time to appreciate its inadequacy. That realization stimulated
our advance to the -behavior-genetic analysis" conceptualiza-
tion (Hirsch 1967a; 1967b; 1986), which describes more
accurately
the approach to the study of organisms and their behavior that
combines the concepts and methods of behavioral analysis from
psychology and ethology, based on knowledge or control of experi-
ence, with those of genetic analysis, based on knowledge or control of
ancestry. The object of a behavior-genetic analysis is a species and its
objectives are twofold, one for each of its two methodologies. The
objective of the behavioral analysis is the description and analysis of
one or more of the behaviors in the species repertoire, as well as of the
components into which each behavior can be resolved. The objective
of the genetic analysis is the discovery of chromosome and gene
correlates of behavior and of its components. (Hirsch 1986, p. 130,
emphasis added; also see p. 132)
Individual, population, and species differences are the raw
materials for the behavior-genetic analysis of one species or
several, because it is such reliably measured differences in
behavior-trait expression that are the phenotypes providing
access to the genetic system through the breeding studies that
constitute genetic analysis. There is neither a "mean genotype"
nor a genetics of behavior.
During courtship the males of many Drosophila species emit
a species-specific song, analogous to birdsong but produced by
the flies' wing displays. It serves two functions: (1) It induces
sexual receptivity in females and (2) its species-specificity serves
to maintain sexual isolation between species. Experimenting
with backcrosses and F 1 hybrids between the sibling species
Drosophila persimilis and D. pseudoobscura, Arthur Ewing
found independently inherited X-chromosome gene correlates
of two parameters of the songs which differ between the species
both quantitatively and qualitatively (Hirsch & McGuire 1982,
pp. 277, 290-95).
It is important to distinguish methodological from substantive
issues; genetical, developmental, and behavioral questions are
each studied by methods developed in response to the nature of
the three quite different properties of organisms as our under-
standing of such properties improved. In part, dissatisfaction
with - instinct-innate" rests on the misconception that, unlike
behavior, learned behavior has been, or can be, described with
conceptual clarity. Hebb's 1953 critique claimed: "Instinctive
behaviour is what is not learned, or not determined by the
environment, and so on. There must be great doubt about the
unity of the factors that are identified only by exclusion" (Ricker
et al. 1986, p. 163). Hebb believed that unlike learning, instinct
lacked validity as a singular concept because it is inferred from
negative evidence.
Nevertheless, in Drosophila research, geotaxis, phototaxis,
and other "tropisms" have certainly not been recognized as
instinctive on the basis of negative evidence from deprivation
experiments. When we began working with them (Hirsch &
Tryon 1956), these readily observable events had been univer-
sally accepted as innate since well before Jacques Loeb's classic
1888 articles (Hirsch 1973, p. x). In our studies of the "evolution
of an instinct" in D. melanogaster, we recognized opposite
expressions of geotaxis in two divergently selected populations
to be instinctive (i.e., what was formerly species-typical had
evolved in response to selection to become population-typical
[ Hirsch & Erlenmeyer-Kimling 1961]) and questions were
raised about correlations with reproductive fitness in laboratory
habitat(s) that have resulted in further research into the adap-
tiveness of the behavior (Ricker & Hirsch 1985; 1988a; 1988b).
The approach has afforded a unique opportunity to study evolu-
tion experimentally in the laboratory.
Negative evidence is used, however, to infer learned associa-
tion. The control experiments in conditioning and learning
studies are the analogue of the deprivation experiment crit-
icized by both Hebb and Johnston in the study of instinct.
Unlike tropisms, one does not observe associative learning
directly, but only infers its presence when controls have ex-
cluded substantial effects of nonassociative (innate) factors. So
one might also question its validity as a singular concept. For
example, unconditioned excitatory states are aroused by our
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procedures, which have proved so successful for conditioning
identifiable individual flies (Holliday & Hirsch 1986; Ricker et
al. 1986). It must hence be demonstrated that such uncondi-
tioned states (innate reactions) cannot account for all responses
to the conditioned stimulus (CS). More generally, association is
inferred from the portion of the increment in responses to CS
that remains after one has controlled for (i.e., subtracted away)
effects due to sensitization, pseudoconditioning, habituation,
excitation, and so forth, some or all of which do occur. There is a
heretofore unappreciated historical parallel between the study
of instinct and the study of learning that is paradoxical because
these usually have been considered polar opposites: Instinctive
behavior is unlearned and learned behavior is not merely (i.e., is
something more than) instinctive.
Unlike the Cheshire cat's grin in the tale, neither song nor any
other trait develops or endures by itself. What develops is a
genotypically specific individual. When the ontogeny (embryo-
logy, etc.) of that individual is studied we describe the develop-
ment of the expression of specific phenotypic traits — anatom-
ical, physiological, behavioral, and so on. Just as there literally
are no "genes for" specific trait expressions, I neither can there
be "developmental events for" specific traits. Individuals de-
velop, and at a certain stage in their ontogeny we can record the
expression(s) of certain trait(s); for example, at a certain age a
male canid ceases the female squat and lifts one hind leg to
urinate, an event that can be advanced to an earlier age by
hormone administration. But the timing and topography may
vary over genotypically disparate individuals, breeds, and spe-
cies, and perhaps over ecological conditions.
The very nature of experimental analysis imposes di-
chotomous or multichotomous thinking: to the extent possible
we hold heredity (or environment) constant and manipulate
environment (or heredity) to identify environmental (or genetic)
influences. In no other metazoan is there a better chance for
studying the role of specific genes in ontogeny and exploring the
"technical limitations" Johnston invokes. But even in D.
melanogaster the task is daunting, as witnessed in the line of
research from Benzer (1967) or Hirsch (1959) through Johnston's
Quinn and Greenspan (1984) reference (p. 13) 2 and more recent
publications; thus my plea for an eclectic behavior-genetic
analysis versus any imperialism: genetic, environmentalist, or
developmentalist.
NOTES
1. About 1910 T. H. Morgan did call a Drosophila X-chromosome
locus "white eye," and likewise many other early investigators labelled
loci by the phenotypic trait expression through which they were first
discovered. But subsequently maybe 50 loci have been discovered,
alleles of which may "cause" white eye. That is why now we speak of
"gene correlates."
2. The widely cited Rothenbuhler (1967) reference on hygienic bee
behavior ("caused" by two genes) that I published remains without
corroboration since 1958. The Brown and van Scoy bee colonies were
never shared with interested colleagues; I understand the colonies have
since been lost.
Selective breeding—selective rearing
interactions and the ontogeny of aggressive
behavior
Kathryn E. Hood
Individual and Family Studies, College of Health and Human Development,
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pa. 16802
If "the interactionist approach replaces the mysterious, but
somehow reassuring, power of the genes with a series of un-
answered questions," (Johnston, 1987, p. 175), then it falls to
the interactionist theorist to specify the appropriate and most
useful questions to ask about the origins of form and change. In
this insightful review and critique, Johnston frames several
promising approaches to the study of song development
in birds, including an emphasis on the functionally signifi-
cant, socially effective features of song. One recommendation
is to implement behavioral studies with "systematic and pre-
cise manipulation of genetic structure and activity, for exam-
ple by the careful use of single-gene mutants and genetic
chimeras. "
There is a complementary approach to genetic-developmen-
tal analysis that is based on functional units of behavior that are
more readily interpretable than the behaviors induced by sin-
gle-gene mutation. Robert Cairns and his colleagues have
shown that aggressive behavior is rapidly responsive to selective
breeding, and that selective breeding effects may occur as
alterations of developmental timing, or heterochrony (Cairns et
al. 1983). The effects of selective rearing are equally powerful:
When male mice are reared in tactile and visual isolation,
aggressiveness is enhanced in an age-dependent function
(Cairns et al. 1985). Applied to the selectively bred lines,
selective-rearing differentials are sufficient to eclipse selective-
breeding effects through repeated exposure to the social setting
of the test situation (Cairns 1983) or through continuous social
differentials (Cairns & Hood 1983; Hood & Cairns, submitted).
Furthermore, disentangling the relative contributions of selec-
tive rearing and selective breeding reveals the cross-sex inheri-
tance of aggressive behavior (Hood & Cairns 1988).
The behavioral mediation of selective breeding effects on
fighting has been investigated (Gariepy et al., in press). The
mediating behavioral system that changes under selection pres-
sure is one component of the configuration of ontogentic
changes produced by selective rearing (Cairns et al. 1985): it is
correlated with attacks, but also with other forms of social
behavior. For example, not only are low-aggressive-line males
less likely to fight other males, they are also less likely to
copulate in 10-minute tests with estrus females (Hood & Cairns,
unpublished data). Future neurobiological and molecular ge-
netic analyses using these lines could provide results that are
interpretable as aspects of evolutionarily meaningful social pat-
terns and as biological and contextual factors fused in social
ontogeny (Cairns et al. 1988; Cairns & Gariépy 1988).
There is an implicit loss of precision in moving from single-
gene effects to the multiple yet unidentified epigenetic com-
plexes that may be altered by selective breeding and the differ-
ent sets of genetic alterations that, in separate studies, might
produce identical patterns of behavior change. While awaiting
the techniques to "induce single-gene mutations that affect song
development," as Johnston suggests, it yet might be useful to
test the hypothesis that the functional components of song are
responsive to two experimental operations that are available
now: selective breeding and selective rearing.
Lehrman (1970) notes that genetic differences may consist of
differences in responsiveness to "the same" environment. "Nat-
ural selection can select for specific ways of being sensitive to
experience, or for phenotypic structures that make experience
possible, just as readily as it can for any other characteristics" (p.
37). This underscores the need for measures of the environment
that are independent of measures of organismic response to the
environment (experience).
I was enormously cheered by Johnston's dispelling of the
mystical properties that adhere to the term "information" (see
especially Johnston 1987). The first pre-Mendelian use cited in
the Oxford English Dictionary as meaning "the action of giving
form to matter" ("in-forming") was in 1646: "There was a
seminality and contracted Adam in the rib, which by the infor-
mation of a soule, was individuated into Eve." Divine informa-
tion, transmuted into DNA, may yet be understood as develop-
ment. Johnston's continuing discussions of these issues and
those of other scientists (Oyama 1988b; Plomin 1988a; Schneirla
1966) are the means to that end.
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 The polythetic perspective
Donald D. Jensen
Department of Psychology, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebr.
68588-0308
Johnston's central thesis is that innate and experiential factors
are neither exhaustive nor exclusive and that terms such as
"innate" and "learned" apply to differences in behavior, not to
behaviors or behavioral components. That thesis was stated in
an early article (Jensen 1961), was criticized (Lorenz 1965), and
has been revised and extended (Jensen 1970; 1987). The revised
viewpoint is broader in focus than the interactionism of Johnston
and Lehrman, emphasizes covariation rather than differences in
behavior, and supports additional criticisms of recent work on
birdsong. This methodological perspective is that of "polythetic
operational biological behaviorism," an eclectic approach to the
study of behavior whose major features are expressed by the
terms combined in its name.
Operationism is the principle that the scientific meaning of a
concept is the observations and investigative procedures which
measure or justify the use of that concept. Operationism de-
mands observations and clearly stated procedures for arguing
from observations to more theoretical constructs. Biological
behaviorism involves observing, describing, and measuring
variation in behavioral content, and then investigating covaria-
tion of behavioral content with other biological events or vari-
ables (causes, correlates, and consequences at ecological, orga-
nismic, and intraorganismic levels). Polytheticism is the
principle that biological concepts are not effectively defined by
monothetic definitions specifying a few key characteristics
which are logically necessary and sufficient to identify an exem-
plar. Instead, biological concepts are effectively defined by
polythetic definitions which indicate the many characteristics
typical of an exemplar, but no one or small set of these charac-
teristics is necessary or sufficient to give the meaning of a
biological concept (Sokal & Sneath 1963). A polythetically de-
fined behavior is a temporary state of an organism which is to be
classified and understood, not just by its behavioral content or
by some key character, such as dependence upon genotype or
particular experiences, but by its content and by the many
causes, correlates, and consequences of that behavior at all
biological levels — by all the events or states which constitute or
covary with that behavior. The polythetic behaviorist holds that
a behavior is understood to the extent that its variation is well
described and its major covariances have been identified
(Jensen 1987).
How would taking this point of view change the criticisms
offered of the work on birdsong? It would not change the useful
and thoughtful suggestions made by Johnston to manipulate
nonobvious experiential factors and to study functional out-
comes of song development (consequences). It would demand
from template theorists a clearer operationalization of their
ideas in terms of observable covariances. It would argue that
specification of "sources of information" as genetic or experien-
tial may be operationally and scientifically impossible, and,
even if possible, that it would be trivial, since it would be a
monothetic rather than a polythetic conceptualization of
behavior.
Scientific investigation of behavior can achieve the measure-
ment of variance in behavior and covariation with other biolog-
ical variables. There is simply no operational justification avail-
able from the study of variation and covariation for terming
behaviors or components of behaviors "learned" or "innate." As
long as investigators seek evidence to justify the classification of
songs, components, or templates as innate, rather than system-
atically studying variance and covariances, their investigations
will be misguided and their theories muddle-headed.
Much of the work on birdsong is very satisfying to a polythetic
behaviorist, since birdsong is a polythetically definable behavior
class. In contrast, the view that birdsong is an especially good
model for the understanding of human oral language and com-
munication is untenable from the polythetic perspective, since
the structures producing signals (larynx and syrinx) are not
homologous, the covariances of birdsong and of human speech
with many biological variables are strikingly different, and the
organisms involved are not closely related. To the polythetic
behaviorist a better model would be a primate oral communica-
tion system (i.e., squirrel monkey calls or gibbon song) which
would appear to be simpler than but homologous to human
speech, rather than only analogous, as appears to be the case
with birdsong.
The study of birdsong is important in its own right, but the
investigation of syrinx-produced sounds of descendants of dino-
saurs cannot be expected to be especially useful for understand-
ing human vocal and linguistic communication. Birdsong, when
studied for its own sake, should be studied polythetically, with
attention to all events which constitute and covary with the song
of the sparrow, the cooing of the dove, and the melody of the
nightingale.
Ab ovo with song?
S. N. Khayutin and L. I. Alexandrov
Laboratory of Ontogenesis of Brain Functions, Institute of Higher Nervous
Activity and Neurophysiology, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow,
U.S.S.R.
The polemical article of Johnston is very timely. The author
vigorously upholds an obviously fruitful view of behavioral
development, one that considers development as a product of
the interaction of an intricate complex of both endogenous and
exogenous factors.
Although most investigators nowadays are declaring their
break with the traditional understanding of a behavior as a
complex of innate and acquired components, the fact that only
minor conceptual progress has been achieved in this field is due
to the use of traditional terms and to the tempting clarity of both
the experimental design and the interpretation of the results.
The unfruitfulness of the traditional approach to behavioral
development in terms of a dichotomous paradigm became so
obvious long ago that it has even been formulated in aphoristic
form. The question of the extent to which certain behavior
depends on genetic versus environmental factors was said to
have no more meaning than the question of the primary deter-
minant of area — length or width (Hebb 1953). Shepherd (1983)
wrote that considering the influence of genetic and environmen-
tal factors separately is as senseless as discussing the problem of
the sound of one hand clapping. However, such declarations are
mostly found in articles' introductions, whereas discussions
usually reveal the tacit sympathies (ecological or genetic) of the
author. Thus the occasional publication of conceptual manu-
scripts like Johnston's is very helpful.
Johnston's target article possesses great polemical potential in
its negative section, criticizing the dichotomous approach; un-
fortunately, its constructive part is less convincing. This might
be due to the fact that the methodology of the interactionist
approach has not yet achieved either its final form or a sufficient
number of consistent adherents. Even in the current article, in
order to substantiate his position, Johnston must make use of
data obtained with the "untenable" dichotomous approach.
Johnston's ideas expressed in terms of a "developmental
ecosystem" are very hard to develop consistently in experi-
ments because it is almost impossible to monitor simultaneously
numerous parameters of this ecosystem. Some of the param-
eters must be fixed in order to reveal experimentally the devel-
opmental contribution of the others. A logical realization of
Johnston's ideas may lead, for instance, to no more than replac-
ing the two-dimensional graph (Fig. 2) based on the dichot-
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omous paradigm by a multidimensional graph that would in-
clude "nonobvious" developmental factors. The difference
between these would be quantitative rather than qualitative.
Nevertheless, again drawing attention to this alternative to the
dichotomous viewpoint may, we think, contribute to the devel-
opment of the favorable intellectual climate that is a necessary
premise of the real (rather than merely declared) acceptance of
an interactionist approach more adequately reflecting the multi-
factorial nature of behavioral development.
We agree with Johnston that the role of nonobvious factors in
behavioral development must be taken into consideration. We
hope that our own experimental material can shed some light on
the role of nonobvious song experience as well as the effects of
social contacts on the process of song formation.
Konishi (1985) singled out the following functions of song as a
social signal: It supplies the female with information about the
closeness of a potential partner – its species and its individual
identity—and about territory and breeding conditions; song
also has territorial functions. However, the studies of the organi-
zation of nest behavior in pied flycatcher (Ficedula hypoleuca)
nestlings in the wild have revealed (Khayutin et al. 1978) that
during the first half of the nest period males sing near the nest-
box several hundred times a day. This suggests that the male's
song could affect not only adult birds but also nestlings, whose
behavior during this period depends only on acoustical stimuli.
It is worth noting here that, according to behavioral and elec-
trophysiological criteria, the maturation of nestlings' acoustic
sensitivity is practically complete by the end of the first half of
nest life (Khayutin & Dmitrieva 1987). Species song has been
shown not only to be a security signal for the young (its action
being antagonistic to that of alarm call), but also to affect greatly
their emotional state. Electrocardiographic recordings showed
that nestling heartbeat frequency increased during alarm calls
and immediately returned to normal when the alarm calls were
abruptly replaced by species song. Without song presentation,
the recovery of normal heart rhythm after alarm calls took
several minutes (Khayutin et al. 1978). The creation and mainte-
nance of the comfort state by the species song may be an
important factor in initial song fixation for future reproduction.
On the other hand, this adequacy of the song to the situation
may be one of the mechanisms underlying the differential
efficacy of live tutors and tape tutors, the problem often stressed
by Johnston.
Another problem we would like to consider is that of "nonob-
vious factors of experience." We think that the choice of experi-
ential factors and their categorization as obvious and nonobvious
will depend on the initial position of the investigator. For
example, the auditory thresholds of a cuckoo nestling reared by
redstarts were shown to differ from the very beginning from
those of the foster parents' own chick living in the same nest
(Khayutin 1985). Both nestlings lived in the same environment
in terms of physical parameters, but they probably perceived it
differently because of the differences in the physiological orga-
nization of their acoustic systems. This difference cannot fail to
contribute to the formation of species-typical vocalization in
these species, but, unfortunately, this notion can only bring us a
little closer to understanding the entire system of factors that
interact in the process of birdsong development.
Ducks don't sing
Andrew P. Kinga and Meredith J. Westb
'Department of Psychology, Duke University, Durham, N.C. 27706 and
°Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
27514
Johnston's target article evokes mixed reactions. We could not
agree more about the need to consider the study of song
ontogeny with respect to more progressive developmental prin-
ciples or about the need to use a more enlightened set of
methodologies. But the sense of ideological camaraderie cannot
overcome our sense of discomfort over Johnston's advice about
what birdsong researchers ought to be doing. We feel the way
one does when being given advice about the rearing of one's
children from someone who does not have to cope with those
same children day in and day out. We suspect that Johnston
might change the tone, if not the substance, of many of his
remarks, if he considers the actual problem involved in imple-
menting his proposed developmental designs at this point in
time.
What is at issue for us is not the status of the template. The
latter is one of those constructs (like linguistic capacities in other
animals) that scientists either love to love or love to hate. But for
that very reason, it has ultimately fueled the formulation of
better theories of song learning (Petrinovich 1988), theories
Johnston does not address. And until someone comes along with
some new words to help us describe how and why acoustically
naive songbirds can produce species-recognizable signals (and
even functionally effective subsong, see West & King 1988),
template-like concepts, with all their limitations, will persist.
And if they provoke argument, all the better. Arguments ignite
new initiatives. "A theory which cannot be mortally endangered
cannot be alive," warned Rushton (in Platt 1964, p. 349). The
template deserves credit because, as Konishi was attempting to
say, it invites the testing of hypotheses.
But the greater source of our frustration comes from John-
ston's call that more use should be made of the interactionist
perspective espoused by Lehrman and that more attention
should be paid to nonobvious sources of experiential influence.
He is right that only the more obvious sources of stimulation
have been studied in detail, but he is wrong about the reasons. It
is not theoretical naivete, inertia, or intractability that has
precluded such experiments: It is time and its interaction with
the ontogenetic cycles of songbirds and the funding cycles of
institutions. Scholarly works on nature and nurture rarely dis-
cuss time or money. The omission is unfortunate, because the
synergy between these commodities has much to do with the
canalization of research objectives.
Consider that the study of song ontogeny is only beginning its
fourth decade. In that period, researchers have had to learn how
to raise songbirds reliably from a young age or ideally from the
egg (still not practical for most species); they have had to learn
how to care for them in the laboratory for multiyear periods;
they have had to find out, through trial and error, which species
thrive in the laboratory (sparrows do, mockingbirds do not);
they have had to develop new acoustic skills to analyze the
thousands of sounds each young bird utters even before he
produces his first real "song"; they have had to work out
experimental regimes based on their best guesses about possi-
ble sources of stimulation; and then they have had to accommo-
date their research schedules to the seasonal cycles of songbirds.
Is it any wonder that extensive longitudinal data even on
structural variation in exclusively captive settings are available
for only several of the thousands of species assumed to learn
their songs? (Marley & Peters 1982a; 1982b; King & West 1988).
Johnston also calls for more functional assessments of devel-
opmental outcome. In that we have championed bioassays in
words and action, we speak with authority and empathy (West &
King 1987a). It took three years to learn to breed cowbirds in
captivity; it took another four to learn to rear the young; it took
another six to master the rudiments of their song system well
enough to know what functional metrics to use. Several more
years were devoted to testing different populations and to
assimilating the within-species variability encountered. And all
of these steps had to be taken before we could do what we
wanted to do in the first place, that is, to study the roles of social
and acoustic experience during song ontogeny, an endeavor
now in its eighth year and still in progress.
Consider the effects of time from another perspective. The
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average life span of a cowbird in the wild is 18 months; in the
laboratory, it is 5 to 7 years. But what is the lifespan of the average
research grant? Never as long as the 15-year program we have just
described. The asynchrony of research cycles, funding cycles, and
songbird cycles is a major impediment to implementation of some
of Johnston's ideas. Moreover, asking for funds to study nonob-
vious sources of experience for which there is as yet little field data
is risky business (especially at a time when molecules are the coin
of the realm).
Finally, we question the utility of comparing the paradigms of
imprinting and song learning. If songbirds could be ordered
from a supplier, or even raised in sufficient numbers in in-
cubators, or studied and tested before their postnatal care and
feeding even became an issue, Johnston would have answers to
many of his questions. It is only quite recently that students of
imprinting have seriously explored the question of social influ-
ences - and with intriguing results (Lickliter & Gottlieb 1985).
Why has it taken so long? Johnston would do us a service by
providing an answer, especially given his part in effecting the
ecological about-face (Johnston & Gottlieb 1981a).
In sum, we agree that all scientists need to take care when
choosing the words to describe their findings. But Johnston
must realize that his words are not falling on deaf ears but on ears
tuned by pragmatics to problems that may seem nonobvious to
nonpractitioners. But if Johnston is right, the more song re-
searchers learn, the more they will hesitate to adopt the
provocative dialect of nature/nurture-ese.
When is developmental biology not
developmental biology?
Ronald Konopka
Department of Biology, Clarkson University, Potsdam, N.Y. 13676
I would agree with Johnston's contention that "comparing the
songs of [birds] reared under identical conditions . . . cannot
reveal any of the detail that we need in order to understand how
genes contribute to development." However, he then states:
"Only by systematic and precise manipulation of genetic struc-
ture and activity . . . can any useful substance be added. Tech-
niques such as these, of course, belong in the province of
 geneticists and developmental biologists, not of ethologists and
other students of animal behavior."
I believe the day is past when a behavioral scientist refuses to
draw upon the techniques of other disciplines. If he wishes to
study development, he must become, at least in part, a develop-
mental biologist willing to combine genetics, developmental
neurophysiology, and ethology. One of the most important
issues in birdsong development concerns the role of genes and
environment in the generation and maintenance of neural plas-
ticity. The regulation of plasticity in the brain involves a genetic
component, which may specify a general "template" (Konishi
1985), as well as auditory feedback and other neurological and
hormonal mechanisms. These mechanisms must be studied
with the appropriate physiological techniques.
Johnston's view resembles that of the early behaviorists, who
were concerned with input-output relations, not with the
physiological mechanisms underlying the observed behaviors.
 The recommendation that "nonobvious experiential contribu-
tions to behavioral development" be studied misses the mark.
The suggested experiments do not remove the problem of
separating genetic variation from environmental variation; vari-
ation is inherent in "normal" or "functional" song. The under-
standing of the developmental mechanisms that contribute to
the formation of adult song necessarily involves an inter-
disciplinary approach to neural circuitry. A good example of the
results of such an approach is provided by the discovery of
1 seasonal replacement of neurons in the adult canary (Not-
tebohm 1985). The modern ethologist must be a geneticist, a
developmental biologist, and a physiologist in order to properly
investigate an organism's behavior.
Behavioral ontogeny research: No pain, no
gain?
Donald E. Kroodsma
Department of Zoology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass.
01003-0027
To me Johnston's target article emphasizes, first and foremost,
that the vocabulary used in developmental studies misleads,
misinforms, and even angers. One could argue that the i-word
(starts with "i," ends with "e," double "n," etc.) and its close
relatives are merely "linguistic conveniences," but on one
important level the outcome of any such debate would be largely
irrelevant. Continued use of such terminology will serve only to
alienate those in diverse disciplines who should be communicat-
ing in a constructive way with each other about the intricacies of
behavioral development. I have used these terms in the past,
but the passion evident in Johnston's article has convinced me
that there is no excuse, other than stubbornness (which his
article might actually promote), for continued use of any vocabu-
lary that has such "invidious" effects among those who should be
talking to each other.
Johnston encourages additional research in two areas that
have proven exciting and fruitful: the role of nonsong experience
in song development and the use of bioassays to test functional
outcomes of the developmental process. I can't imagine anyone
disagreeing. Johnston also rehashes the Lorenz-Lehrman con-
troversy, and again I don't disagree with the essentials of the
arguments. The environment of a developing organism contains
many factors, a few of which are excluded in "isolation rearing,"
many of which are not.
To state, however, that those who rear birds in soundproof
boxes in so-called deprivation experiments are attempting to
"eliminate all [emphasis mine] environmental contributions to
development" is an exaggeration. Konishi and Marler, for exam-
ple, favorite targets of Johnston, recognized and studied the
importance of auditory feedback (Konishi 1965a; 1965b; Marler
& Sherman 1983). Neither has my use of the "i-word" and its
close relatives prevented me from asking additional questions at
lower levels, such as how "obvious" or "nonobvious" (depend-
ing on one's viewpoint) changes in the environment (e.g.,
rearing in groups, with males, with females, by cross-fostering
at egg stage, without auditory feedback, etc.) influence song
development. Throughout his article it seems to me that John-
ston establishes a nonconstructive polarity of viewpoints; he
passionately argues how one is right and the other wrong, how
only one gives useful knowledge of the world, and how only one
allows a glimpse of the "obvious" avenues for research.
Although much of the developmental literature is unfortu-
nately discussed in "invidiously" absolute terms (e.g., behavior
"x" is "bleep"), the implicit value of most developmental work is
in its relative, or comparative, nature. Someone interested in
the ecology or evolution of developmental differences among
populations or species or other taxonomic groups is not neces-
sarily obsessed with "the only question," the question that seeks
to determine, in absolute terms, exactly how "genes contribute
to the process of development." For many studies Johnston
would restrict our conclusions to the "unhelpful platitude that
`genes affect behavior'," and perhaps appropriately so if one
confines his world view to how genes produce behaviors. I
wouldn't argue that such studies aren't important; I would
merely point out that they address different questions, at differ-
ent levels from those usually asked. And, contrary to Johnston's
forceful message, they aren't the only questions begging for
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study. For my studies of song development among flycatchers
and songbirds (representatives of the 2 suborders of the Pas-
seriformes), I am less interested in how the genes produce
behaviors than in the evolutionary and phylogenetic implica-
tions of drastic developmental differences between the two
groups.
Overall, I applaud Johnston for encouraging rigor in our
vocabulary and quality in our experiments. I am not convinced,
however, that different uses of terminology by "them" and "us"
and that different viewpoints by Lorenz and Lehrman have led
to bad and good science, respectively.
Song development and sexual imprinting:
Toward an interactionist approach
Jaap P. Kruijt and Carel ten Cate
Zoological Laboratory, University of Groningen, 9750 AA Haren, the
Netherlands
Johnston's vigorous attack on the conceptual framework of much
research on song development will no doubt arouse a lot of heat.
One reason for this may be the way in which Johnston phrases
his criticisms. He seems to overstate his case when he argues
that the study of song development "has only served to perpetu-
ate the confusion" to which the distinction between learned and
innate behavior gave rise. It is true that examples of innate—
learned dichotomies are not difficult to find in this field. Despite
this, these studies have contributed a great deal of insight into
the factors involved in the development of song, and Johnston at
times illustrates the interactionist approach by quoting results
from this field. Also, although Johnston is nowhere stating this
explicitly, we sometimes got the impression that he rejects the
concept of templates entirely or fails to appreciate its potential
merits. If this is correct we wish to reply that the concept of
templates will probably remain useful in developmental re-
search if stripped of its connotations of genetic determination.
Finally, Johnston's statement in section VII, that using the
template metaphor hampers the analysis of "functional develop-
ment," fails to convince us. Studying the functional outcomes of
development is of course important. However, we do not see
why studying structural outcomes should make one blind to
functional ones, if only because much of the quoted functional
research was done by the same people Johnston criticizes with
regard to their structural research.
However, these objections should not distract from John-
ston's main message: He rightly points out that the Lorenzian
way of thinking about development is still very much alive
despite lip service to the contrary. We agree that the use of an
untenable dichotomy, however cleverly disguised, hampers
rather than illuminates insight in behavioral development. The
interactionist approach treats development as a complex process
resulting from the interaction of many factors impinging from
inside and outside on the developing organism. Therefore, the
absence of an environmental influence cannot reveal the direct
operation of a genetic program, let alone how genetic factors
have contributed to the end product. The fallacy of this "exclu-
sion argument" was already put forward by Lehrman (1953) and
has been ably recounted by Johnston.
We are familiar with the exclusion argument from studies on
"sexual imprinting," showing that mate preferences in birds can
be influenced by their early rearing environment. If reared with
foster parents of a different species or morph, individuals often
prefer to mate with individuals of that other species or morph
later on. However, in other cases cross-fostering with another
species may reveal tendencies to respond to, or to prefer,
conspecifics, even in the absence of any previous contact with
them. In a striking parallel to the examples on song develop-
ment quoted by Johnston, here too the conclusion derived from
such experiments has often been that the preference is "innate"
(Schutz 1965), "genetically determined" (Sonnemann & Sjo-
lander 1977), "genetically preorganized" (Bischof 1979), or
expresses "genetical predispositions and constraints" (Immel-
mann 1979). In this view the final mate preference is seen as a
superposition of innate and learned components similar to the
intercalation of both proposed by Lorenz (e.g., Bischof 1979).
The same objections formulated by Johnston can be raised
against the false dichotomy concerning the development of mate
preferences, and it has been possible to get further insight into
the development of these preferences by abandoning this di-
chotomy (e.g., Kruijt et al. 1982; Kruijt 1985; ten Cate & Mug
1984; ten Cate 1985a; 1988). This example serves to illustrate
that the dichotomous approach criticized by Johnston is also
prominent in a related area of ontogenetic research. Therefore,
and in view of the perennial nature of the problems with innate-
learned dichotomies (Beach 1955), we believe that it is useful
that researchers are reminded from time to time of the pitfalls in
this approach, and we welcome that Johnston has once more
outlined the flaws of the dichotomy under consideration.
In section VI Johnston outlines the specific contribution that
the interactionist approach may make to developmental prob-
lems. We would like to suggest that the interactionist approach
not only draws attention to the identification of nonobvious
experiential contributions, but may also require us to rethink
the value of an outcome demonstrating the effect of experiential
factors. As pointed out by Johnston, finding that some factor
does not influence the development of some trait leaves the
question of the developmental process unanswered. But sup-
pose that an influence of some environmental factor does occur,
for example, suppose contact with a live tutor causes a young
bird to learn the tutor's song. Such a result should not lead us to
conclude that we understand the developmental process. The
interactionist approach raises further questions, not only about
which other factors are involved, but also, and perhaps in
particular, about the process by which the external factor
achieved its impact. To identify an influence of "social context"
on song learning, as is the case for zebrafinches (Immelmann
1969) and white-crowned sparrows (Baptista & Petrinovich
1984), should immediately raise the questions of how the influ-
ence is brought about and of what the underlying mechanism
might be (cf. ten Cate 1988). Abandoning the dichotomy thus
not only makes "innate" traits a subject for further investigation,
it may do the same for "learned" traits.
Birdsong development: Real or imagined
results?
R. E. Lemon
Biology Department, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
H3A 1B1
Johnston is right in saying that studies of birdsong development
have not clarified the innate—learned argument as much as we
would have liked. But I think he is wrong in asserting that there
is no point to such an argument. In a sense, this is exactly what
geneticists do when trying to determine the importance of
genotypic and phenotypic effects.
The "inheritance" of birdsong has been demonstrated to
occur in two distinct ways: One way, mainly phenotypic, is
through cultural means in which one individual copies another;
the second is through "innate" means, as is demonstrated by the
fact that the song of an experimental subject is predictably
equivalent to a model song, even though that model was not
available to the subject when he might have copied it. Johnston
may complain about the failure to control for this and that
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variable, but to me the argument and evidence seems clear in its
essentials.
Birdsong researchers are not alone in thinking that certain
acoustic behaviors are learned or innate, as exemplified by those
studying acoustic behavior in other animals, including man. In
man, one recognizes that persons of different races and lan-
guages have no trouble in acquiring the languages of others,
provided that the acquisition occurs in a particular social context
and within certain age limits. Yet it is equally clear that major
differences occur between Homo sapiens and his closest allies,
differences which prevent the latter from ever acquiring speech
(Lieberman 1984); even Neanderthal man probably did not
speak, judging from the estimated position of the larynx. In this
sense, therefore, researchers have claimed "innate" differences
between man and the other primate species. Perhaps the best-
studied examples of innate acoustic behavior are those in
crickets (Teleogryllus) where partial localization of genes has
been achieved (Bentley 1971; Bentley & Hoy 1972).
Yet, the studies on song development have shown serious
problems. One has been the confusion of levels of similarity. If
one were to say that the song of a species is innate, one might
expect to be able to match to a high degree the frequency
modulation patterns of models' and isolates' songs, as one does
in confirming or denying that copying has occurred. This has not
always been the case (see Discussion in Lemon 1975); the details
of the song that matched were sometimes more general features
of organization rather than the precise and detailed sequence of
the sounds.
This failure to distinguish the levels of detailed description
has carried over to conceptual levels. There has been a tendency
to reify the unspecified processes into an organizing "species-
specific" template. Again, at a descriptive level such a concept
fails to distinguish which parts of the song are considered innate
or species-specific — the component sounds, the ways they are
organized, or both. The emphasis on differences separating
species also fails to consider the similarities, for often the best
predictor of the detail and organization of a song in one species is
the song of a close relative, as in New World warblers, thrushes,
and so on. Does this mean there are generic or family-specific
templates as well?
Another problem is what exactly the term "innate" implies.
The implication would seem to be that there are genes somehow
determining the neural control of the song and still others
producing the vocal structures on which these patterns are
expressed. This genetic control could extend to details of the
motor patterns themselves, as in crickets, or it could be more
limited to feature detectors on the sensory side. What we need
to identify in birdsong are genes and their alleles, and to my
knowledge we have not yet attained that state of the art in birds,
although it is much closer in crickets. Indeed, we are unlikely to
have this information available in many studies because of the
difficulties of breeding birds quickly, as Johnston has noted. A
likely success would be small finches.
The two problems of "what is innateness" and "what levels of
organization is one addressing" are evident in studies of car-
dinals (now Cardinalis cardinals) (Dittus & Lemon 1969; 1970).
I believe we neither said nor intend to say that the sounds
eventually developed by the birds isolated from nestling stage
were in themselves innate in the sense of having precise neural
programming. What we concluded, however, was that the
sounds that such birds produced were predictable in certain
parameters, although for the most part different in precise detail
from those of their parents. In other species such as flycatchers
(Tyrannidae) (Kroodsma 1984), it would seem equally reason-
able that the actual motor pattern of the song components is
neurally controlled in an "innate" manner.
In conclusion, birdsong is probably not the best vehicle for
studying innate—learned interactions, as Johnston argues. Yet
the problem is a valid one that cannot be avoided in such
studies. Birdsong research also has the attraction of illustrating a
number of features similar to acoustic behavior in other animals
and man.
Beyond interactionism: A transactional
approach to behavioral development
David B. Miller
Department of Psychology and Center for the Ecological Study of
Perception and Action, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn. 06268
I applaud Johnston's effort in pointing out that the na-
ture/nurture issue is not only alive but has found a happy (but
unfortunate) home in the birdsong literature. I agree that the
"interactionist" position of Lehrman and others affords a more
realistic view of behavioral development. However, most con-
temporary scientists would probably refer to themselves as
"interactionists," including both those who think that some
behaviors are innate and some learned and those who attempt to
assess how much of a given behavior is genetic and how much is
influenced by experience. Interactionism, by its very name,
invites dichotomous thinking (i.e., one interactant acting upon
another).
An appreciation of the overwhelming complexity of behav-
ioral development necessitates adopting a world-view or meta-
theory that transcends a relatively simplistic exchange between
two interacting components. Specifically, as I (and others) have
advocated elsewhere (Miller 1988), development can be better
characterized as a transaction. A transactional approach dictates
that the organism and its internal (neuroanatomical, physiologi-
cal, genetic) and external (physical and social contexts) environ-
ments form a functional unit. Transactions refer to a continuous
exchange of influences among these components. Thus, at all
points along the developmental trajectory, the organism is a
"new" organism, and the internal and external environments
are "new" environments as a function of the transactions occur-
ring throughout development. Since the functional unit of
analysis is the "organism-internal environment-external en-
vironment," one can neither parcel out individual components
as being exclusively responsible for the development of a partic-
ular behavior nor assess what percentage of a behavior is influ-
enced by each component (see Hebb, 1953, for a particularly
cogent critique of this latter point). Unfortunately, this point of
view has not been popular among investigators who have taken
an experimental approach to the study of species-typical behav-
ior. As Johnston points out, the birdsong literature remains a
hotbed of genetic-deterministic as well as environmental-deter-
ministic thinking.
Rather than being an alternative to Lehrman's (1953; 1970)
interactionism, this transactional approach is, instead, a meta-
theoretical shift in emphasis or extension of his views. If one
views the organism and its environments (internal and external)
as a cohesive action system, the only changes that can occur
throughout development are to the system as a whole rather
than to isolated constituent elements. In such a system, some
components may change more than others at any point in time,
but there is a gradient governing the system such that any
change in one component, however minute or large, influences
other components, thereby altering the system as a whole.
Moreover, the system is always in a state of flux, thereby
rendering development a continuous process. Thus, as the
environment changes, so does the organism, which in turn
causes the environment to change again (often in ways too
minute for us to assess), as does the organism, and so on.
As Johnston aptly points out, subtle or nonobvious environ-
mental changes can greatly affect the developmental trajectory
(see also Gottlieb 1981). Accordingly, the development and
Johnston: Birdsong Development
©1988 Cambridge University Press THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1988), 11:4 637
expression of species-typical behavior (e.g., birdsong) can be
influenced by factors not often considered important by experi-
menters. One such influence, which Johnston mentions, is the
influence of context on behavior. Although Kuo (1967) included
environmental context as one of five major determining factors
of every behavioral act, it is a feature that is often neglected or
assumed to be relatively unimportant (particularly in the labora-
tory study of behavior, where the animal's context is far from
species-typical). However, if one were to adopt a transactional
approach to the study of species-typical behavior, context be-
comes a major factor, as it is inseparably related to the develop-
ing organism. There are, in fact, at least two contexts that an
experimenter or observer needs to be concerned with — devel-
opmental context and assessment context. (We sometimes refer
to the latter as the testing context or the behavioral context.)
Birdsong experiments that use varying degrees of isolation
rearing followed by recording songs (or assessing respon-
siveness to songs) in laboratory enclosures implicitly assume
that context is not very important. (The same criticism holds for
most laboratory studies of animal learning as well as behavioral
development in general.) Yet, in the relatively few studies
where investigators have attempted to assess contextual effects
(usually social versus asocial rearing or enclosure type), dramat-
ic differences have been found in the development and ex-
pression of instinctive behavior (e.g., Blaich & Miller 1986;
Brookhart & Hock 1976; Hofer & Shair 1987; McClintock 1987;
Smotherman & Robinson 1986; Vestal & Schnell 1986; Wallen
1982; Whitney 1986). Only after many years of research on the
development of birdsong did investigators realize that social
tutoring affects the developmental trajectory of song acquisition
differently from the commonly used, convenient method of tape
tutoring (as discussed by Johnston). These tutoring experiments
illustrate the importance of social context in behavioral develop-
ment. Little attention has been directed toward assessing the
effects of asocial contextual factors on birdsong learning or
perception. Such factors encompass those features of the natural
habitat of the species under study that are typically missing from
laboratory (and sometimes seminatural) settings.
What also remains to be investigated is the interaction be-
tween developmental and assessment contexts. For example,
the common laboratory practice of moving an animal from a
particular developmental context (e. g., rearing or home cage) to
a different type of testing context (e. g., open field, Skinner box,
preference-testing apparatus, etc.) might greatly affect the ex-
pression of species-typical behavior patterns. We have recently
found this to be the case with respect to the development of the
"freezing" response that mallard ducklings exhibit upon initial
exposure to the maternal alarm call (Blaich et al., in press).
In conclusion, Johnston has raised some important red flags
regarding the tradition of studying the development of a particu-
lar species-typical behavior (which can, in fact, be extended to
developmental studies in general). It is hoped that the transac-
tional approach I have outlined, along with a heightened consid-
eration of the importance of context, will stimulate some investi-
gators to reconsider the kinds of developmental questions they
are asking and the means by which they are seeking answers.
"Innate": Outdated and inadequate or
linguistic convenience?
Eugene S. Morton
Department of Zoological Research, National Zoological Park, Smithsonian
Institution, Washington, D.C. 20008
Johnston offers constructive criticism of isolation experiments
and their interpretation as research pertinent to the develop-
ment of behavior. But is development the entire focus of the
experiments he criticizes? I think not. The general question of
how the end product functions, quite apart from a developmen-
tal scientist's interest in determining the details of control over
the end product's ontogeny, is also important. These details are
significant and interesting to learn, but, if focused solely on
questions about how birdsong develops, they may or may not be
relevant to questions about why the end product is as it is.
Indeed, that focus might miss important aspects of ontogeny.
This is because birdsong development may be due to factors
not immediately connected with its function or its contribution
to individual fitness. This is not unique to birdsong. For exam-
ple, Lack (1949) refers to habitat selection in an invertebrate,
which in nature is found only in fresh waters between certain
temperature limits, as follows:
It might be shown, first, that the animal selects its habitat through a
direct response to temperature, and second that, under laboratory
conditions, it readily survives in temperatures outside these limits. In
this case, though temperature is the proximate factor controlling
habitat selection, the ultimate factor determining survival is different,
perhaps competition for food with another species. A temperature
response has evolved because the animal is thereby brought into the
habitat where it can survive. (pp. 299-300)
Two things are important: Detailed developmental research
may not provide answers to ultimate questions in evolutionary
biology and these answers must involve knowledge of function
derived from studies of the animals in nature. For these reasons,
the concept of "innate" as a linguistic convenience is useful:
Research into birdsong function is showing that relative ca-
nalization of song development has important evolutionary
causes and consequences. Furthermore, the innate versus
learned dichotomy, as a linguistic convenience reflecting that
canalization, seems to describe what occurs in birds in nature
better than does a model that emphasizes gradation. That its use
may have caused mischief in studies of development, or has
sometimes led to relegating development to a "black box," does
not mean that it has no heuristic value in evolutionary biology.
In nature, only a few avian taxonomic groups are described as
having learned songs (Nottebohm 1975). Normal song structure
is lacking without auditory experience of the adult song in the
oscine passerines, whereas in other passerines, such as
flycatchers (Kroodsma 1984; 1985) and antbirds (Morton, per-
sonal observation), normal song structures develop without
such experience. It would be valuable, in the manner that
Johnston suggests in sections VI and VII, to study the develop-
ment of song in more representatives of all passerine families
from a variety of climatic, ecological, and social environments.
The study of song function is crucial to understanding ultimate
causation.
Most earlier studies of song function have concentrated on
species-specific coding in oscines (e. g. , Becker 1982). A positive
response to a song playback is taken as proof that species-specific
information is present. Recent work is showing that variation in
response levels is even more informative about the function of
song as a long distance signal. It is also more closely allied with
modern evolutionary biology, since response variation is dis-
cussed at the individual level, at or nearer where natural
selection operates, rather than at the species level (Williams
1966).
In developing a hypothesis (the Ranging Hypothesis, Morton
1982) to incorporate variation in responses to song with song
function, I stated:
It differs from many recent hypotheses on the significance of bird song
and its evolution by incorporating the fact that these signals travel
some distance through environments and evolve in populations
differing in demographic profile. An analysis of bird song spec-
trograms cannot incorporate these elements because the data are
largely lost in spectrograms. Hypotheses of bird song function and
evolution must incorporate all of the natural characteristics of bird
songs, including the effects of distance on their physical structure and
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other elements of the acoustic environment in which they function.
(Morton 1986, p. 66)
By this I meant that singing is only a part of the analysis of song
function because the results of song development have conse-
quences for the same individual as a perceiver of the songs of
conspecifics. If the individual has a song stored in memory, it is
able to assess acoustic degradation in the incoming signal by
matching it with the same song stored in memory. This provides
it with an estimate of its distance to the singing conspecific
(range). The ability to expend energy efficiently is closely tied to
the ability to range in those birds with small body size. These
species have a low energy storage capacity relative to their daily
energy need: They can starve overnight. It is this class of birds
that is said to "learn" long distance signals. I suggested that
ranging ability is directly related to the evolution of song
learning as exhibited by small oscines and hummingbirds (Mor-
ton 1986). It follows that large species of oscines, such as crows,
do not use their phylogenetic ability for vocal learning to
develop signals with which to defend territories.
This is to say that function is important in birdsong research
but it is not without its own pitfalls as a guide to generating
hypotheses. Whenever proximate causation is not directly tied
to ultimate causation, it might be best to encourage many
approaches to research before we relegate some to the outdated
and inadequate category.
Conceptual errors, different perspectives,
and genetic analysis of song ontogeny
Paul C. Mundinger
Department of Biology, Queens College, City University of New York,
Flushing, N.Y. 11367
The "conceptual errors" Johnston assigns to ethology appear to
be the outcome of a misalignment of psychological and eth-
ological perspectives. Ethologists are biologists. The gene and
evolution are of central interest, as are ultimate as well as
proximate questions about behavior and a focus on detailed
behavioral description. Interactionists are primarily trained as
psychologists for whom the gene and evolution are not as central
and who tend primarily to ask proximate, mechanistic ques-
tions. Now consider the ethological "error" of focusing on
structural analyses and overlooking functional ones. Ethologists
do focus on structural analysis. Careful description is a basic
component of ethological training. But structural analyses are
basic and logical first steps to subsequent comparative or func-
tional analyses. And they do not limit asking functional ques-
tions; for example, Johnston cites several functional analyses
performed by ethologists (sect. VII.2). So there is no "concep-
tual error" here; this seems to be a fiction, primarily apparent
and of concern to someone who, like Johnston, has a strong
functional bias in assessing the structural emphasis of a different
scientific tradition.
A more important "error" is Johnston's claim that modern
ethology still dichotomizes behavior into innate (=gene deter-
mined) and acquired categories. This "error" may not be real
either. The two different perspectives may have produced
misunderstandings once again, in this instance facilitated by the
dual meaning of "innate." The first meaning (11) is used when
behavioral differences are attributable to genetic differences.
Essentially "innate" then means "genetically determined"
(Brown 1975; Lehrman 1970). Comparative behaviorists (in-
teractionists) prefer this meaning (Lehrman 1970), which is best
applied to differences appearing in genetic experiments.
The second meaning (I2) is applied to behavior that develops
independently of learning from other individuals, such as to the
songs of birds raised in isolation experiments. I cannot speak for
all ethologists, but it is 12 that I apply to isolate behavior, and I
believe it is the one most ethologists use. Johnston, following
interactionist tradition, seems to prefer II. He gives 12 only
passing reference (sect. II. C.3), while devoting sections II and
III to citing many ethologists in ways that make it appear they
intended "innate" to mean "genetically determined. "
If this were really so then the charge that modern ethologists
categorize behavior as either acquired or genetically deter-
mined might hold. But that is not how I interpret their work.
Many of the studies cited refer to the innate (I2) songs of acoustic
isolates. Then, when considering or discussing the causal factors
associated with those innate patterns, ethologists, being biolo-
gists, will generally focus on ultimate questions and on genes as
a causal factor of special interest, instead of, say, nonobvious
factors. By linking 12 to genes in his discussion, an ethologist
might seem to equate innate with gene-determined and thereby
appear to be supporting the dichotomy. So ethology's "concep-
tual error" of dichotomizing behavior into innate (gene deter-
mined) and acquired also seems to be a fiction arising from the
failure of two scientific traditions to fully understand the other's
point of view. Lehrman (1970) brought some of this to our
attention a generation ago.
Johnston is quite partisan in his presentation of the interac-
tionist agenda. I noted a number of strongly worded statements
and predictions very critical of the ethological position while
supporting an interactionist one. For example,
(1) Johnston predicts that the ethological approach will prove
inadequate for the genetic analysis of song development (see
Abstract; also sect. IV, last para.).
(2) He states "Until [we] induce single-gene mutations that
affect song development . . . our knowledge of genetic contri-
butions to song development must remain virtually nil."
(3) He is almost dogmatic in the contention that the in-
nateness concept is not useful in analyzing behavior develop-
ment. For example, he says "Lehrman (1953) argued the
learned—innate dichotomy was entirely inadequate to the task of
analyzing the development of behavior" and later he criticizes
Marler and Sherman (1985) for suggesting that finding innate
differences in behavior (11) has developmental relevance. I
contend that these statements reflect conceptual errors by
Johnston, and perhaps of the interactionist school as a whole.
Not yet published evidence falsifying these statements, thereby
exposing them as errors, comes from a recent genetic analysis of
canary song learning (Mundinger, in preparation).
Genetic analysis of canary song learning. This breeding ex-
periment focused on song-learning predispositions, but other
developmentally relevant data were collected. The canary was
chosen because inbred strains exist; some (e. g., the roller strain)
have been selected for their song patterns for perhaps 200 years.
Other strains (border canaries) have not been selected for song.
The experimental design, based on the isolation experiment,
was similar to the hypothetical one in Johnston's Figure 2. There
were four genetic treatments: pure roller (RR), pure border
(BB), and the two reciprocal cross hybrids (RB & BR). There
were two environmental treatments: untutored isolates and
tutored (providing equal exposure to a roller and a border song
pattern). The results reveal clear, statistically significant behav-
ioral differences among the genetic lines. All four tutored
borders learned only from the border tutor; all three tutored
rollers learned only from the roller tutor; all four BR and RB
hybrids learned from both tutors. Figure 1B - D provides some
examples of this differential imitation. The conclusion reached
was that differences in song-learning predispositions are due to
genetic differences between the strains. In the language used
here and in the article, differences in roller and border song-
learning predispositions are I1, or "genetically determined."
This experiment was based on the standard ethological isola-
tion experiment and no single-gene mutations were identified.
Yet the experiment represents a useful first step in the genetic
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programs may in the future be used to search for those proposed
single-gene mutations affecting song development.
This commentary is not a criticism of the interactionist per-
spective, which is an important one. To understand birdsong
development we benefit by having the subject studied by
scientists trained in different traditions, with differing intellec-
tual perspectives, different questions posed, and different ex-
perimental techniques employed. But we also need mutual
understanding and a clear channel of communication. John-
ston's target article is beneficial in that he has articulated the
interactionist perspective clearly, and perhaps it will stimulate
ethologists to choose their words more carefully and to expand
their research horizons. Where he seems to have erred is in
being too partisan and in not fully appreciating and understand-
ing the ethological perspective.
Figure 1 (Mundinger). Representative songs of different ca-
nary strains. A, untutored border; B, tutored border; C, tutored
roller X border hybrid; D, tutored roller; E, untutored roller.
Upper-case letters refer to border tutor imitations; lower-case
letters refer to roller tutor imitations; letter (a) in parentheses
refers to a roller-tutor-like tour that developed independent of
tutoring.
analysis of song development. For the first time in the analysis of
song development, ethology went from the isolation experiment
to one embedded in a genetic experiment. Furthermore, the
project uncovered detailed strain differences involving the
motor side of song development (e.g., rollers go through song
ontogeny much faster than borders, with hybrids intermediate).
So the first two of Johnston's predictions and statements are
falsified.
Now I turn to innate behavioral patterns, to an innate—
acquired classification, and to whether or not they have any
relevance to the analysis of behavior development. Figure IA
and 1E are the I1 song patterns of an untutored border and
roller, respectively. They are representative and reveal that the
innate songs of borders are structurally abnormal. These isolate
songs are not organized into tours, and they do not sound like
canary songs. A comparison between the songs of tutored and
untutored borders shows clearly that border canaries require
tutor experience to develop normal song organization. In con-
trast, the 12 songs of the isolate rollers were, like those of the
tutored rollers, organized into tours (Fig. 1D&E) and sounded
somewhat normal. But the tours were generally not composed
of syllables resembling those in the roller tutor, with an occa-
sional exception such as syllable type (a) in Figure 1E. Tour (a) is
flute-like in quality and roller breeders have, for over a century,
bred for long, tour-dominated songs that include such flute-like
tours.
Thus it seems that modern roller canaries have a genetic
constitution that results in long, tour-dominated, 12 song pat-
terns, and on occasion, some individual rollers will develop
flute-like tours independent of tutoring. These genetic breeding
results show that roller and border developmental programs
differ and that differences in their song development programs
are II. These innate differences involve differences in song-
learning predispositions, differences in rate and timing of motor
development, differences in their respective subsong stages,
differences in tour organization, and differences in the structure
of 12 syllable patterns. These are all developmentally relevant
findings.
Therefore statement 3 (above) is incorrect as both 12 and
acquired categories (used when comparing song patterns of
tutored and untutored birds), and the concept of innate dif-
ferences in behavior (used in examining strain differences in 12
song structure) were needed to discover some of those develop-
mentally relevant results. Furthermore, the discovery of I1
differences in canary song structure and in song development
How do you transmit a template?
Susan Oyama
Department of Psychology, John Jay College, City University of New York,
New York, N.Y. 10019
Johnston's analysis clearly demonstrates the ways in which the
nature/nurture opposition, frequently declared to be obsolete,
continues to inform basic assumptions, methods, and in-
terpretations in a highly influential field. Work in this area has
reflected its major figures' insistence on distinguishing, in some
way or other, between innate and acquired components of
phenotypes. The target article shows forcefully the conse-
quences of formulating a research question in terms of the
nature/nurture dichotomy; it reveals the intimate links between
theoretical framework, design, and explanation. Indeed, it
helps us understand why, in the face of constant disclaimers,
methodological clarifications, and cautionary notes, the na-
ture/nurture dichotomy (or continuum, as its liberal proponents
would have it) lives on.
If Johnston's message is taken to heart, it will be a good thing,
not only for students of birdsong, but for all those others who
look to birdsong studies for models and kinds of explanations. I
remember very well how salient the imprinting and birdsong
literatures were for students of language in the 1960s and 1970s.
Anyone who had been the least bit impressed by Chomsky's
(1959) critique of Skinner's (1957) Verbal behavior was on the
lookout for a "biological perspective" on language. Penfield and
Roberts's volume had appeared the same year (1959), and later,
Lenneberg's book, Biological foundations of language (1967),
was seen as giving definitive biological support to the claim that
language was innate. Lenneberg's thinking on "biological
bases" became progressively more subtle as time went by, and
ultimately he grew quite unhappy with the way the notion of
critical periods was being used by students of language develop-
ment (Oyama 1978). But templates and imprinting were irresist-
ible. Images of experience being trimmed to fit genetically
ordained outlines or of shutters opening and snapping shut on
the sensory world were too attractive to pass up. To be an
courant was to be a nativist, and the ethologists and other
biologists were showing us how.
A look at some papers from a relatively recent volume on
human language acquisition (Wanner & Gleitman 1982) shows
the continuing pervasiveness of these ideas. There is a strong
presumption of innateness in the collection. Goldin-Meadow
(1982, p. 51) cites (among others) Lenneberg on critical periods,
Marler on birdsong, and Mayr on open and closed programs,
arguing for "resilient" ("prepared" or "closed") properties of
language. Shatz (1982) adopts the increasingly popular language
of internal constraints (though she also speaks of programs); the
primary problem in acquisition studies, she says, is the assign-
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ing of "the primary burden of development" to internal or
external control. Although she believes both are involved, "the
issue is still how and how much each contributes" (p. 108).
The birdsong literature is obviously not responsible for the
nature/nurture dichotomy in studies of human language. Both
draw on a very old tradition of thought. Two things are notewor-
thy, though. One is the similarity of the intellectual strategies
used in both research traditions (infer innateness from depriva-
tion cases, pit insides against outsides, quantify causal contribu-
tions of genes and environment to the phenotype, and, con-
versely, partition phenotypes according to the kind of cause that
supposedly formed them). The other is psychologists' and lin-
guists' use of biologists' accounts to justify nativist arguments.
The authority of biology is used to legitimate just the di-
chotomous views that need criticism. Like the reverberating
circuit between theory and evidence, this sort of cross-reference
among fields helps shaky concepts to transcend their weak-
nesses and become deeply entrenched through sheer reiter-
ation.
Running through all nature/nurture literature is the meta-
phor of transmission. Transmission by genetic means is con-
trasted with cultural transmission; maturation and learning are
the alternative "mechanisms." The induction favored by psy-
cholinguists accords the young human a greater role than the
imitation and conditioning that exhaust many conceptions of
learning, but both maturation and learning, however misguided
their conventional meanings, are developmental processes, and
development is just what the transmission metaphor denies
(Oyama 1988c; in press). The language acquisition field's focus
on cognitively active children is a kind of antidote to the old
child-as-sponge view, but it does not succeed in overcoming the
weaknesses of the dual-transmission framework. [ See also
Lightfoot: "The Child's Trigger Experience" BBS, forth-
 coming.]
Leaving aside the question of just what a template could be,
we may wonder how such a thing (or a grammar, or a language
acquisition device, or any other feature) can be transmitted in
the genes. Or, alternatively, how can it be transmitted socially?
How can it be transmitted at all, if by transmission one means
the conveyance or delivery of an object or message, rather than
its ontogenetic construction? And, if we are less literal-minded
and use the word to refer only to the reliable outcomes of
development, we are assuming the formative processes, not
identifying or explaining them. Nor is it possible to distinguish
two kinds of process, one in which the genes are more important
and one in which they are less important. Finally, if "transmis-
sion" is reserved for variation attributable to genetic or environ-
mental variation, it is properly applied to populations, not
phenotypes. We find ourselves in just the muddle over dif-
ferences and characters that Johnston describes in his section
IV.
Bever's chapter in the Wanner and Gleitman (1982) volume
points out that both nativists and empiricists claim that the other
side's mechanism cannot possibly explain language; one's own
position is declared valid by default. "We must rely either on as
yet inconceivably complex genetic mechanisms of behavioral
I transmission or on an inconceivably delicate and sensitive in-
ductive system of learning" (p. 432). Following Katz, he sug-
gests a retreat from the perplexities of the phenotype — away
from language acquisition and use, to a view of language as
uncaused Platonic reality.
I think Bever is right to scrutinize some of the assumptions
underlying nativist and empiricist views of language. My own
preference would be to take another look at development before
turning my eyes to the realm of uncaused forms. The interac-
tionist perspective described by Johnston offers us a way of
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Johnston's target article brought to mind the chemical reflux
experiments of undergraduate days when we would endlessly
boil and reboil the voluminous products of a synthesis. We
would eventually distill a few mls of pure sample, the "experi-
mental essence." This endproduct, a well-known material,
could also be obtained in large quantity from lab supplies, and
repetition of the distillation process, once it had been mastered,
did little to further our education.
Johnston's paper boils down to two admonitions: that careless
use of nature/nurture terminology can lead to careless in-
terpretation of results and that research merely for the purpose
of attributing behaviors to "a particular cause (genes or environ-
ment)" may obscure more fruitful lines of investigation. These
admonitions are already well known (see Bateson 1984; Schleidt
1985; West & King 1985a). I agree with Johnston's aim of
stimulating further research on developmental questions, par-
ticularly with respect to the stage of development at which such
investigations should begin. I do not agree that yet another
discussion of the nature/nurture dichotomy is necessary to
effect significant changes in experimental design, nor that label-
ing a behavior "innate" has specifically prevented important
further research from taking place.
Johnston targets areas in the study of birdsong that he feels
have been ignored or performed poorly because of adherence to
the innate versus learned dichotomy. He believes, rightly, that
much can be learned by examining different or more basic
developmental stages. But one need not first discredit the
concept of innate versus learned in order to suggest that what is
"innate" might be more basic than was originally thought — e. g. ,
an innate blueprint for neurons that respond only to a specific
call rate, rather than to a species-specific call. And although
birdsong researchers do indeed use terms such as "innate"
when they should instead state that the role of learning in one
system is relatively small compared with that in another, I doubt
that anyone studying song would refuse to do the experiments
Johnston suggests because a behavior has already been labeled
" innate. "
It wasn't the acceptance of an innate template, for example,
that prevented studies on the effects of social interaction on song
acquisition prior to the recent work cited by Johnston. The
effects of social interaction were ignored because many re-
searchers, not yet understanding either what young birds actu-
ally experienced in the field or the effects of a sterile environ-
ment on an animal's behavior, blithely adopted (rather than
adapted) the conditions of the psychology lab in an attempt to
establish experimental rigor (see discussions in Kroodsma
1985a; Pepperberg 1988; West & King 1985b). Even so, some
researchers did perform finer-grained examinations of behav-
iors that had already been designated "innate." For example,
despite the (then) generally accepted idea that song sparrows
(Melospiza melodia) produced "basically normal" songs without
experience (i.e., had an innate program for conspecific song;
Konishi & Nottebohm 1969; Mulligan 1966), Kroodsma (1977)
cross-fostered song sparrows with canaries and found that the
juvenile sparrows produced abnormal conspecific songs and
replicated some song characteristics of their foster parents.
Similarly, Waser and Marler (1977) examined the effects of
social interaction on song learning in another bird thought to
have an "innate template," the roller canary.
The point of the above examples is that careful researchers
recognize that the problems Johnston (mis)attributes to a desire
to partition behavior into innate and learned components are
instead caused by (1) premature conclusions drawn from experi-
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ments that misapply techniques from other fields (both in design
and scope) and (2) our continuing ignorance of the complex
interactions that actually occur between birds (young-old,
female-female, male-male, male-female) in nature. Many ex-
periments have not yet been done because researchers recog-
nize these pitfalls and cannot yet see how they can be avoided.
Johnston does recognize the technical difficulties that prevent
certain experiments from being performed: for example, that
genetic manipulation cannot yet contribute to the study of
birdsong. Unfortunately, our ability to perform the other ex-
periments he proposes is also limited, because they require
careful adaptation of procedures from other fields as well as
assays solidly based on the detailed behavioral ecology of the
subject (note Kamil 1984).
I am sensitive to the issues Johnston raises: I have proposed
(although not in print) some of the same experiments that
Johnston suggests. My colleagues have patiently explained why
such experiments haven't yet been done or they have described
their attempts to design or perform these experiments. Thus,
although there is agreement that the effects of prenatal hearing
should be part of a comparative study on song development, few
labs are equipped for such an undertaking. To perform these
experiments correctly, one must raise birds from eggs both in
total isolation and with many forms of auditory stimulation; for
example, one must not only play tapes of allospecific calls and
songs but also find a different species capable of cross-fostering
to examine the effects of allospecific social interaction as well as
vocalization. Controls must be run using devocalized con-
specific and allospecific parents to examine effects of nonvocal
interaction. Experiments must also be performed with birds
that are deafened both pre- and postnatally to examine the
effects of self-stimulation. But passerines, unlike mallards, are
not easily raised in the laboratory from eggs, and I doubt that
prenatal deafening of these birds is yet a viable technique. Many
of these experiments might elicit objections from animal care
committees. Nevertheless, these are important experiments if
we are to understand all the environmental aspects that influ-
ence vocal development. In a similar vein, Johnston proposes
examining the functional normality of songs and singing behav-
ior of tape-tutored males. Such experiments require appropri-
ate male and female assays of potency of male song — but the
quality of current assays and the conditions under which they
are valid are still not clear (e.g., Rothstein et al. 1988; Searcy &
Marler 1981; West et al. 1981b).
A new (or resurrected) paradigm is not necessary to energize
research into developmental issues. Important discoveries will
be made by those who carefully adapt techniques from other
fields and design exacting experiments, not by those who argue
over the definition of "innate." Bateson (1984), for example,
already defined the difference between "unlearned," "genet-
ically inherited," and "phylogenetically adapted" behaviors; he
also stressed that behavior patterns that were first expressed
without learning could be modified by later learning. Eth-
ologists like Tinbergen succeeded because they were commit-
ted to discovering the most basic, underlying reasons for a
behavior. By exhaustively examining and describing a behavior
in nature, continuously questioning the reasons for its exis-
tence, and designing new techniques to answer these questions,
they made the kinds of discoveries that Johnston desires. And
this form of science is still in existence: At a recent ornithological
meeting (American Ornithologists' Union, August 1987), many
of the topics that Johnston proposes for study were indeed the
subjects of the papers presented.
Had Johnston's theme simply been that birdsong researchers
ought to improve their techniques (e.g., Kroodsma 1987) and
learn to integrate their field experiences with detailed knowl-
edge of endocrinology, neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, social
psychology, nonverbal linguistics, and so on, I would have
unhesitantly cheered. I do believe that that was the essence of
his paper — but I regretted having to perform the distillation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Preparation of this commentary was supported by NSF grant BNS
86-16955. I am indebted to Roger Milkman for the title.
In defense of innateness and of its critics
Jonathan Schull
Department of Psychology, Haverford College, Haverford, Pa. 19041
Although Johnston's intention is to show that the concept of
innateness is incoherent, his Figure 2 only demonstrates (with
considerable elegance) that "innate" does not mean "heritable."
There are many other things "innate" does not mean, and
Johnston demonstrates that the concept continues to cause
confusion and to occlude worthwhile research questions. But he
does not get at the source of the trouble: We need a concept that
means "not learned" (approximately; see below) yet we also
need to (1) dissociate it from other attributes which do not
necessarily go along with innateness ("heritable," "evolved,"
"developmentally fixed," "present at birth," etc.) and (2) dis-
card other connotations which are now bankrupt and incoherent
if compellingly seductive ("in the genes," "independent of
experience," etc.).
"Innate" does not mean "due to genotypic differences."
Everyone agrees that when two genotypes give rise to phe-
notypic differences these are validly attributed to the genotypic
differences. Unfortunately, the concept of innateness has been
yoked to this formulation by commentators as diverse as
Lehrman (1970) and Johnston on the one hand, and Mader and
Sherman (1985) on the other. Thus, Johnston allows that "we
may describe the behavioral differences as innate," whereas
Marler and Sherman even assert that the "crucial point for
ethologists to appreciate . . . is that . . . the appropriate ap-
plication of the term [. . . innate is not to characteristics of
organisms but to . . .] differences between organisms" (p. 57;
italic in original).
Although all these writers seem to hold that "innate" is a
synonym for "due to genotypic differences," we usually bring an
entirely different kind of evidence to bear upon the conclusion
that a trait (or a difference) is innate: The trait (or difference)
must arise in an environment in which it could not have been
learned. So, for example, Marler and Sherman write that "the
most striking result of this experiment [comparing song spar-
rows with swamp sparrows] is the large number of song dif-
ferences that persist in birds of the two species when they are
reared in isolation from adult conspecific song. We conclude
that many of the differences between normal swamp and song
sparrow songs are innate, developing as a consequence of
genotypic differences between the two species" (p. 68). The
validity of this conclusion stems not from the fact that it is
applied to differences, but that it is applied to animals reared in
isolation from all plausible models.
Showing that behavioral differences are due to genetic dif-
ferences is neither sufficient nor necessary to demonstrate that
the behavioral differences are innate. Suppose individuals of
species X and of species Y are exposed to Y's normal song. Y
individuals learn their normal song, whereas X individuals learn
nothing and acquire only a crude song. The "behavioral-dif-
ferences-due-to-genotypic-differences" formulation would have
us conclude that the difference between normal and crude song
is innate, even though it is clear that the difference is due to
learning and that the normal song is learned. Similarly, suppose
neither species is exposed to normal song, and both species
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develop identical, crude songs. Since there is no difference, the
"differences-are-innate" formulation must fail to draw the right
conclusion — that the crude song (or the pattern-generating
process which gives rise to it; see below) is innate in both
species.
This is not to deny the value of demonstrating that behavioral
differences are due to genetic differences. Such a demonstration
indicates that the behavioral differences are heritable and could
have been, or could be, naturally selected. But those (I urge) are
different questions. Conversely, although the demonstration
that a behavior pattern can develop in the absence of an environ-
mental model may establish the innateness of the pattern, the
example demonstrates that this need not mean "developmen-
tally fixed," "present from birth," and so on. These too, are
different and eminently investigatable questions. Thus, if we
dissociate "innateness" from other characteristics which may or
may not be associated with it, the conclusion that a behavioral
pattern is innate should open (rather than foreclose) further
investigation. Indeed, I suggest below that a whole other type of
investigation and explanation is mandated for innate behavioral
patterns. Learned patterns are copied. "Innate" patterns, ulti-
mately, are generated.
Explanations of complex patterns are of two distinct (but not
incompatible) types. The first type of explanation shows how a
complex pattern arises through the interaction of processes
which do not themselves contain the pattern. For example, it
has been suggested that relatively simple processes of reaction-
diffusion could give rise to complex patterns of pigmentation in
animal fur (Murray 1988). This may explain how zebras get their
stripes. The second type of explanation shows how a complex
pattern is derived from a preexisting isomorphic pattern that has
been "captured" by some kind of a copying mechanism. For
example, my skin could be sunburned in stripes if I fell asleep in
the shadow of a venetian blind. Applying this distinction to
birdsong, Johnston's "nonobvious experiential contributions to
song development" inform explanations of the pattern-generat-
ing type; learning processes by which behaviors acquire the
patterning of environmental patterns (such as conspecific songs
or contingencies of reinforcement) inform explanations of the
copying type.
This distinction allows a refinement of the definition of "in-
nate": Behavioral patterns are innate if they are not copied from
the environment (thus, neither learned patterns nor unlearned-
but-copied patterns like striped suntans are innate). More
important, the failure to recognize the distinction is arguably
responsible for much of the confusion and controversy regarding
innate characteristics.
For one thing, the demonstration that a behavior pattern is
innate often leads to the spurious conclusion that the environ-
ment does not contribute to the pattern. This is necessarily false
because the environment interacts with the organism to pro-
duce every organismic trait, innate or acquired; in the case of
innate behaviors, however, the environment does this via pat-
tern-generation processes. Another source of confusion is that
our facility with pattern-copying accounts can lead to spurious
explanations of innate patterns. Consider the case in which
species-typical song characteristics develop in an environment
which provides no opportunity for learning — either (1) the
pattern was created rather than copied or (2) the pattern was
copied from a pattern elsewhere within the organism (e.g., a
sensory template). Contrary to Johnston, I see nothing wrong
with this hypothesis, which is supported by the observation that
deafening prevents the development of normal innate song
(putatively by preventing the bird from learning how to sing
songs which fit the sensory template).
However, researchers will inevitably be led astray if they
think that copying-type explanations can be extended "all the
way down" to the genome, since genes do not in any meaningful
sense contain, represent, or encode the innate behavioral pat-
terns they make possible. Genes encode sequences of amino
acids. Sequences of amino acids make sequences of behavior
possible, but the latter are in no sense copies of the former, not
even copies many times removed. Rather, genes somehow
enable an organism to interact with its environment to generate
an innate pattern. Behavioral scientists haven't a prayer of
discovering how this occurs unless they recognize that explana-
tions of the noncopying-type must be sought and that all expla-
nations are bankrupt which presume that patterns of behavior,
aspects of behavior, or even differences in behavior are repre-
sented "in the genes," or in a genetic "blueprint." If they do
recognize the need for the pattern-generation type of explana-
tion they will be better prepared to manipulate genetic, physio-
logical, and environmental variables in order to identify critical
organism—environment interactions.
This then is the significance of innateness. To the extent that
an organismic pattern is innate it is (a) not explicable in terms of a
copying process from the environment and therefore (b) must
ultimately be explained in terms of pattern-generation rather
than pattern-copying. To the extent that an organismic pattern
is learned, (a) its provenance is to be found in the environment
and (b) explanation in pattern-generation terms may or may not
be necessary. (Even if a pattern was learned from an environ-
mental model, we will often want to know how the pattern is
regenerated by the nervous system during -playback.") In
either case, however, the pattern is inevitably due to interac-
tions of a developing organism with an environment, and these
interactions are made possible by the organism's genome. In-
vestigating these interactions is a good thing but does not
require that we abandon the notion of innateness.
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Song development from evolutionary and
ecological perspectives
William A. Searcy
Department of Biological Sciences and Pymatuning Laboratory of Ecology,
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260
Johnston's criticisms of work on song development in birds can
be divided into two categories: He suggests, first, that this work
has relied on an outmoded theoretical formulation, the innate
versus learned dichotomy, and second, that researchers in this
area have used uninteresting and unproductive research de-
signs while ignoring better ones. Without conceding the first
criticism, I will concentrate on the second, which I regard as
more fundamental.
It should hardly be necessary to point out that judgments
about what is and is not interesting may vary between scientific
disciplines. Most workers on song development come from the
discipline of ethology, which has traditionally placed great
emphasis on the evolution of behavior, especially in terms of
elucidating the selective costs and benefits of behavior in eco-
logical settings (Hinde 1982; Tinbergen 1951). Thus, although
workers in song development must necessarily have some in-
terest in proximate mechanisms of development, their interests
are likely to go beyond this to include ultimate questions about
the evolution of song and song development. It is in this context
that we need to evaluate the form taken by song development
studies.
Among research designs that have been used commonly,
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Johnston is most critical of isolation experiments, in which
young birds are reared in conditions that prevent them from
hearing songs during their critical learning period and the songs
developed by these isolates are compared with songs of control
birds reared with exposure to song from recordings or live
tutors. Johnston complains that this design "offers only a rather
crude analysis of the contribution of experience to song develop-
ment and provides no information at all about genetic contribu-
tions to development." However, from an evolutionary per-
spective, this experiment does seem a logical first step in
analysis, since its results will indicate the extent to which
observed variations in song are the product of imitation. Fea-
tures incorporated due to imitation of conspecifics may be
classified as cultural traits; in fact, it would be terminologically
more correct (if less euphonious) to refer to a noncultural-
cultural dichotomy in place of the "innate—learned" dichotomy.
This noncultural—cultural dichotomy is of special importance
from an evolutionary perspective in that the forces that cause
culture to evolve, although they are not well understood, are
certainly different from those causing genetic evolution (Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman 1981). Another positive feature of the isola-
tion experiments is that, because this one type of experiment
has been repeated many times with different species (though
the methods are not as standardized as one would like), phy-
logenetic trends of great interest are starting to emerge concern-
ing the relative importance of imitation in different taxa
(Kroodsma 1982).
Johnston also criticizes studies of differences between songs
developed by individuals of different genotypes raised in identi-
cal environments. He states that "comparing the songs of, say,
swamp and song sparrows reared under identical conditions
(Marler & Sherman 1983; 1985) cannot reveal any of the detail
that we need in order to understand how genes contribute to
development." Perhaps, but again this design does give us
information of evolutionary interest: It tells us which differences
between the two species' songs are not due to imitation and
must therefore be attributed to genetic rather than cultural
evolution.
The areas that Johnston claims have been neglected because
of a failure to adopt an interactionist viewpoint include fine-level
genetic differences, nonobvious experiential contributions, and
functional outcomes. The absence of studies of fine-level genetic
differences can be ascribed to the unavailability of the necessary
tools (such as single gene mutations affecting song), as Johnston
admits. However, I would add that such studies would strike
many ethologists as uninteresting anyway; if we know that a
feature is under genetic control, then it will almost certainly
evolve due to natural selection, no matter how the genetic
control is realized.
Among factors that might make nonobvious experiential con-
tributions, Johnston lists social context; calls produced by par-
ents, siblings, or the subjects themselves; nonvocal stimulation;
and song heard prenatally or in early postnatal life. Johnston
admits that the first of these has been extensively studied. The
reason that ethologists have focused on effects of social context is
that this bears on a number of important evolutionary and
ecological questions. For example, the question of whether
social stimulation affects the length of the critical learning
period is tightly tied to the problem of the origin and signifi-
cance of dialects (Baker & Cunningham 1985; Baptista & Pe-
trinovich 1984; Marler & Tamura 1962). In addition, the effect of
social relationships on choice of song models by the male has
major implications for how the song can be used in mate choice
by the female (e.g., McGregor & Krebs 1982; Millington &
Price 1985). The other factors listed by Johnston have certainly
been relatively, though not entirely, neglected, undoubtedly
because they do not have such obvious evolutionary implica-
tions. Further work on any of these factors should certainly be
encouraged.
The final area that Johnston claims has been neglected in song
development concerns functional outcomes: the question of
how experimentally induced alterations in song development
affect the function of song in communication. To me, this
question seems to flow more logically from the evolutionary and
ecological interests of the ethologists than from an interactionist
viewpoint. A recent comprehensive review of song learning
called for just this type of study (Kroodsma 1982), and systematic
experiments along these lines antedate this call (King & West
1977; West et al. 1981a) and have continued to be performed
(Searcy et al. 1985; Searcy & Marler 1987, Spitler-Nabors &
Baker 1987). Much more work certainly remains to be done in
this area, but its importance has already been realized.
Progress in any scientific discipline can hardly be expected to
be optimal, depending as it does on decisions made by many
researchers working independently, each with an agenda.
Nevertheless, I believe the overall trend of research in birdsong
development can be fully justified; given the interests of the
workers involved, the most productive research designs have
been used, and no better ones have been neglected.
The nature and nurture of birdsong
P. J. B. Slater
Department of Biology & Preclinical Medicine, University of St. Andrews,
Fife KY16 9TS, United Kingdom
Johnston's target article is a timely one, although his case is
somewhat overstated. There is hardly the widespread reversion
to thinking in terms of a learning/instinct dichotomy amongst
those working on song development that he claims. However,
Peter Marler, who is justifiably regarded as the leading figure in
this field, together with some of his co-workers and students,
certainly does use some of the terminology of that earlier era
(e.g. Marler & Sherman 1985). It is to his group that most of
Johnston's quotes are attributable. Most others who study song
development at least claim to espouse a more interactionist
viewpoint, though their wording may suffer from the occasional
lapse and some of their experiments may ask inappropriate
questions.
I agree totally with Johnston's distaste for such expressions as
"preordained," "blueprinted," or "genetically controlled." It is
hard to imagine anyone imprinted on the writings of Danny
Lehrman during the sensitive phase of their early ethological
upbringing who would think otherwise. There is nothing new in
Johnston's argument here. What is new, and surprising, is that it
should be necessary to reiterate it so soon after the na-
ture/nurture controversy seemed dead and buried. The oddest
sign of this is the fact that the word "innate," having all but
disappeared from the ethological dictionary during the 1970s, is
making something of a comeback. Its problem is rather different
from that of the other expressions referred to above, for the very
word is ambiguous and unclear in meaning. Is it implied that the
behaviour is "genetically determined," or is it simply "present
in the newborn animal," as a more literal interpretation might
imply? Is it totally "unaffected by environmental influences" or
just "unlearnt" or, more precisely still, is it "developed without
copying from others"? Perhaps innate behavior is that which
"appears in its typical adapted form the first time an animal of
suitable age is faced with the correct situation" as Ewer (1971)
would have had us agree. The word innate simply has too many
possible meanings to be other than confusing, especially when
different authors use it, without definition, in different ways.
Amongst those studying song development I doubt if many of its
adherents wish to imply genetic determination. Most who use
the word probably mean that the song develops without copying
from others: for example, this certainly seems to be its meaning
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in Kroodsma's (1984) title. But it would have been better had he
said just that and avoided both the ambiguities and the possible
accusation of genetic determinism altogether.
Yet, even here, we must be cautious. Although it is im-
pressive that the flycatchers Kroodsma raised sang their own
species-specific songs despite hearing only that of another spe-
cies while in his care, the young birds were 7-10 days old when
taken from the nest. There is no evidence to date that songbirds
(oscines) can learn as nestlings, but these Tyrannid flycatchers
are suboscines and may well differ in this respect. The fact that
the young birds produced songs which were recognizably those
of their own species as early as 15 days of age certainly shows that
its development is exceptionally rapid: Experience of the spe-
cies-specific song in the first few days of life (or even earlier)
could well be crucial. It is thus a strong claim to call their song
innate, even if all this is meant to imply is that it is not copied
from others.
Whether, as Johnston argues, these problems over phrasing
reflect outdated thinking which has closed the eyes of those
studying song development to worthwhile questions I find it
hard to judge. As the target article makes clear, Marler himself
has done some very impressive and interesting studies in recent
years, and work is already in progress in his laboratory and
elsewhere along several of the lines that Johnston recommends.
In particular, the growing literature on social influences on song
learning and on the timing of sensitive phases (e.g., King &
West 1983; Petrinovich & Baptista 1987; Slater et al. 1988) has
an impeccably interactionist pedigree. By contrast, only a small
minority of the papers on song development currently being
published profess the aim of investigating the extent to which it
is under genetic or environmental control.
The nature/nurture debate: Same old wolf in
new sheep's clothing?
Horst D. Steklis
Department of Anthropology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.
08903
There are compelling reasons in addition to those addressed in
Johnston's target article for a renewed broadscale attack on the
nature/nurture problem (see especially Oyama 1985). Many
have declared that debate "dead," settling for a comfortable
"interactionism" that seems to threaten neither innatist nor
environmentalist, with neither camp emerging the winner or
the loser of the classic debate. As a result, we have a new
vocabulary to describe the interplay of innate and learned
components of behavior, one that appears to satisfy both biolo-
gist and social scientist. Examples of this new interactionist
language abound. Consider the following terms: "prepotent,"
"predisposition," and "potential." These are frequently used to
+describe behaviors whose expression is codetermined by signifi-
cant biological factors (implicitly genes) as well as early experi-
ence (such as postnatal learning in mammals). In their choice of
popular book titles, some wax more metaphorical but speak the
same interactionist language: The whisperings within (Barash,
1979); The tangled wing (Konner 1982). Although it allays deep
fears of "determinism" and "reductionism" (two "no's" in the
current behavioral science community), the new vocabulary
rarely elucidates mechanisms of behavior. The terminology and
metaphors are poor substitutes for specifying the genetic, hor-
monal, neural, and experiential factors that govern the develop-
ment and expression of behavior. More often than not, the
language betrays our ignorance of these factors.
I am unconvinced, however, that the less simplistic kind of
interactionism proposed by Johnston (cf. Lehrman 1970) is
sufficient to lay to rest the nature/nurture dichotomy. Even at
its very best, as in Johnston's analysis of birdsong development,
an interactionist position may validate the very dichotomy it
tries to avoid. According to Johnston, the interactionist position
considers "all behavior to arise in development from interac-
tions within and between the organism and its environment."
This sounds prima facie reasonable, but it quickly raises ques-
tions as to the identity of the interacting factors. Most (perhaps
all) of these factors (such as "the organism" at a point in time) are
merely endstates reached as a consequence of previous interac-
tions among endstates (e.g., the onset of endocrine functioning,
axonal sprouting), and so on. It is not clear what is gained from
interactionism, since all life processes can be reduced to a
(seemingly infinite) series of interactions of structure—function
units. To avoid this problem of infinite regress, we may select
particular endstates (or factors) for experiment and discussion,
for example, genes and the cellular-organismic environment or
the "organism and its environment." When we now proceed to
unravel the relative contribution of any such set of dichotomous
factors to some further structural-functional endstate, we may
(because of the dichotomy imposed by interactionism) commit
the same analytical errors inherent in the original na-
ture/nurture dichotomy.
In speaking of the contribution of genes to behavior, Johnston
suggests "modern developmental genetics . . . provides no
support for the alternative view that some elements of behavior
can be described as 'genetically determined,' that is, specified
by the genes alone." Strictly speaking, the idea that genes (or
any other part of the organism) cannot act alone is a mere truism.
When used in this narrow sense, "determinism" loses all mean-
ing. However, "determine" also means "cause" or "induce,"
and in this sense genes may well determine at least some aspects
or types of behavior. This is particularly the case where the
linkage between gene activity and neurobehavioral function is a
close one.
The egg laying behavior of the marine snail Aplysia (Scheller
et al. 1983) is a good example. This behavior pattern consists of
an elaborate but stereotypical set of coordinated muscular con-
tractions, glandular secretions, and other autonomic changes.
These are reducible to the neural and systemic effects of several
peptides transcribed from three genes. It is hard to see why in
this case the genes cannot be said to "cause" the behavioral
pattern. Such deterministic influences on behavior should not
be ruled out in principle in more complex organisms either. We
accept that possibility in cases of pathology, such as Hunting-
ton's disease. Why not also for the regulation of (at least aspects
of) normal behavior patterns, such as reproduction (e.g., Pfaff
1980), where genetic-hormonal-neural links are being estab-
lished? It is only strict adherence to an interactionist position
that, on the basis of principle, robs genes (or other factors) of
deterministic qualities.
A final example further illustrates the potential pitfalls of
interactionism. Johnston asserts that persistent differences in
behavior between groups of animals reared in identical environ-
ments "allows one to say only that the behavioral differences can
be attributed to genetic differences between the groups." This
conclusion seems no better than one reached from a deprivation
experiment by a good Lorenzian. I am sure Johnston will agree
that many factors other than genetic ones (e.g., prenatal nutri-
tion, hormones, sensory stimulation) can account for persistent
differences between animals reared in identical environments.
My point here is not so much to show where I disagree with
Johnston, for I agree with most of what he says, but rather to
advocate a more extreme position than does Johnston in favor of
identifying mechanisms of behavior. As I have tried to indicate,
there is a weak kind of interactionism that does no more than pay
lip service to the contribution of so-called innate and environ-
mental factors to behavior. A stronger type, one that addresses
mechanisms of behavior and its development, for all its merit,
seems nonetheless potentially hamstrung by its strict adherence
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to interactionist philosophy. My own sense is that the most gains
could be made in understanding the origins of behavior if we
simply focused on mechanisms (e.g., genetic, biochemical,
physiological, ecological) at appropriate levels of analysis (e.g.,
organismic, interorganismic). If in this scheme we read "in-
teractions" among factors to be "influences," then determinism,
as in embryonic induction, for example, is a type of influence.
Other types of influences on neurobehavioral development are
described by Gottlieb (1976). We should be able to forge ahead
unconcerned about the "sins" of "isms" (reductionism, deter-
minism) that are of great social and moral, but little scientific,
significance.
Interactionism is good, but not good enough
Esther Thelen
Department of Psychology, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. 47405
The Lehrman—Johnston program of empirical interactionism
goes a long way toward broadening the scope of inquiry into
developmental processes. Their position eschews the simple
learned—innate dichotomy and underscores the multideter-
mined and functional aspects of ontogeny. Johnston calls for a
developmental analysis "to determine which elements interact
in what ways to give rise to particular aspects of the phenotype."
We need to know the developmental story, as Johnston
suggests, species by species, function by function, and trait by
trait. But that is not enough. The essence of development is the
appearance of new morphological and behavioral forms from
precursors which do not contain those forms. We also need a
principled basis for epigenesis, for understanding across levels
and species what pushes the developmental process along to
create complexity where none existed before. Nothing in the
interactionist program alone points toward an integrated theory
or offers guidance about which elements and which processes
may have developmental significance.
Promising candidates for more general ontogenetic principles
entirely consistent with the interactionist program may be
derived from contemporary work in nonlinear dynamical sys-
tems theory, a branch of mathematics dealing with pattern
formation in complex systems. Questions about the origins of
order and complexity are being asked about a wide variety of
physical, chemical, and biological systems (see, for example,
Kelso et al. 1988; Yates 1986). Insights gained from other
physical and biological systems may be fruitfully extended to
developmental analysis.
Systems composed of many microscopic elements that exist in
thermodynamic nonequilibrium can exhibit self-organizing
properties. That is, these systems may generate patterns with
complex temporal and spatial organization without a prior plan
specifying those patterns. It is the cooperation of the elements
and the peculiar exchange of energy between the system and its
surrounds that determines the pattern. Such systems are highly
nonlinear; they remain stable within certain boundary condi-
tions, but when those conditions are exceeded, the system may
reorganize into a qualitatively different mode. Changes in only
one or a few of the elements can disrupt the stability of this
system. Small changes can thus reverberate and have system-
wide consequences (Haken 1977; Nicolis & Prigogine 1977;
Yates 1986)
When we characterize developing organisms as part of a more
general class of complex, self-organizing systems, we can pro-
vide a more principled basis for the interactionist program,
explain many persistent and puzzling features of behavioral
ontogeny, and indeed, generate a set of powerful predictions
not derivable from interactionism alone (Fogel & Thelen 1987;
Kugler et al. 1982; Thelen et al. 1987; Thelen, in press a; in
press b). The basic assumption is that, as in other systems that
openly exchange energy with their surrounds, behavior
emerges as a function of the cooperative interaction of all the
participating elements strictly within a task context. No pre-
scription or code for the particular configuration of behavioral
form exists in symbolic or iconic form beforehand, either in the
genes, in a cognitive code, or in the structure of the environ-
ment. Rather, the behavior is fluidly assembled as a function of
the maturational status of the animal, its task context, and
general environment constraints. Some behavioral configura-
tions are thermodynamically more stable than others and are
preferred outcomes in particular contexts, but they are not
predetermined. Under even slightly different conditions, the
components may reassemble into other preferred configura-
tions. Examples of such exquisite context-sensitivity during
development abound, and it is not uncommon to shift young
animals into seemingly more mature or more retarded perfor-
mance by experimentally manipulating the task context (Fogel
& Thelen 1987; Thelen 1986).
Interactionism itself is not enough because complex dynamic
systems are nonlinear. As performance is determined by the
coherent whole, a small scalar change in only one or a few critical
parameters may have systemwide consequences. No element
alone is causal, but the asynchronous and asymmetrical growth
of the components means that at different times in ontogeny,
different elements may act as these critical agents of change.
The elements contributing to new ontogenetic forms may be, as
Johnston points out, entirely nonobvious. Most important,
there is no logical distinction between the within-the-organism
agents for change, such as anatomical growth or neural differ-
entiation, and those outside the organism, such as social systems
or other expected environmental opportunities and constraints.
The innate—acquired dichotomy is meaningless. Behavior
emerges as more or less stable or fluid assemblies of compo-
nents, which themselves shift in dominance and influence as the
organism develops and as its ontogenetic niche changes as well.
Dynamical systems theory suggests that we exploit the in-
stabilities at transitions to uncover the processes which move
the systems forward. At transitions, systems exhibit more vari-
ability. We often characterize developing animals as playing
with or exploring new ensembles, some of which are lost and
some of which are retained. At such times, systems are also
more vulnerable to perturbations. By selectively removing or
facilitating environmental supports, we can isolate the compo-
nent agents of change. Because these agents of change are
themselves nonstationary, isolation or selective rearing over a
long developmental span is too nonspecific to tease out these
fluctuating and interactive processes. At each transition, the
underlying dynamics can -be different.
An interactionist, constructivist, and dynamical view of de-
velopment signals the demise of any single-cause or determin-
istic model, be it genetic, neurological, cognitive, or environ-
mental. However, the principles must be useful to explain
developmental phenomena at many levels from morphology to
cognition and across many time scales as well. The neuronal
group selection theory of Edelman (1987), for example, prom-
ises an integration of epigenetic mechanisms across levels con-
sistent with a truly dynamical perspective.
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Author's Response
Challenges to an interactionist approach to
the study of song development
Timothy D. Johnston
Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Greensboro,
Greensboro, N.C. 27412-5001
The commentators have raised a number of interesting
and provocative issues. The tone of many of them is rather
critical of my arguments, but overall there seems to be
some consensus that the issues I raised are important
ones — although there is less agreement on whether my
proposed resolutions are successful. The diversity of the
commentaries has made it a challenging task to compose
an integrated response. Several readings have suggested
the (perhaps somewhat artificial) classification of com-
mentaries in Table 1. I have tried to respond to all of the
commentaries as thoroughly as possible, but paid most
attention to the most critical ones. I am largely in agree-
ment with the points made by Hood, Jensen, Miller,
Oyama, and Thelen; their supportive remarks receive
less attention than they deserve.
As should have been clear from the target article (and as
several commentators also pointed out), the interactionist
position that forms the basis of my criticisms is not an
original one, but is part of a long tradition of which Kuo,
Table 1. Commentators grouped by topics
1. Innateness and templates: Defenders and detractors
Guttinger; King & West; Kroodsma; Kruijt & ten
Cate; Mundinger; Oyama; Pepperberg; Slater
2. The many different meanings of the word "innate"
Alcock; Burghardt; Gttinger; Hirsch; Jensen; Lemon;
Morton; Mundinger; Pepperberg; Schull; Slater
3. Learning is as obscure as instinct
Burghardt; Dehaene & Changeux; Hirsch; Hood;
Khayutin & Alexandrov ; Kruijt & ten Cate; Oyama;
Schull
4. What is the logical status of interactionism?
Alcock; Bekoff; Dehaene & Changeux; Gollin;
Khayutin & Alexandrov; Kruijt & ten Cate; Oyama
5. Developing an interactionist theory of development
Bekoff; Dehaene & Changeux; Gollin; Hirsch; Jensen ;
Khayutin & Alexandrov; Miller; Steklis; Thelen
6. Genetic contributions to development
Hirsch; Hood; Konopka ; Lemon; Mundinger; Searcy;
Steklis
7. The origin of traits and the origin of differences
Hirsch ; Schull; Steklis
4 8. The evolutionary interests of ethologists
Alcock; Gollin; Konopka; Kroodsma; Morton;
Mundinger; Searcy
9. Technical issues in the study of birdsong
Güttinger; Khayutin & Alexandrov; King & West;
Kruijt & ten Cate; Pepperberg
Schneirla, and Lehrman have been perhaps the most
prominent architects. Given the frequent repetition of
arguments against dichotomous thinking in develop-
ment, and the equal frequency of attempts to rebut them,
I was pleased that very few commentators took the
position that this is a stale issue, tiresomely familiar to
everyone, and not worth a rehearing. The issue may well
be familiar, but as several commentators (including
Khayutin & Alexandrov, Oyama, Slater, and Steklis)
pointed out, it is extraordinarily persistent. One reason
for its persistence, as Khayutin & Alexandrov note, is that
it offers an attractive simplification of an enormously
complex problem: that of explaining how the phenotype
develops. Simplification, of course, is no bad thing: As
Burghardt points out, one of the main tasks of theory in
science is to simplify, to draw our attention to important
aspects of the phenomena we want to explain and to let
the less important details recede into the background.
Simplification alone, however, is no guarantee of the-
oretical cogency; the trick is to simplify appropriately,
and the interactionist position is that the dichotomous
approach to development is the wrong kind of simplifi-
cation.
1. Innateness and templates: Defenders and detractors.
The target article argued, first, that there is a widespread
tendency in the song development literature to approach
development from a dichotomous perspective and, sec-
ond, that the dichotomous perspective is an inadequate
one. Clearly, not all research on song development has
adopted such a perspective, although I would dissent
from Slater's view that this approach characterizes only a
"small minority of the papers" in the field. Indeed, Slater
himself admits that the concept of innateness has risen to
greater prominence in recent years, indicating an in-
creased willingness to adopt the dichotomous view of
development that I criticized. Several commentators who
acknowledge that innateness and its cognates are widely
used to discuss the results of experimental studies on song
development argue that this really doesn't matter. Pep-
perberg and Kroodsma both argue that there is nothing
in the use of the word "innate" that precludes valuable
and productive research. I agree that the terminology
does not make it impossible to do good experiments;
obviously much of the research that has been carried out
under the auspices of the innate—learned dichotomy has
contributed a great deal to our understanding of how
birdsong develops. But I think all this misses the point.
We should surely attempt to use the best conceptual tools
available to guide our analysis of song development rather
than relying on an inadequate perspective simply be-
cause it doesn't absolutely preclude getting useful re-
sults. Dichotomous thinking has obviously produced a lot
of data about development; I do not think, as Mundinger
proposes, that the innate—acquired distinction is not
developmentally relevant. I argued that it is conceptually
inadequate and that interactionism is to be preferred on
theoretical grounds as a basis for developmental research.
The point of worrying about problems like this is not
simply to do good experiments (although that is one
important outcome of the debate), but to build good
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theories. If dichotomous thinking is bad theory then it
should be replaced by something better, not defended
because it doesn't preclude doing the right experiments.
Indeed, Khayutin & Alexandrov remark that it is partly
because of the tempting clarity of the experimental ap-
proach dictated by the dichotomous view that conceptual
progress in the study of development has been so slow.
Because the concept of a sensory template is so impor-
tant in research on song development, many of my
criticisms against the concept of innateness were directed
more specifically against the concept of innate templates.
This led Kruijt & ten Cate to wonder whether I mean to
reject the template concept altogether; together with
King & West, they suggest that this would be a mistake
because it has been and will remain a useful concept in
the field. I intended my criticisms of the template con-
cept to address only the idea that some determinant of
song (such as a template) can be said to be innate, or
genetically determined. To the extent that the template is
used to explain the development of singing during the
young bird's first season (through an auditory feedback
mechanism of the kind illustrated in Figure 1 of the target
article), I tend to agree with Kruijt & ten Cate that it is a
useful concept. For example, it provides a compelling
account of the effects of deafening at different times
during the acquisition of song (Konishi 1965a). Oyama
has less sympathy for the template than I do, and the
concept is certainly not without its problems. My primary
concern, however, was with the nondevelopmental con-
notations of an innate template, with the idea that tem-
plates can be said to be genetically determined; I fully
endorse Oyama's elaboration of the problems inherent in
such formulations. The concept of "latent templates,"
discussed by Guttinger, seems just as vulnerable to
Oyama's criticisms.
2. The many different meanings of the word "innate."
Several commentators pointed out that "innate" can be
used in a variety of ways, not all of them open to the
criticisms I raised. There is ample reason for believing
that the implication of genetic specification is very tightly
linked to the use of "innate" in the minds of many
(Johnston 1987), but in any case, pointing to the multiple
meanings of a term in scientific discussion is a strange
defense of its use. Jensen points out the necessity of
precise and operationalized terminology, and the com-
mentators themselves illustrate just how little precision is
accomplished by the use of "innate" in discussions of
development. The word is used by these commentators
to mean at least the following: developing in the absence
of exposure to a song model (Alcock, Lemon, Mun-
dinger); developmentally buffered or canalized (Alcock,
Morton); latent, but requiring specific triggering by the
environment (Guttinger); resulting from nonassociative
factors (Hirsch); different because of genetic differences
(Mundinger); and, grounded in precise neural program-
ming (Lemon).
As pointed out by Burghardt, Pepperberg, Schull, and
Slater, the use of "innate" to mean so many different
things underscores the need for a different and more
sophisticated terminology for talking about development
(see Arnold 1981; Bateson 1984). The confusion that
results from this multitude of meanings can be seen in
Lemon's commentary. He first uses "innate" to refer to
song that develops normally without exposure to a song
model; he then illustrates the use of this concept in other
fields by citing evidence on presumed innate differences
between man and other primates in regard to speech
acquisition. The imprecision engendered by such diverse
usage is a good argument for abandoning the term; it can
hardly be advanced as an argument in its defense.
Mundinger bases a critique of my argument on a
detailed analysis of two meanings of "innate" in eth-
ological writing (in the second paragraph of his commen-
tary). I found it very difficult to follow this analysis, partly
because Mundinger seems to use "genetically deter-
mined" to refer both to differences and to traits (see sect.
7, below).
Is all of this just a debate over semantics? Pepperberg
and Kroodsma seem to feel that it is (although Kroodsma
does acknowledge the importance of terminological rigor
in science). As mentioned above (sect. 1), several com-
mentators pointed out that those who discuss song devel-
opment in terms of learned and innate contributions have
nonetheless made important empirical discoveries. The
collective message of those commentators seems to be
that this is all simply a debate over words, an editorial
rather than a scientific issue. But the problem cannot be
dismissed so easily. What is really at stake in this discus-
sion are the ideas that provide the foundation for theories
of behavioral development, and the connection between
semantic and theoretical precision is very close; indeed, I
would suggest that we can hardly expect precise theories
if we do not demand precise terminology. It may be
argued that the conceptual distinctions I sought to draw
in my target article are not important, but if they are, then
so are the words we use to draw them. The fact that
Lemon and Guttinger both seem content to use the word
"innate" to refer to the genetic determination of certain
characters illustrates the persistence of that concept.
3. Learning is as obscure as instinct. As Lehrman (1953;
1970) pointed out in his criticisms of the concept of
instinct, the temptation to attribute some behavior to the
genes is strongly reinforced by a narrow interpretation of
what is meant by "learning." It does not seem to be true
that, as Burghardt suggests, interactionists seek to at-
tribute behavior entirely (or mostly) to learning, although
this remains as persistent a misinterpretation today as it
was when Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1961) first offered it in re-
sponse to Lehrman's criticism of ethological instinct theo-
ry (see Lehrman 1970; Johnston 1987). Although Kuo
(1929) did deny the utility of learning as an explanation for
development, later interactionists (such as Gottlieb 1976;
Lehrman 1953; Schneirla 1966) addressed their criticisms
to the narrow interpretation given to learning, and to the
view that learning and instinct are alternative (and ex-
haustive) sources of behavior. The reason interactionist
criticisms have tended to focus more on instinct (or
innateness) than on learning is that theories of learning do
offer an account, no matter how narrow, of how behavior
might develop, whereas theories of instinct avoid the
developmental question by proposing that behavior origi-
nates in the genes. One thrust of the interactionist argu-
ment has been that we must expand our concept of
learning to accommodate a broader range of mechanisms
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by which experience can influence the development of
behavior. Khayutin & Alexandrov, Kruijt & ten Cate,
and Dehaene & Changeux all emphasize the importance
of specifying such mechanisms; the last of these authors
even offer a specific suggestion which is discussed below.
I agree with Hirsch and with Schull that current
concepts of learning are hardly adequate to the require-
ments of a theory of behavioral development (see John-
ston 1981; 1982; 1985). Hirsch makes this point by sug-
gesting that the critics of dichotomous thinking have held
the mistaken belief that learning is a unitary, easily
defined concept. That hardly seems a fair characteriza-
tion, since interactionists from Kuo to Gottlieb have
argued that traditional concepts of learning are as inade-
quate for the analysis of development as are traditional
concepts of instinct. The term "learning" can be defined
quite narrowly (for example, as synonymous with condi-
tioning) or more broadly, to include all effects of experi-
ence on behavior. The disadvantage of the narrow defini-
tion has been pointed out above, although Hirsch seems
willing to accept both the definition and its disadvantage
when he uses "innate" to refer not just to unlearned
behavior but to any nonassociative factor in learning as
well. That seems to stake out a larger territory for innate
behavior than even Lorenz was willing to accept.
Providing a detailed account of learning that is com-
patible with the interactionist perspective would be im-
possible within the confines of this response (see Johnston
1981; 1982). Schull suggests a formulation that would
continue to distinguish between learned and innate be-
 as follows: "Learned patterns are copied [from the
 environment]. 'Innate' patterns, ultimately, are gener-
ated." This seems to be just a reformulation of Lorenz's
(1965) sources-of-information metaphor for distinguish-
, ing learned and innate behavior (see Johnston 1987). The
only difference is that Lorenz attributed innate behavior
to genetic information, whereas Schull attributes it to
unspecified "pattern-generating processes." I don't see
 the difference between such processes and Lorenz's pro-
cess of maturation, by which genetic information unfolds
to produce the innate components of the phenotype. The
copying mechanism in Schull's formulation is left unspec-
ified, just as the mechanisms for the transmission of
innate patterns of behavior are left unspecified in instinct
theory. Oyama's commentary cautions against the use of
 such unspecified mechanisms of transmission, and else-
∎ where (Oyama 1985) she has spelled out the problems of
transmission metaphors in some detail. Curiously, Schull
realizes the inadequacy of copying metaphors when they
attribute the source of information to the genes, but not
when the source is in the environment. As Hood empha-
sizes at the end of her commentary, information has been
given almost mystical powers in discussions of develop-
ment. Dispelling the mystery is just as important when
the information is presumed to originate in the environ-
ment as when it is presumed to originate in the genes.
Kruijt & ten Cate make a similar point when they urge
more careful consideration of the processes of develop-
ment as well as its outcomes.
Dehaene & Changeux recommend that more attention
be given to the process by which song learning occurs;
 they offer their selectionist model of learning as an exam-
, ple of how that process might occur. Selectionist accounts
of learning are not new (Campbell 1960; 1974; Skinner
1981) but recent proposals by Changeux and his col-
leagues and by Edelman (1987) are important additions to
this theoretical lineage. As Dehaene & Changeux point
out, Marler and Peters's (1982b) demonstration of attri-
tion of syllables in the development of song in the swamp
sparrow suggests that the late phase of song learning
(when song production begins) may be especially amena-
ble to a selectionist account. Khayutin & Alexandrov
describe some experiments showing that hearing song
has a powerful influence on nestlings' state of arousal,
suggesting that this effect may partly underlie the early
learning of song. Investigations of this kind will provide
the evidence that is needed to construct theories of how
song learning occurs.
4. What is the logical status of interactionism? The logical
status of interactionism, and its relation to the dichot-
omous view of development, seems to have been misun-
derstood by some commentators. Interactionism is a
theoretical framework (or paradigm, following Kuhn
1961) that legitimates certain kinds of experiments and
offers interpretations of their results. The dichotomous
view is a different framework, legitimating different ex-
periments and interpretations. The test of interactionism
lies in whether it generates productive experiments,
provides a compelling account of their results, and ulti-
mately leads to a clearer understanding of development
than its competitor. Neither view is an empirical hypoth-
esis, capable of being tested by an experiment.
Dehaene & Changeux complain that interactionism is
incapable of being refuted by experiment, thus giving it
the logical status of a hypothesis. Bekoff sees interac-
tionism as a theory, suggesting that while it may account
for some instances or types of development, an alter-
native theory might account for others. By proposing that
there might be an (unspecified) "middle ground" be-
tween dichotomous and interactionist theories of devel-
opment, he implies that each position is too extreme,
laying claim to more territory than is plausible. "Middle-
ground" solutions are appropriate when the disputants
occupy opposite ends of some continuum. For example,
when one school claims that human behavior is infinitely
malleable and another that it is rigidly constrained, one
might reasonably suggest that the truth lies somewhere in
between. But dichotomous and interactionist views of
development do not stand in that kind of relation to one
another. Rather, they offer competing and qualitatively
different accounts of the way in which behavioral devel-
opment should be understood.
Alcock suggests that there have been few productive
research applications of interactionism, and asks why. It
is true that the interactionist view has not been widely
assimilated into the study of behavior, as I argued in the
introduction to my target article, but I think it has proven
its value in many applications. The study of cowbird song
development by West and King (1985a; see especially
King & West 1987) is thoroughly interactionist, as is
much of the research on zebra finches cited by Slater in
his commentary. Outside the song-development liter-
ature, Gottlieb's (1981) and Miller's (1988) studies of
auditory development in ducklings, Emlen's (1972a) re-
search on navigation in indigo buntings, and Held and
Johnston: Birdsong Development
©1988 Cambridge University Press THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1988), 11:4 649
Hein's (1963) work on visuomotor development in kittens
all illuminate the interactionist nature of behavioral de-
velopment. Not all of these authors were (so far as I know)
specifically influenced by theorists such as Lehrman and
Schneirla, whose contributions I discussed, but all of
them demonstrate that an interactionist perspective can
generate productive research programs. Why, then, has
the interactionist approach not been more widely
adopted in the light of both its conceptual cogency and its
apparent productivity? Alcock asks whether this is simply
the result of a slavish adherence to dichotomous thinking;
his question is rhetorical, but in part I believe he is right.
The dichotomous view of development has very deep
historical roots, and as Gollin, Khayutin & Alexandrov,
Kruijt & ten Cate, and Oyama point out in their com-
mentaries, it manifests itself implicitly as well as explicitly
throughout the study of development (see also Johnston
1987). As already noted, it provides a compellingly
straightforward account of behavioral development, with
a deceptive simplicity that is lacking in the interactionist
alternative.
5. Developing an interactionist theory of development.
The interactionist approach to development is not itself a
theory, as suggested above, but it does provide a basis for
theory construction. Gottlieb's (1976; 1981; see Aslin
1981) theoretical writings offer one example of the kind of
theory that might be built along interactionist lines.
Gottlieb proposes three roles for experience in the devel-
opment of behavior: maintenance, in which experience is
necessary to preserve an already existing behavioral abil-
ity; facilitation, in which experience ensures the ap-
pearance of behavior at the normal time in development;
and induction, in which a behavior will not appear at all
without the experience. The selectionist model of song
development outlined by Dehaene & Changeux is an-
other example of an interactionist theory of development.
Their model implies that a fourth role of experience might
be added to Gottlieb's account: attrition, in which some
experience is necessary for the normal loss of a behavior
from an animal's repertoire (see also Marler & Peters
1982; King & West 1983; 1987).
Several commentators offered criticisms of interac-
tionism that will need to be taken into account as interac-
tionist theories are developed. (One general criticism,
that interactionism is too vague to be a useful theory of
development, has already been addressed, under sect. 4,
above.) Bekoff questions whether the view that develop-
ment results from an organism—environment, rather than
a gene—environment, interaction is correct. He links this
question to that of defining the unit of selection in
evolutionary theory, but I confess that I do not see the
relation between the two questions. [ See also Ghiselin:
"Categories, Life and Thinking" BBS 4(2) 1981.] I will
argue below (sect. 8) that evolutionary and developmen-
tal inquiries should be more closely linked than some
commentators implied, but the units-of-selection issue
does not seem to link them in the way Bekoff suggests.
The question whether genes can be said to interact with
the environment is nonetheless an important one. When
development is described as a "gene—environment" in-
teraction, it is usually the organism's (not the genes')
environment that is being referred to, and that is why the
formulation is usually rejected as inaccurate. Of course,
genes do interact with an environment, but that environ-
ment is the biochemical milieu within the cell, not the
environment outside the organism. Another reason for
rejecting the "gene—environment interaction" formula-
tion is that it invites confusion with the statistical use of
the term "interaction" in population genetics (see Section
IV of the target article). Despite these important cau-
tions, there is mounting evidence that events in the
organism's environment may influence genetic activity,
although this influence is always exerted through com-
plex intermediate pathways of physiological and bio-
chemical interactions. For example, Grouse et al. (1978)
have shown that environmental enrichment results in an
increase in genetic activity in rats' brains (but not in other
body tisses) and experiments reviewed by Moses and
Chua (1988) reveal that light influences plant growth in
part by controlling genetic activity. The conventional
proscription against speaking of gene—environment in-
teractions may need to be relaxed, but it is important to
remember that even in these cases, the link between
genes and environment is only relatively direct. The
biochemical and physiological intermediaries are part of
the phenotype, which provides the direct interface with
the external world.
Gollin suggests that interactionism, while criticizing
the dichotomy between learned and innate behavior,
introduces other dichotomies of its own that may be just
as problematic. The distinction between organism and
environment is one of these, and I agree with both Gollin
and Miller that it is necessary to formulate developmental
theories that respect the integrity of the organism—en-
vironment system (ecosystem). This is a point I should
have made more clearly in the target article (although I
have developed it extensively elsewhere: Johnston 1982;
1985; Johnston & Turvey 1980). The transactional ap-
proach described by Miller (see also Johnston & Turvey
1980) preserves that integrity and emphasizes the neces-
sity of an ecological approach to developmental analysis.
The emphasis in my article on nonobvious sources of
experience and on the development of functional at-
tributes of song both derive from an ecological perspec-
tive of that kind. As Miller points out, the transactional
approach is entirely compatible with more conventional
interactionist principles, and indeed is implicit in
Lehrman's original formulation (see quotation from
Lehrman [1953, p. 345] in Section V of the target article).
But all such approaches require, eventually, the identifi-
cation of elements whose influences on one another cause
the changes that we identify as development; identifying
those elements requires their experimental manipulation
to see whether they have the hypothesized effects. As
Hirsch and Khayutin & Alexandrov both point out, any
experimental approach requires that we isolate certain
factors for manipulation and measurement, implicitly
fractionating the organism—environment system in the
process. However, this does not seem to resurrect the
problems of the nature/nurture dichotomy, as Steklis
suggests, because identifying a contributory factor in the
developmental interaction is not the same as attributing
elements of behavior to separate causes (environmental
and genetic). Demonstrating that a particular pattern of
genetic activity contributes to the development of a
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behavior is not the same as claiming that the behavior is
genetically determined (see also sect. 6, below).
Hirsch and Miller both emphasize that development
involves change in the whole organism (and its environ-
ment), not in isolated behavioral traits; again, however,
we are constrained to focus on particular elements of
behavior in order to make the problem of analysis tracta-
ble. The challenge is to do this in a way that maintains the
integrity of the system (Johnston 1981; 1985). The ap-
plication of nonlinear dynamical systems theory (Kugler
et al. 1982; Schoner & Kelso 1988), described by Thelen,
is one promising approach. As Thelen points out, this
theory eliminates the linear causal approach to develop-
ment typified by the acquired/innate distinction, which
Jensen also identifies as one of its underlying problems.
6. Genetic contributions to development. Interactionists
are often accused of being uninterested in the role of
genes in behavioral development; some have even
claimed that interactionists deny any significant genetic
contribution at all (e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1961; see Burg-
hardt's commentary). It is true that we have generally
had less to say about genetic influences on development
than about environmental ones, but there is nothing in
the interactionist perspective that either minimizes the
genetic contribution to development or prevents a speci-
fication of how that contribution might be made. The
problem is, at least in the case of birdsong, that there are
few data available to support any account of the genetic
contribution to development. Konopka is right that the
study of behavioral development must draw on a variety
of fields, including some (like developmental molecular
genetics) that are very far removed from traditional areas
of ethological concern and expertise. Konopka apparently
read my remarks on that point as a suggestion that
ethologists should not trespass on the territory of other
disciplines, which is not at all what I meant. I was merely
pointing out that the conventional techniques of eth-
ological analysis (such as isolation rearing) will not illumi-
nate genetic contributions to development, which will
require tools borrowed from other disciplines. I think
Konopka and I are in closer agreement on this issue than
his commentary would suggest.
Steklis raises an interesting point concerning what we
mean when we speak of genes as "causing" a behavior. He
cites research on egg-laying in Aplysia that has shown
genetic regulation of the behavior through the production
of different peptides at appropriate stages of the egg-
laying cycle and suggests that it is entirely appropriate to
speak of this behavior as caused by the genes; Scheller
1 and Axel (1984) describe the behavior as "innate." These
experiments show that the activity of certain genes is
necessary for the appearance of egg-laying behavior (al-
though on a somewhat shorter time-scale than that typ-
ically involved in developmental studies; see Johnston &
Turvey 1980). Scheller and Axel call the products of these
genes "control elements"; they function as biochemical
switches, activating existing neuromuscular systems. But
 the genes do not cause the development of the systems
that they activate. Those systems are the result of prior
developmental processes that involved interactions
among numerous elements (including other genes) of the
organism and its environment. The sense of "cause" in
which genes may be said to cause the activation of egg-
laying behavior is quite different from the sense in which
genes are (erroneously) said to cause the development of
that behavior.
The artificial selection described by Hood is one way in
which small genetic modifications affecting behavior can
be produced without identifying single-gene mutations.
Experiments of this kind with songbirds would be very
valuable, but I think their interpretation in developmen-
tal terms is limited by our inability to specify precisely
what genetic modification has been produced. I take it
that this is the kind of work Hirsch refers to as "an eclectic
behavior-genetic analysis," and (if so) I certainly support
his call for further efforts along these lines. Of course,
songbirds are a lot harder to breed for studies in selection
than are either rats or Drosophila, but Lemon suggests
that small finches might be appropriate. Mundinger
argues that his research with canaries demonstrates that
information about genetic contributions to the develop-
ment of song can be made using standard ethological
methods (such as deprivation rearing), contrary to my
claims in the target article. His work shows that different
canary strains show differences in song, in song-learning,
and in the effects of isolation rearing. I don't see the
conceptual distinction between this study and those of
Marler and Sherman (1983; 1985). Mundinger has used
different strains of a single species rather than different
species, which means that the genetic differences in-
volved are likely to be smaller. Sufficiently small dif-
ferences would in fact approximate the effect of a single-
gene mutation. If the genetic differences between roller
and border canary strains can be precisely characterized,
then Mundinger's work could provide the basis for a more
tractable analysis of genetic contributions to song devel-
opment. As they stand, however, these experiments
show only that the development of song differs in genet-
ically different strains.
7. The origin of traits and the origin of differences. Section
IV of the target article distinguished the analysis of
behavioral differences between individuals from the anal-
ysis of the origin of the behavioral traits in which the
differences are measured. Both are important tasks in the
study of behavior, although it is the latter that is of direct
relevance to the understanding of development. Hirsch
points out that the analysis of behavioral differences is not
the only thing that behavior geneticists are interested in
these days, but it is certainly part of the subject matter of
the field and the source of many misinterpretations
(Oyama 1988b; Plomin 1988a).
Steklis questions whether attributing behavioral dif-
ferences between animals reared in identical environ-
ments to genetic differences is correct. He suggests that
these differences might arise from differences in prenatal
nutrition, hormones, or sensory stimulation. The first and
last of these factors are themselves environmental and so
do not seem to help in making Steklis's point. The
capacity to produce hormones develops as a result of
interactions between the animal and its environment; the
capacity itself is not genetic, but differences in hormonal
capacity (given identical environments) would seem to
be. It is true, however, that attributing behavioral dif-
ferences to genetic differences is an incomplete analysis
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of the situation - one would also want to know how the
different genetic makeups of the organisms in question
bring about the observed behavioral differences, and I
think that is the real point of Steklis's argument. I think
the same point underlies Schull's thought experiment in
which two species of birds (X and Y) are given exposure to
Y's normal song; Y learns the song and X learns nothing.
Since the environments are identical, we would attribute
the differences in song to genetic differences, but it
appears that in fact they are due to differences in learning
(i.e. , Y learns the song and X learns nothing). But then
again, the differences in learning are due to differences in
neurophysiological organization, which are due to dif-
ferences in the patterns of development in the nervous
system, which are due to differences in the molecular
recognition systems that form nerve circuits, . . . which
are due to differences in genes. The view that differences
in song between X and Y in Schull's thought experiment
are due to genetic differences is not so much incorrect as
it is incomplete.*
8. The evolutionary interests of ethologists. Not everyone
who studies behavior is interested primarily in its devel-
opment, nor should they be. Morton and Searcy point
out that the interests of many ethologists lie primarily in
the evolution of song, not in its development; they both
argue that the dichotomous approach is appropriate to
those interests. Setting aside (for a moment) the question
of whether a dichotomous view is indeed appropriate for
the evolutionary study of behavior, it is clear that many
ethological studies (including virtually all of those dis-
cussed in my article) do concern the development of song,
not its evolution. If my criticisms of those experiments is
well-founded from a developmental perspective (as these
commentators seem to agree) then they cannot be dis-
missed on the grounds that the experiments may yet
provide us with information about the evolution of song.
The conclusion that our understanding of development is
not being advanced as advertised still stands.
But is it in fact the case that evolutionary analysis is well
served by the acquired-innate distinction? I think a
strong argument can be made that dichotomous thinking
is as unhelpful in evolutionary theory as in developmental
theory. Part of the argument is that evolutionary theory
must account for change in phenotypes, and phenotypes
are brought into being by development. If, as interac-
tionism maintains, the acquired-innate dichotomy is
conceptually inadequate for understanding the develop-
ment of phenotypes, then it must surely transport those
inadequacies into any account of how phenotypes change
in the course of evolutionary time. (Of course, if it is
denied that evolutionary theory seeks to explain change
*Editorial Note
Without any vested interests in the dichotomist/interactionist dispute,
one finds this reasoning rather strained. "Semantics" may not be the
right word for it, but some sort of farfetched view of the chain of
causation seems to have been adopted here that simply deprives the
dichotomy at issue of any real content. One may as well declare oneself a
cosmologist rather than an interactionist! On this reasoning it would
seem that every question about the causes of behavior — even "Why did
the chicken cross the road?" — can have only one satisfactory answer:
because of the Big Bang and all of its complex ramifications. Ed. [T. D.
Johnston's reply to this editorial note appears at the end of this Author's
Response.
in phenotypes, being concerned only with change in
genotypes, this argument fails. However, when we speak
of the evolution of birdsong, we are clearly referring to
change in a phenotype.) As modern evolutionary biology
deals more and more directly with the relation between
evolutionary and developmental mechanisms (see Bate-
son 1984; Ho & Saunders 1979; Jamieson 1986; Johnston
1984; Rosen & Buth 1980), any problems with the con-
ceptual fit between evolutionary and developmental the-
ory become more and more acute. A developmentally
based evolutionary biology must examine the adequacy of
the developmental theory on which it builds (see John-
ston & Gottlieb 1982; in preparation).
The distinction between evolutionary and develop-
mental analysis is sometimes expressed as a distinction
between ultimate and proximate causes of behavior,
which has a venerable history in biology. Alcock chides
me for not making this distinction when I suggested that
the study of song development has focused extensively on
the form rather than the function of song. I certainly do
not believe that the study of form precludes the study of
function (or vice versa) as Alcock implies - indeed, one of
my arguments in the target article was precisely that both
kinds of study are necessary for understanding song
development. But my primary concern in this issue was
not the question "What function does this signal have?"
(an inquiry into its ultimate causation) but rather a related
(and more proximate) question "How does the song
acquire its functional characteristics (whatever those may
be) in the course of development?" The former question
must, of course, be answered before the latter can be
asked at all, and there is a large literature on the functions
of adult song in a number of species. These, I think, are
the studies to which Lemon refers in the last sentence of
his commentary, but this literature does not address the
issue of song development, except for the few papers I
cited in the target article.
Whereas Alcock objects that I did not make the struc-
ture-function distinction correctly, Gollin chides me for
making the distinction at all. He recommends a style of
analysis that captures the structural and functional as-
pects of a system in a single description, making it
unnecessary, and indeed impossible, to separate them.
Since the function of any structure can only be defined in
relation to some ecological context, Gollin's point rein-
forces his other argument (discussed under sect. 5, above)
against strict separation of animal and environment, an
argument with which I am in complete agreement. A
similar point surfaces in Morton's commentary, when he
points out that behavioral development may depend on
factors that are unrelated to the function of the behavior
in question. The idea of nonobvious contributions to
development (Gottlieb 1976) addresses that issue - the
lack of a relation between developmentally and func-
tionally relevant factors usually provides the motivation
for calling the developmental factors nonobvious. A for-
mal account of such relationships is provided by Som-
merhoff's (1950) concept of a coenetic variable, which is
discussed in detail elsewhere (Johnston 1982; Johnston &
Turvey 1980).
9. Technical issues in the study of birdsong. The tech-
nical problems of studying birdsong are formidable, as
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Pepperberg and King & West both point out. King &
West's commentary eloquently describes the difficulties
(both intrinsic and extrinsic) that they faced in their own,
highly interactionist research program on song develop-
ment in the cowbird. I do not intend to minimize those
difficulties by suggesting that the conceptual issues that
were the main concern of my article are both prior to and
partly independent of problems of technique. No experi-
ment, whether straightforward or demanding, is likely to
be conducted unless there is a theoretical justification for
supposing that it will give valuable results. The more
demanding the experiment, the more compelling the
theoretical justification must be; King & West point out
that experiments of the kind I propose would be very
demanding, so they will require a particularly compelling
theoretical justification. That is what my article sought to
provide; it was not, contrary to Pepperberg's evaluation,
simply a call for the use of different techniques to study
song development. But even if such techniques are im-
practicable at present, that is no reason to abandon
attempts to sort out the theory we use to motivate
technically feasible experiments and to explain their
results. We can design such experiments to test interac-
tionist hypotheses, and we can articulate theories of song
development that offer interactionist explanations rather
than dichotomous ones.
The inertia imposed by entrenched conceptual frame-
works, even where technical obstacles are not especially
great, is illustrated in another field of behavioral develop-
ment, namely the study of imprinting. Kruijt & ten Cate
point out that work on sexual imprinting has been largely
guided by dichotomous thinking until very recently.
Only with the abandonment of that perspective, they
argue, has further insight into the process of sexual
imprinting been possible. This suggests an answer to the
question that King & West raise, namely, why certain
questions (such as the role of social influences) went
unasked for so long in the study of filial imprinting (the
process whereby young precocial birds learn to recognize
the visual characteristics of their mother). The conceptual
framework in this field was based on work by Lorenz
(1935) and Hess (1959) that viewed imprinting as a pro-
cess whereby learned information (the mother's visual
features) was intercalated with an innate tendency to
approach a moving, calling object. That framework ig-
nored the context in which imprinting takes place, over-
looking possible contributions by the maternal call (John-
ston & Gottlieb 1981b) and the presence of siblings
(Johnston & Gottlieb 1985; Lickliter & Gottlieb 1985). No
radically new techniques were required to investigate
these contributions; the old framework simply failed to
recognize them as possibilities and offered an appealingly
simple, but largely incomplete, solution to the problem of
filial imprinting. As Khayutin & Alexandrov suggest, the
appealing simplicity of apparent solutions to the problem
of development that are offered by a dichotomous ap-
proach may be one reason why it has engaged the atten-
tion of the field for so long. [ See also Ewert: "Neuro-
ethology of Releasing Mechanisms" BBS 10(3) 1987.]
The interplay between technical and conceptual issues
in scientific research is complex. Students of song devel-
opment have already produced an impressive battery of
techniques that allow them to answer questions raised
within a particular conceptual framework. Sometimes the
available techniques may have partly determined the
direction of research in the field: Guttinger points out
that the use of the sound spectograph encouraged re-
searchers to focus on the microstructure of notes and
syllables in the song rather than on more global patterns
of song organization, although his own research suggests
that the latter may be more important in some species.
Pepperberg believes that it was the importation of psy-
chological techniques into the study of birdsong that
resulted in social factors being overlooked for so long,
although I find this connection less convincing. The study
of song development derives from ethology, not psychol-
ogy, and the influence of the classical deprivation experi-
ment seems quite clear.
10. Conclusion. It is clear that the dichotomy between
learned and innate behavior, so often pronounced dead
and buried, is in fact alive and well. That is shown not only
by the papers reviewed in the target article but also by
many of the commentaries. Those who, like myself,
believe that it is an obstacle to theoretical progress in the
study of development will need to articulate more com-
pelling arguments against its use and (most important)
must continue to construct alternatives that can eventu-
ally supersede it. Several commentators indicated ways
this might be done. No doubt the problem of how best to
explain the development of behavior will continue to be
debated and the study of birdsong will continue to pro-
vide fertile ground for those debates. The resolution of
this important problem is unlikely to come quickly or
easily; searching for it, however, will remain an exciting
challenge.
Response to Editorial Note
Rather than trying to discuss all of the philosophical issues
raised by the editor's comment, let me simply clarify the
point I was making in this passage. If we design an
experiment to manipulate one independent variable (ge-
netic constitution in the example discussed) and hold all
others constant, then any differences between the experi-
mental groups can be attributed to the change in the
independent variable. Of course, the differences that are
measured in the experiment may depend on the indepen-
dent variable through a number of intermediate vari-
ables; a complete understanding of the situation would
require that we specify all of those interconnections in
addition to the endpoints. For example, if I grow toma-
toes in soils with low and high nitrogen content, with all
other variables held constant, I may find that one group of
plants produces a higher yield than the other. If so, I can
attribute the difference in yield to the difference in
nitrogen. Of course, the plants will differ in a number of
other characteristics having to do with the role of nitrogen
in the physiology and development of tomatoes, which
elaborates but does not contradict my original conclusion.
However, if I want to explain the origin of tomatoes
(rather than the origin of differences between groups of
tomatoes), then I must include these physiological and
developmental factors in the explanation; it would be
incorrect, not merely incomplete, to say that tomatoes
are produced by nitrogen.
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